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ABSTRACT 
Apologies are a unique type of communication that organizations can use to 
rebuild their public image and their relationships with stakeholders after a crisis. 
Scholars in many disciplines have studied apologies, and apologies have been the most 
heavily studied crisis communication strategy. Despite the attention scholars have paid 
to this concept, no single, unifying definition of an apology exists. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to determine what constitutes an effective organizational apology from 
the perspective of an organization’s stakeholders.  
Three separate studies were conducted. Study 1 was an online experiment that 
used a 2x2x2x2 between-subjects factorial design. The purpose of this study was to test 
the effects of four apology components (expressions of remorse, acknowledgements of 
responsibility, promises of forbearance, and offers of reparations), as well as the effects 
of the organization-stakeholder relationship, on stakeholders’ reactions to a crisis. 
Participants were asked to identify an online retailer with whom they had done business 
in the past, and then to imagine that the online retailer had been hacked and their 
customer information had been stolen. Participants were presented with one of 16 
different apology messages, and completed a questionnaire to measure their perception 
of the apology, account acceptance, perceptions of the organization’s reputation, 
relationship quality (OPR), anger, empathy, attributions of responsibility, and 
behavioral intentions. 
 Study 2 and Study 3 were designed to find out what stakeholders considered to 
be the important components of an organizational apology without prompting from the 
researcher. Participants in both studies were asked to imagine the same data breach 
xvi 
crisis used in Study 1. Study 2 asked participants to write the kind of apology they 
would accept from the organization in the scenario. Study 3 asked participants to write a 
list of suggestion the organization could use to make an effective apology.   
 The results of Study 1 revealed that all four of the apology components 
contributed to stakeholders’ perception that the organization had apologized. These four 
components also produced higher scores for account acceptance, organizational 
reputation, and post-crisis relationship quality. The offer of reparations component 
produced lower levels of anger and higher levels of empathy. Both the promise of 
forbearance component and the offer of reparations component improved stakeholder’s 
behavioral intentions toward the organization. However, effect sizes were generally 
small.  
None of the apology components significantly affected attributions of 
responsibility. Also, feelings of empathy had a small negative effect on behavioral 
intentions. Overall the best predictor of account acceptance, organizational reputation, 
attribution of responsibility, post-crisis relationship quality, anger, and empathy was not 
the apology but the quality of the organization-stakeholder relationship before the crisis. 
The best predictor of behavioral intentions was the quality of the relationship after the 
crisis. 
 Nine apology components emerged from the qualitative data. A typology was 
developed to classify these components based on whether they were intended primarily 
to (1) fix problems or (2) rebuild relationships, and whether they were primarily based 
on (a) words or (b) behaviors.  
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The category of words that fix problems (1a) included acknowledging 
responsibility, offering explanations, and telling stakeholders what actions they could 
take to protect themselves in the crisis. The category of behaviors that fix problems (1b) 
was comprised of three types of corrective action: mitigating harm, offering reparations, 
and preventing future recurrences. The category of words that rebuild relationships (2a) 
contained expressions of genuine remorse, identification with stakeholders, and 
requesting another chance. The category of behaviors that rebuild relationships (2b) 
included providing compensation and fostering personal communication.  
 Overall, the three studies conducted for this dissertation demonstrated that 
stakeholders do recognize expressions of remorse, acknowledgements of responsibility, 
promises of forbearance, and offers of reparation as possible components of an effective 
organizational apology. However, stakeholders do not require all four components to be 
present for an apology to be effective, nor do they limit apology components to these 
four. In particular, behaviors such as taking corrective action and providing 
compensation appear to be important parts of effective organizational apologies. 
This dissertation concludes that an effective organizational apology, from the 
stakeholder perspective, is comprised of a combination of words and behaviors that fix 
problems and repair relationships. In some cases, behaviors can even take the place of 
words for communicating the apology. However, organization-stakeholder relationships 
have a much greater effect on stakeholder reactions to a crisis than the way 
organizational apologies are constructed.  
This dissertation contributes to public relations and crisis communication theory 
by offering a stakeholder perspective on organizational apologies that challenges the 
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way many scholars have operationalized organizational apologies. Important 
differences between interpersonal and organizational apologies are identified, as well. 
Finally, the results highlight the importance of building good relationships with 
stakeholders before a crisis in order to improve outcomes after a crisis.  
For practitioners, this dissertation provides insight into what stakeholders look 
for in organizational apologies so that organizations can formulate more effective 
apologies in crisis situations. The findings suggest that organizations may be able to 
offer effective apologies even when they cannot directly accept responsibility for a 
crisis. Ultimately, the best way for an organization to repair its image and rebuild its 
relationships after a crisis is to build a strong image and strong relationships before the 
crisis.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Crisis communication (An & Cheng, 2010; Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 
2010) and relationship management (Ledingham, 2006) are two of the most heavily 
researched subjects in public relations scholarship. Since the early 1990s, a growing 
number of studies have explored how organizations respond to crises and how these 
responses affect organizations’ relationships with their stakeholders. Several of these 
studies have considered the role of organizational apologies in crisis communication 
(e.g., Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Hargie, Stapleton, & 
Tourish, 2010; Hearit, 1994, 2006; Lee & Chung, 2012; Pace, Kediuk, & Botero, 2010). 
However, scholars have not been consistent in how they define and operationalize 
apologies (Coombs, Frandsen, Holladay, & Johansen, 2010; Fediuk, Pace, & Botero, 
2010), and research on how stakeholders perceive organizational apologies is limited 
(Pace et al., 2010). The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify what constitutes an 
effective organizational apology in the minds of an organization’s stakeholders. 
Understanding organizational apologies is vital because organizational misdeeds 
have serious consequences for both organizations and stakeholders. When an 
organizations does something wrong, it may incur liability (Tyler, 1997), lose customers 
(Souiden & Pons, 2009), lose market share or stock value (Massey & Larsen, 2006) or 
suffer damage to its reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Stakeholders may be 
affected in various ways depending upon their relationship to the organization. People 
can be injured or killed by dangerous products or practices, employees can lose their 
jobs, and investors can lose money (Siomkos, 1989). People may also experience strong 
negative emotions such as fear, anger, or worry when they feel victimized by an 
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organization (Choi & Lin, 2009a). When organizations cause this type of harm, they 
have a moral obligation to admit their wrongdoing (Benoit & Pang, 2008). Furthermore, 
apologies can produce psychological benefits for victims (Lazare, 2004) and, in many 
cases, can help organizations rebuild their public image (Benoit, 1995a, 1997b; Hearit, 
2006). 
Developing a better grasp of how apologies work is also important because 
apologies have become a staple of public discourse. Some writers have called the 
modern era an “Age of Apologizing” because of the number of high profile public 
apologies (Joyce, 1999, p. 159). Not only do businesses use apologies to manage 
stakeholder relationships (Bolkan & Daly, 2009; Hearit, 1994, 2006), but public figures 
such as athletes (Brazeal, 2008; Walsh & McAllister-Spooner, 2011), politicians 
(Eisinger, 2011) and media personalities (Bentley, 2012; Steiner, 2009) also seem to be 
apologizing more often for offensive words or actions. Even governments now use 
public apologies to address historic injustices (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Philpot 
& Hornsey, 2011). Some of these apologies are accepted and others are rejected. 
Scholars continue working to determine why.  
Even if apologies have become rather commonplace, there are several reasons 
organizations may be reluctant to apologize. In some crisis situations, such as a natural 
disaster or product tampering, organizations may not be responsible for the suffering of 
others (Benoit & Pang, 2008; Coombs, 2004). Situational crisis communication theory 
(Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2002) argues that apologies are only necessary 
in certain types of crises where stakeholders are likely to attribute responsibility to the 
organization. Furthermore, even if the organization is responsible, attorneys will often 
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counsel against apologizing because of increased liability costs (Heath, 2006; Tyler, 
1997). Finally, when it comes to the effectiveness of apologies as crisis responses, 
research findings are mixed (Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Lee & Chung, 2012; Pace et 
al., 2010; Schultz, Utz, & Goritz, 2011). Coombs (2012) has suggested that these 
inconsistent findings may come from a failure to distinguish between the way victims 
and non-victims react to organizational apologies. Additionally, Fediuk and his 
colleagues have observed that researchers do not always provide consistent definitions 
or operationalizations for communication strategies such as apologies (Fediuk, Pace, & 
Botero, 2010; Pace et al., 2010). This dissertation seeks to address those issues. 
What is an Apology? 
Research on apologies extends well beyond the discipline of public relations. 
Apologies have been studied from perspectives such as psychology (Darby & 
Schlenker, 1982; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997), sociology (Tavuchis, 1991), philosophy (N. Smith, 2005, 2008), 
psychiatry (Lazare, 2004), political science (Blatz et al., 2009; Eisinger, 2011) and 
marketing (Fisher, Garrett, Arnold, & Ferris, 1999). As Tavuchis (1991) explained, the 
term apology originally referred to a defense or justification of one’s actions. To this 
day, apologetics is a branch of Christian theology devoted to defending the faith. 
However, modern usage has shifted so that an apology is now a voluntary declaration 
“that one has no excuse, defense, justification, or explanation for an action (or 
inaction)” (Tavuchis, 1991, p. 17). According to Tavuchis, an apology must, at a 
minimum, acknowledge one’s misdeed and express regret for it.  
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Apologies have been described as speech acts (Tavuchis, 1991). That is, 
apologies are a way of using words to get things done (J. L. Austin, 1962). Other 
examples of speech acts include “making statements, asking questions, issuing 
commands, giving reports, greeting, and warning” (Searle, 1965, p. 221). The purpose 
of an apology as a speech act is to repair relationships by demonstrating that an offender 
recognizes a social rule was violated and does not wish to be seen as the kind of person 
who normally violates such rules (Goffman, 1971; Tavuchis, 1991). If the people 
offended by a misdeed accept the apology, the offender is allowed to rejoin society as a 
member in good standing.  
Although Tavuchis (1991) argued for two essential elements of the apology 
speech act (admitting what one has done and expressing remorse for it), other authors 
have suggested additional elements that need to be included in a complete apology (e.g., 
Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Lazare, 2004; Scher & Darley, 1997; N. Smith, 2005, 
2008). Two more key elements in an apology are a promise of forbearance (i.e., an 
assurance that the offensive act will not happen again) and an offer of reparations. 
There is evidence that each of these four components contributes to people’s 
satisfaction with an interpersonal apology (Scher & Darley, 1997). However, more 
research is needed to determine whether these components are also necessary in 
organizational apologies. 
There are several reasons why it is dangerous to assume that organizational 
apologies work like individual apologies. Many scholars have noted the differences 
between interpersonal and organizational communication. Sproule (1988) argued that 
the twentieth century was marked by a “shift from an individual to a managerial form of 
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rhetoric” (p. 469). Hallahan (2000) observed, “theorists confound reality when they 
suggest that communications involving a large unnatural organization operates in the 
same way as communication among natural persons” (p. 509). Thus, we cannot simply 
take for granted that individuals and organizational apologies are the same speech act, 
or that both are comprised of the same components. 
Some scholars believe that interpersonal apologies produce reconciliation by 
fostering empathy between offenders and victims (McCullough et al., 1997, 1998). 
Bisel and Messersmith (2012) suggested people might not feel the same empathy for an 
organization that they would feel for another individual. Furthermore, while 
organizations do have relationships with their stakeholders, or publics (Broom, Casey, 
& Ritchey, 1997; Hon & Grunig, 1999; Ledingham, 2006), these relationships are not 
the same as the relationships individuals have with one another. The concept of the 
organization-public relationship deserves a brief discussion at this point. 
Relationships between Organizations and Stakeholders 
 The organization-public relationship (OPR) is a central concept in public 
relations research (Ledingham, 2006). As early as 1984, Ferguson was suggesting that 
public relations research is fundamentally the study of relationships between 
organizations and key publics (i.e., relevant stakeholders). J. E. Grunig and Grunig 
(1992) argued that the most ethical and effective approach to public relations was a two-
way symmetrical approach based on mutual understanding rather than manipulation. 
This symmetrical approach was thought to provide the best foundation for building 
long-term stable relationships with stakeholders.  
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 Broom et al. (1997) noted that public relations writers were using the term 
relationship without clearly defining it. Broom and his colleagues reviewed literature on 
relationships from various fields and concluded that relationships generally have both 
objective and subjective dimensions. On the one hand, people have relationships with 
one another when their actions affect each other. On the other hand, relationships are 
social constructs that exist when people perceive or recognize their connections to one 
another.  
 Public relations theory has tended to emphasize the objective dimension of the 
OPR. Broom et al. (1997) wrote, “Relationships represent the exchange or transfer of 
information, energy or resources” and, “the attributes of linkages among the participants 
describe the relationships” (p. 94). Ledingham and Bruning (1998) defined the OPR as 
“the state which exists between an organization and its key publics in which the actions 
of either entity impact the economic, social, political and/or cultural well-being of the 
other entity” (p. 62). Neither of these definitions includes the perceptual or subjective 
dimension of relationships. 
 Although public relations scholars have tried to define the OPR objectively 
(Broom et al., 1997; J. E. Grunig & Huang, 2000; Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), they 
have generally measured the quality of the OPR subjectively. Ledingham and Bruning 
(1998) operationalized OPR quality in terms of five dimensions: trust, openness, 
involvement, investment, and commitment. Hon and Grunig’s (1999) widely used OPR 
scale has four primary dimensions: trust, control mutuality, commitment, and 
satisfaction. Trust is the belief that an organization can and will do what it says. Control 
mutuality is the level of satisfaction with how power is shared in the relationship. 
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Commitment is the intention to maintain the relationship. Satisfaction is the belief that 
the relationship is worth what it costs to maintain. The fact that all four of these 
dimensions are subjective highlights the difference between how scholars have 
conceptualized the OPR and how they have measured it.   
 Technically, Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR scale measures an outcome of the 
OPR—that is, perceived relationship quality. Nevertheless, this scale is so widely used 
in public relations research that is has become almost a proxy for the OPR, itself. One 
reason may be the instinctive recognition that the OPR involves subjective or perceptual 
elements. No matter how much organizations and stakeholders actually affect each 
other, both parties are likely to act based on their perceptions of the situation. For 
instance, Ledingham and Bruning (1998) found that customers were more loyal to a 
company that had invested in the community, but only when the customers knew about 
this community investment.  
 For the purposes of this dissertation, then, the OPR is not just the interaction 
between an organization and its stakeholders, but the perceptions of those interactions 
that affect the way both parties continue to act toward each other. A higher quality OPR 
is characterized by more positive feelings of trust, shared control, commitment, and 
satisfaction on the part of stakeholders.  
 Research indicates that perceptions of OPR quality affect the way organizations 
and stakeholders interact. For example, OPR quality has been linked to college 
students’ intention to recommend their school to others (Ki & Hon, 2007b) and to 
donors’ willingness to support non-profit organizations (O’Neil, 2007; Waters, 2008). 
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In terms of crisis communication, OPR quality affects how much blame 
stakeholders assign to an organization (K. A. Brown & White, 2011) and how 
stakeholders respond to crisis communication from an organization (Caldiero, 2006). K. 
A. Brown and White (2011) found that stakeholders who had good relationships with an 
organization blamed the organization less for a crisis, regardless of how the 
organization responded to the crisis. Caldiero (2006) demonstrated that when 
stakeholders had positive relational histories with an organization, those stakeholders 
were more willing to accept defensive responses from organizations (e.g., denials, 
excuses). Different types of crisis response can also influence stakeholders’ perception 
of the OPR (Huang, 2008). When organizations respond to crises in a timely and 
consistent manner they foster better relationships with stakeholders. Therefore, it is 
possible that the OPR affects evaluations of organizational apologies or is affected by 
organizational apologies. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to advance public relations theory by 
clarifying what constitutes an effective organizational apology in the minds of 
organizational stakeholders. Interpersonal apologies are comprised of (1) an expression 
of remorse, (2) an acknowledgment of responsibility, (3) a promise of forbearance, and 
(4) an offer of reparations (Bisel & Messersmith, 2012; Scher & Darley, 1997). 
According to Scher and Darley (1997), expressions of remorse demonstrate that 
offenders regret what happened. Acknowledgements of responsibility show that 
offenders understand that they are guilty of violating social norms. Promises of 
forbearance reassure victims that offenses will not be repeated. Finally, offers of 
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reparations mean that offenders will take steps to fix the damage their offenses have 
caused.  
Researchers have not tested the relative importance of these four components in 
organizational apologies. Bisel and Messersmith (2012) did show that organizational 
apologies with all four components are effective at producing forgiveness, and Pace et 
al. (2010) demonstrated that expressing remorse and taking responsibility both improve 
organizational reputation and reduce stakeholder anger. Nevertheless, research is 
needed to demonstrate whether or not each of these four components contributes to the 
effectiveness of an organizational apology. 
This dissertation also considers the role of OPR quality in shaping stakeholder 
perceptions of organizational apologies. When stakeholders have more positive 
perceptions of the OPR going into a crisis, they assign less blame to the organization 
(K. A. Brown & White, 2011). Since apologies involve accepting at least some 
responsibility for a situation, OPR quality could affect the way stakeholders perceive 
organizational apologies.  
This research makes an important contribution to public relations theory by 
clarifying what organizations need to say (or do not need to say) when they mean to 
offer an apology. For example, some scholars have suggested that offers of 
compensation can take the place of explicitly accepting responsibility in organizational 
apologies (Hearit, 2006). Organizational communication theory will also be extended 
by comparing and contrasting organizational apologies to interpersonal apologies. 
Perhaps stakeholders do not expect the same type of apology from an organization that 
they expect from another individual. Professional communicators will benefit from 
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knowing how to construct effective apologies on behalf of organizations. Finally, this 
research may help to increase the likelihood that crisis victims will receive more 
satisfying apologies.  
Several theoretical traditions inform this dissertation. First, rhetorical theories of 
apologia (Hearit, 1994, 2006; Ware & Linkugel, 1973) and image repair (Benoit, 1995a, 
1997b) suggest that apologies are an important communication strategy for rebuilding 
an organization’s public image after a crisis. Second, situational crisis communication 
theory (Coombs, 1995, 2006a, 2007b) and attribution theory (Heider, 1944; Kelley & 
Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1985, 1995, 2006) explain that apologies are necessary when 
people blame organizations for crises, and apologies can help to shift the way people 
assign that blame. Third, speech act theory (J. L. Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) argues that 
specific elements must be present for communication to perform certain functions—in 
this case, to apologize. Fourth, relationship management theory (Broom et al., 1997; J. 
E. Grunig & Huang, 2000; Ledingham, 2006) holds that the way stakeholders perceive 
their relationship with an organization will influence the way those stakeholders react to 
the organization during times of crisis. Therefore, stakeholders who have a good 
relationship with an organization may evaluate organizational apologies differently than 
stakeholders who have a poor relationship with an organization. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses the theoretical foundation for this project 
in greater detail, and reviews the relevant literature on apologies and crisis 
communication. Chapter 2 begins by discussing crisis management generally, and then 
focuses on crisis communication, specifically. Both rhetorical and social scientific 
approaches to crisis communication are considered. Next, literature on apologies is 
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reviewed, followed by literature on organization-public relationships. Finally, Chapter 2 
ends with a series of research questions and hypotheses to be tested experimentally.  
Chapter 3 describes the methodology for this dissertation. Three studies were 
used to test the necessary components of an organizational apology. Study 1 was an 
online experiment that presented participants with a hypothetical crisis situation (in this 
case, a data breach at an online retailer) and presented participants with one of 16 
possible apologies. This study used a 2x2x2x2 between-subjects factorial design to 
measure how much each of the four components in an ideal interpersonal apology 
(Scher & Darley, 1997) contributed to the effectiveness of an organizational apology.  
Study 2 presented participants with the same hypothetical crisis and asked 
subjects to write an apology they would consider effective if issued by the organization. 
Study 3 used the same scenario and asked participants to write a list of suggestions for 
making an organizational apology effective. The data from these studies were analyzed 
using a modified version of Glaser’s (1965) constant comparative method in order to 
identify components of an apology that went beyond the four components in Study 1.   
Chapter 4 reports the quantitative results of Study 1. Data from the online 
experiment were analyzed using four-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the 
effects of each apology component on a series of dependent variables, including 
participants’ perception that the organization had apologized, as well as participants’ 
intention to do business with the organization in the future. Simple regression analysis 
was used to test the effect of pre-crisis OPR quality on the dependent variables.  
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Chapter 5 reports the qualitative findings of Study 2 and Study 3. A number of 
themes and categories emerged from the data, including several apology components 
besides the four components tested in Study 1.  
Chapter 6 discusses the findings in the context of previous literature. Finally, 
Chapter 7 considers the implications of the findings for public relations theory, practice, 
and method. Chapter 7 also notes certain limitations of the dissertation and proposes 
directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of crisis has been a growing subfield within public relations research 
since the 1990s (An & Cheng, 2010). While business and management literature has 
tended to focus on crisis management (e.g., Pauchant, Mitroff, & Lagadec, 1991; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993), public relations scholars have placed 
more emphasis on crisis communication (Coombs, 2010b). In fact, Toth (2010) argued 
that crisis communication has become its own paradigm within public relations.  
From a social constructivist perspective, the distinction between crisis 
management and crisis communication is rather artificial. Organizations are built on 
communication (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1979), so many management functions 
are actually communication functions. Nevertheless, the business literature sometimes 
leaves the role of communication in crisis management more implicit than explicit. This 
dissertation emphasizes the importance of organizations communicating with their 
stakeholders in crisis situations. 
Apologies represent a unique way of using communication to respond to a crisis. 
This literature review positions apologies as a strategy for preserving and rebuilding an 
organization’s public image and its stakeholder relationships during a crisis. The first 
section of this chapter defines several key terms that are relevant to this dissertation. 
The second section offers a brief overview of crisis management. The third section 
provides a more detailed discussion of crisis communication. The fourth and fifth 
sections explore two public relations approaches to crisis communication: the rhetorical 
approach and the social scientific approach. The sixth section reviews relevant literature 
on apologies to show how apologies function to preserve or rebuild one’s image and 
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relationships. The seventh section explores the concept of organization-stakeholder (or 
organization-public) relationships and discusses how apologies fit into these 
relationships. The final section of this chapter poses a series of hypotheses and research 
questions to be tested empirically. 
Defining Key Terms in Crisis Communication 
This section defines several key concepts related to crisis communication. These 
concepts are organization, stakeholder, public, image, reputation, and crisis. The 
organization is defined first. 
Defining the Organization 
Organizations are social constructions. As Berger and Luckmann (1966) 
explained, everyday life includes phenomena that seem to exist independent of us, but 
also includes “an intersubjective world, a world [we] share with others” (p. 23). While 
we cannot reasonably doubt the existence of an objective, external reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966), we think and act based on our perceptions, or image, of that reality 
(Boulding, 1956). Human institutions are created when people perceive each other’s 
habits, form expectations about what other people will do, and adapt their own behavior 
accordingly. Berger and Luckmann (1966) described this process of institutionalizing 
human behavior as “reciprocal typification of habitualized actions” (p. 54). These 
shared perceptions create social realities that are often taken for granted as part of 
everyday life.  
Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) description of the instutionalization process 
points out the importance of communication. People’s perceptions of one another are 
shaped by words as well as behaviors. Organizations are a particular type of human 
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institution, created consciously and intentionally as a way of coordinating human action 
and achieving common goals (Keyton, 2011). 
Daft and Weick (1984) described organizations as interpretation systems. 
Human actions or situations often have more than one possible meaning. Therefore, 
when people organize themselves, they are specifying how they will interpret certain 
actions or situations. In Weick’s (1979) terms, organizations provide a means of 
“reducing equivocality” (p. 6). Kreps (2008) pointed out that this view of the 
organization makes communication and public relations especially important. If 
organizations are interpretation systems, then internal communication is the key to 
helping members of an organization develop shared interpretations of reality, and 
external communication is how members of an organization share their interpretations 
with nonmembers. 
 Although organizations are socially constructed realities, they still exist within 
the context of an external reality that includes other people who may have different 
interpretations of the world. Keyton (2011) defined an organization as “a dynamic 
system of organizational members, influenced by external stakeholders, who 
communicate within and across organizational structures in a purposeful and ordered 
way to achieve a superordinate goal” (p. 9). This definition is the one adopted for the 
present study.  
 For most organizations, “wealth creation is the key indicator of success” (K. S. 
Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003, p. 3). However, the growing field of positive 
organizational scholarship has sought to expand the definition of organizational 
effectiveness by exploring how organizations can promote human flourishing through 
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qualities like excellence, resilience, or virtuousness (K. S. Cameron, 2005). Park and 
Peterson (2003) argued that virtuous organizations are characterized, in part, by being 
honest and listening to their customers. A. D. Brown and Starkey (2000) called upon 
organizations to set aside their ego-defense and be willing to admit and learn from 
mistakes.  
According to K. S. Cameron (2003), the concept of virtue in organizations 
emphasizes “the betterment of human beings” over “the immediate concerns of self-
interest” (p. 63). At the same time, virtuousness can have a positive effect on 
organizational performance. Although this dissertation assumes that organizations are 
primarily goal-oriented, it also believes organizations have a moral duty to show 
concern for the well-being of their stakeholders.   
Defining Stakeholders and Publics 
 Stakeholders are those who have some sort of interest or stake in an 
organization. In 1984, Freeman defined a stakeholder as “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (2010, p. 25). This 
definition has continued to be widely accepted (Bryson, 2004), although some scholars 
have argued that stakeholders are only those people with the “power to respond to, 
negotiate with, and change the strategic future of the organization” (Eden & 
Ackermann, 1998, p. 117). Eden and Ackermann’s definition seems to fit with the 
concept of publics in public relations theory. 
 As J. E. Grunig and Repper (1992) explained, public relations scholars often use 
the terms stakeholder and public interchangeably. However, stakeholder is a broader 
term than public. People become stakeholders when they are “affected by decisions of 
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an organization or if their decisions affect the organization” (p. 125). However, people 
may not realize they are connected to an organization in this way. Only when 
stakeholders become “aware and active” are they considered publics (p. 125). J. E. 
Grunig’s (1978, 1989a) situational theory of publics holds that people form publics and 
become active when they identify problems or issues that affect their lives. The more an 
issue affects people, the more active people become in seeking information and trying 
to influence the organization’s position on that issue.  
Because the present study focuses on crisis communication, the concept of 
stakeholders is more pertinent than the concept of publics. Organizations need to 
communicate with anyone affected by a crisis, not just those who are aware and active. 
Effective communication, both through words and behaviors, will help to preserve the 
organization’s image and reputation. 
Defining Image and Reputation 
Boulding’s (1956) concept of the image has already been mentioned and is 
central to this dissertation. One’s image of reality is a “subjective knowledge structure” 
(p. 11) that determines how one behaves. Each person’s image of the world is unique 
because images are based on personal experience. People receive messages about facts 
or values via their senses and use these messages to construct their image. Over time, 
incoming messages can change people’s image, although images can also be quite 
stubborn. People may reject or ignore messages that conflict with their image of the 
world.  
In his work on image repair, Benoit (1995a, 1997b) offered essentially the same 
concept of image. The image of an organization or individual is “a subjective 
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impression…held by other people” (Benoit & Pang, 2008, p. 244). According to Benoit 
and Pang (2008), one’s perception of an organization is formed by what the 
organization says or does, as well as by what other people say or do in regard to the 
organization. Coombs (2007a) used the term reputation to refer to this concept. Coombs 
wrote that a reputation “is an evaluation stakeholders make about an organization” and 
reputations “are formed as stakeholders evaluate organizations based upon direct and 
indirect interactions” (2007a, p. 24). 
Business researchers have debated whether concepts such as corporate image, 
reputation, and identity are the same or different (e.g., Barnett, Jermier, & Lafferty, 
2006; Bromley, 2000). Certainly, Benoit (1995a, 1997b; Benoit & Pang, 2008) used 
these terms interchangeably. Benoit (1995a) also included Goffman’s (1955) concept of 
face as a synonym of image and reputation. For the purposes of the present study, 
Boulding (1956) and Benoit’s (1995a) definitions are sufficient. Terms such as image 
and reputation will refer to subjective perceptions held by an organization’s 
stakeholders.  
Defining Crisis 
 Crises can arise from situations outside an organization, or from dysfunctions 
within an organization (Kersten, 2005). Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2007) defined an 
organizational crisis as a “specific, unexpected, and nonroutine event or series of events 
that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an 
organization’s high-priority goals” (p. 7). Coombs (2007a) wrote, “A crisis is the 
perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of 
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate 
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negative outcomes” (pp. 2-3). If an organization is a socially constructed reality, a crisis 
is a situation that threatens that reality in at least three ways.  
 The first way a crisis threatens an organization is by making it harder for the 
organization to reduce equivocality. Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2007) noted that 
crises create high levels of uncertainty, and Coombs (2007a) observed that crises are 
unpredictable. If organizations are created to help members share meaning, uncertainty 
and unpredictability undermine the way organizations function.  
 The second way a crisis threatens an organization is by keeping it from 
achieving important goals. If organizations are created to achieve goals (Keyton, 2011), 
those organizations that cannot achieve their goals are unlikely to last. The more a crisis 
hinders an organization from achieving its goals, the more severe that crisis is. 
 The third way a crisis threatens an organization is by calling its social legitimacy 
into question. Social legitimacy is the public’s belief that an organization has a right to 
exist. According to Hearit (1995), organizations earn social legitimacy when they 
perform useful functions in society and when their values match society’s values. Crises 
often threaten the social legitimacy of an organization by making society question 
whether an organization can do its job, or by raising questions about the organization’s 
values. 
 Not all situations pose the same level of threat to an organization. According to 
Barton (1994), a crisis is a “scenario that could seriously damage the organization’s 
reputation, financial condition, market share, and brand value” (p. 63). Coombs (2002) 
described a crisis as a situation that threatens an organization’s reputational or 
operational survival. A situations that makes it hard for an organization to thrive, but 
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not to survive, should simply be labeled a problem. Coombs and Holladay (2002) listed 
13 types of crises ranging from rumors or natural disasters (situations over which an 
organization has little control) to misconduct by management or human error that 
causes damage or injury. Different types of crises pose different kinds of threats. For 
example, a natural disaster may not threaten the reputation of an organization, but may 
pose a grave threat to the organization’s operations.  
Most definitions of crisis (e.g., Coombs, 2007a; Heath & Millar, 2004; Ulmer, 
Sellnow, and Seeger (2007) also note that crises are perceptual. Crises exist whenever 
organizations or stakeholders think they exist. This perspective is consistent with 
Boulding’s (1956) view that people act based on their image of reality. For this reason, 
crisis management cannot simply deal with objective reality. Crisis management must 
also address people’s interpretation of reality. The next section explores the concept of 
crisis management in greater detail. 
Crisis Management 
Weick (1988) described crises as “low probability/high consequence events that 
threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization” (p. 305). Despite the fact that 
any particular crisis is a low probability event, crises in general are inevitable, given the 
complexity of modern life (Fink, 1986). For this reason, Fink encouraged organizations 
to plan for crises the way people plan for death and taxes.  
Based on a review of business and management literature, Pearson and Clair 
(1998) defined crisis management as working to sustain or resume operations, minimize 
losses to the organization or external stakeholders, and learn from the incident in order 
to improve future responses. According to Coombs (1999), crisis management is the 
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effort to “prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the 
organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage” (p. 4). Fearn-Banks (2001) 
explained that crisis management is a kind of strategic planning that “removes some of 
the risk and uncertainty and allows the organization to be in greater control of its 
destiny” (p. 480).  
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) identified five stages in crisis management. First, 
in the signal detection stage organizations must recognize the signs of potential crises. 
Second, in the preparation/prevention stage organizations try to find or anticipate 
problems and fix them before those problems grow into crises. Third, in the 
containment stage organizations seek to limit the damage caused by the crises that do 
occur. Fourth, in the recovery stage organizations work to return the situation to normal. 
Fifth, in the learning stage organizations reflect on crises and makes changes to improve 
their crisis response in the future. 
While the five stages of crisis management identified by Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992) have been used by a number of other scholars (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2001), these 
stages are not the only way to segment the crisis management process. Fink (1986) 
divided crises into the prodromal (warning) stage, acute (erupting) stage, chronic 
(cleanup) stage, and the crisis resolution (return to normal) stage. Coombs (1999) also 
identified four steps in the process: prevention (taking steps to avoid crises), preparation 
(identifying potential threats, developing a crisis management plan, training a crisis 
management team, etc.), performance (the execution of the crisis management plan by 
the crisis management team), and learning (evaluating performance to make 
improvements for the future). More recently, several authors have simply divided crisis 
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management into the pre-crisis, crisis event, and post-crisis stages (Coombs, 2007a, 
2010b; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Each of these three stages will be discussed in 
more detail. 
Pre-Crisis 
 During the pre-crisis stage, an organization works to manage issues, risk, and 
the organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2007a). Issue management is the process of 
identifying political, economic, or social issues that could affect the organization and 
then trying to influence the public debate about those issues (Hainsworth & Meng, 
1988). Organizations that do not manage issues may become the victims of changes 
directed by other interests (Jones & Chase, 1979). However, taking a proactive 
approach to current issues ensures that organizations are represented in the public 
discourse.  
Risk management involves assessing the organization’s personnel, products, and 
procedures to identify elements that could cause harm (Seeger et al., 2003). Risks could 
include technological malfunctions, human error, or failures to comply with laws or 
regulations. Once these risks are identified, precautions can be taken to reduce them.  
Finally, reputation management involves careful attention to the interactions 
stakeholders have with an organization (Coombs, 2007a). Direct interactions (e.g. 
making purchases) or indirect interactions (e.g. media reports) all influence 
stakeholders’ image of the organization and, therefore, the organization’s reputation. 
Fostering positive relationships with stakeholders before crises occur helps protect the 
organization’s reputation during a crisis.  
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 Managing issues, risk, and reputation requires environmental scanning 
(Coombs, 2007a; Seeger et al., 2003). Environmental scanning is the process of 
gathering information about the world outside an organization (Lauzen, 1995). Public 
relations professionals within an organization may read newspapers, trade journals, or 
websites to look for issues that could affect the organization (Coombs, 2007a). These 
professionals may also monitor media coverage of the organization, letters or e-mails 
from customers or other stakeholders, as well as social media sites and online forums 
where people are talking about the organization. This type of environmental scanning 
helps to reveal what kind of reputation the organization has with its stakeholders, along 
with any threats to the organizations that may exist in the external environment. Internal 
threats are addressed through risk assessment. 
Risk assessment is primarily an internal process, and may include audits, 
reviews of maintenance and safety records, or even ethical climate surveys to determine 
how likely the organization is to face a financial, legal, technical, or personnel crises 
(Coombs, 2007a). In many organizations, public relations professionals act as boundary 
spanners (Seeger et al., 2003). Boundary spanners are go-betweens who carry 
information from outside the organization to decision makers inside, or between 
different parts of the organization. A major cause of organizational crises is the failure 
to share information between organizational units (Taylor, 2010). 
 The purpose of collecting issue, risk, and reputation information is to analyze 
this information and determine which types of crises are most likely to occur. Kash and 
Darling (1998) referred to this process as strategic forecasting. A crisis management 
plan should be developed that provides guidance for management and employees during 
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likely crisis scenarios (Barton, 1994). Crisis management teams should be appointed 
and trained to respond quickly and professionally in crisis situations (Kash & Darling, 
1998; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). As part of this process, the organization should 
determine who will make decisions during the crisis and who will speak on behalf of 
the organization during a crisis event (Albrecht, 1996; Coombs, 2007a).  
Crisis Event 
 When crisis events occur, the first priority is to protect stakeholders (Coombs, 
2006) and limit the damage (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Evacuating people from 
dangerous areas or recalling defective products are two examples of containing crisis 
events. Containment is easier if the organization has successfully anticipated and 
prepared for the crisis (Fink, 1986). However, Boin and Lagadec (2000) warned that 
many modern crises are difficult to predict because crisis events are, by definition, 
“something out of the ordinary” (p. 186). Boin and Lagadec noted that crisis managers 
often have to “fix key goals, rearrange priorities, rethink relationships with 
stakeholders, clarify the communication strategy” and do so “in a very fuzzy 
environment” (p. 188).  
 Managing a crisis event requires the coordination of many diverse elements. 
Members of an organization may have to interact with the news media, as well as 
concerned stakeholders, government officials, and first responders (Albrecht, 1996). 
Once a crisis has been contained, managers need to restore normal operations as soon as 
possible (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). This process requires organizations to understand 
what their most essential functions are and what, at a minimum, is required to perform 
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those functions. Once organizations have restored their primary functions they can 
move on to restoring secondary and tertiary functions.  
Throughout the crisis event, organizations want to minimize damage to their 
image or reputation, but they must put the safety and well-being of their stakeholders 
first (Coombs, 2006a). Only after the damage from a crisis has been contained should 
organizations worry about reputation management. Additionally, as the situation returns 
to normal, organizations should consider what lessons they can learn from the crisis 
event that will facilitate better crisis management in the future. 
Post-Crisis 
 Reflecting upon and learning from crises is a vital part of crisis management, but 
one that is often neglected (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Boin and 
Lagadec (2000) called this phenomenon “the amnesia syndrome” (p. 188). Once a crisis 
is over, too many organizations forget about the crisis and never deal with the questions 
generated by the crisis event. A better approach is to collect records of the event and 
meet with members of the crisis management team to evaluate the organization’s 
performance (Coombs, 2007a). Although some people may worry that examining a past 
crisis will “only reopen old wounds,” research indicates that when organizations take 
the time to evaluate their crisis performance, they are better prepared for the next crisis 
(Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 54). In some cases, post-crisis learning may lead 
organizations to make changes in their structure or leadership (Seeger et al., 2003). 
However, the purpose of this process is not to assign blame, but to consider all of the 
pertinent information, whether positive or negative (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).  
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At every step along the way, crisis management involves communication. The 
next section focuses specifically on crisis communication. 
Crisis Communication 
Scholars have defined crisis communication is various ways. Gilpin and Murphy 
(2008) noted that some authors use the term crisis communication to describe different 
sets of communication tactics employed during crises. Indeed, much of the crisis 
communication literature focuses on this area (Coombs, 2010a).  
Sandman (2006) argued that crisis communication is a specialization of risk 
communication. Risk communication includes warning people who need to be more 
concerned about a serious hazard, and reassuring people who are overly worried about a 
small hazard. According to Sandman, crisis communication is necessary when “people 
are appropriately concerned about a serious hazard” and need information “to help them 
bear it and guide them through it” (2006, p. 257). In other words, Sandman considered 
crisis communication to be an activity that only takes place during the crisis event, 
itself. 
In contrast to these rather narrow definitions, Coombs (2010b) defined crisis 
communication as “the collection, processing, and dissemination of information 
required to address a crisis situation” (p. 20). Coombs (2010a) also observed that crisis 
communication involves managing information as well as managing meaning. 
Managing information refers to sharing facts (e.g., where shelters are located), while 
managing meaning refers to shaping the way people perceive the crisis (e.g., whose 
fault it is). Following Coombs’ approach, this section considers the role of 
27 
communication in information management and meaning management during all three 
crisis management stages. 
Communication Before a Crisis 
 Communication is an essential part of the pre-crisis stage of crisis management. 
In fact, Taylor (2010) argued that one reason “so many organizations experience a crisis 
is because there is a lack of communication…among the organizational units” (p. 700). 
When communication is used to manage information, it encompasses environmental 
scanning, boundary spanning (Seeger et al., 2003), issue management, risk assessment, 
and reputation management (Coombs, 2007a). Training people to respond to crises 
before those crises arise (Ashcroft, 1997) is another essential communication activity 
that involves information management. However, convincing members of an 
organization to take potential crises seriously is a meaning management function of 
communication (Coombs, 2010a).  
Although scholars like Sandman (2006) consider crisis communication to be a 
subset of risk communication, others like Seeger et al. (2003) see risk communication 
as part of the pre-crisis stage of crisis communication. To the extent that risk 
communication involves warning people about potential dangers and educating people 
about how to avoid those dangers (Palenchar & Heath, 2007), risk communication 
during the pre-crisis stage is clearly part of the crisis prevention process and constitutes 
information management. When risk communication involves persuading people to take 
precautionary action (Sandman, 2006), it becomes meaning management. 
 Kempner (1995) has suggested several communication-related tactics to use 
before a crisis arrives. These tactics include drafting preliminary press releases for 
28 
situations that are likely to occur, designating primary and backup spokespeople, 
preparing a list of reporters who would likely cover a crisis-related story, and keeping 
printed information about the organization up to date. By preparing communication 
materials ahead of time, organizations can respond to crises more quickly. The next 
subsection considers how communication is used during the crisis event. 
Communication During a Crisis 
 Once a crisis occurs, communication becomes vital in responding to that crisis 
(Heath, 2004). According to Seeger et al., (2003) the purpose of communication at the 
beginning of a crisis is to reduce uncertainty, coordinate response efforts, and 
disseminate information to affected stakeholders. Stakeholders need information to 
protect themselves during a crisis, and as Coombs explained, “The primary concern 
during a crisis is human lives and safety” (2006a, p. 184). This type of communication 
is mostly information management (Coombs, 2010a). 
Once the safety of all stakeholders has been addressed and the response has been 
coordinated, crisis communication often becomes more about meaning management 
than information management (Coombs, 2010a). A major goal of crisis communication 
is to protect an organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2007b; Kempner, 1995). This type 
of meaning management includes defending the organization, apologizing for mistakes 
or misdeeds, and offering explanations of what happened from the organization’s 
perspective (Seeger et al., 2003).  
Research on crisis communication during the crisis event stage has considered 
both the form and the content of crisis response (Coombs, 2006a). These two 
dimensions deserve brief discussions. 
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Crisis response form. Scholars generally agree that the form of a crisis 
response should be prompt, consistent, and open (Coombs, 2006a). These three 
concepts, along with other from-related issues are outlined below. 
Promptness. Because media technology allows journalists to file stories about a 
crisis almost instantly, the first hour after a crisis erupts is critical (Lukaszewski, 1997). 
Crises are characterized by uncertainty (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007) and a quick 
response can help reduce some of that uncertainty (Seeger et al., 2003). If organizations 
do not respond quickly to reporters’ inquiries, initial reports about a crisis may not 
contain the organizations perspective, or may misrepresent the facts of the situation 
(Albrecht, 1996). 
When an organization breaks the news about its own crises, instead of waiting 
for journalists uncover the story, this approach is called “stealing thunder” (Arpan & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005, p. 426). Stealing thunder enhances the organization’s 
credibility (Arpan & Pompper, 2003) and makes stakeholders perceive the crisis as less 
severe (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). Research also indicates that when public 
figures steal thunder, there are fewer news stories about the crisis and the crisis is 
framed more positively (Wigley, 2011). A study by Holtzhausen and Robert (2009) 
found that when an organization was proactive (i.e., initiated contact with the media) it 
received more positive coverage than when it was reactive (i.e., answering media 
inquiries). 
Consistency. Most scholars agree that crisis responses should be consistent to all 
stakeholder groups (Seeger, 2006; Stephens, Malone, & Bailey, 2005) and that 
organizations should “speak with one voice” (Lukaszewski, 1997, p. 8). Consistent 
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messages enhance the organization’s credibility (Coombs, 1999). However, Sandman 
(2006) dissented somewhat from this view. Sandman argued that if different experts 
have different opinions about a crisis situation, transparency requires that stakeholders 
be allowed to weight these different opinions. Transparency is part of making sure a 
crisis response is characterized by openness.  
Openness. Openness and honesty during a crisis situation may seem more 
compatible with Coombs’ (2010a) concept of information management than with his 
concept of meaning management. When organizations are trying to protect their 
reputations, they may be tempted to take a “no comment” approach (Albrecht, 1996, p. 
136). However, openness is more than just an ethical duty to stakeholders who are at 
risk during a crisis (Coombs, 2006a). Being cooperative and accommodating with the 
news media is usually a better strategic choice than ignoring them (Lukaszewski, 1997; 
Seeger, 2006). When journalists sense that an organization is difficult to work with or 
not transparent, journalists may report on the crisis without including the organization’s 
side of the story, or may become antagonistic (Kempner, 1995).  
Given the uncertainty inherent in crises, (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007), 
journalists will sometimes ask questions an organization cannot answer. In such 
situations, organizational spokespeople should promise to find the answer for the 
journalists as soon as possible, and then make sure to keep this promise (Kempner, 
1995). In their desire to be helpful, spokespeople must be careful not to provide 
information they think is true but that turns out to be inaccurate later (Albrecht, 1996). 
Any inaccurate information undermines the organization’s credibility. 
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Other form issues. Other issues related to the form of crisis response include the 
medium of communication and the use of particular spokespeople. For instance, Perry, 
Taylor, and Doerfel (2003) found that most organizations use their websites during 
crises to distribute news releases and fact sheets, and some organizations also take 
advantage of the Internet’s unique capabilities to post audio or video, or to interact with 
stakeholders online. According to Caldiero, Taylor, and Ungureanu (2009), news 
releases on organizational websites are often quoted in media reports about a crisis. 
Sweetser and Metzgar (2007) found that organizational blogs were effective at 
maintaining relationships with stakeholders during crisis. On the other hand, L. Austin, 
Liu and Jin (2012) found that people perceive traditional media to be more credible than 
social media for getting information about a crisis. Schmierbach and Oeldorf-Hirsh 
(2012) also found that information on Twitter was considered less credible than 
information on a newspaper’s website. Coombs and Holladay (2009) found that people 
who received a crisis response via print had a more positive evaluation of an 
organization’s reputation than those who received a crisis response via video.  
Overall, the research on channel selection offers less of a consensus than the 
research on promptness, consistency, and openness. While traditional media seem to 
have the most credibility, some studies have suggested that different media are more 
important to people in different age categories (Avery, 2010) and certain types of 
messages are more effective when delivered via a particular medium (Liu, Austin, & 
Jin, 2011). Thus, effective channel selection depends on factors such as the type of 
message to be conveyed and the type of stakeholder to be reached. 
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Organizations may be able to improve their crisis response by selecting the right 
spokesperson. In some cases, the CEO of an organization may deliver the crisis 
response. Turk, Jin, Stewart, Kim, and Hipple (2012) found that when the CEO is 
visible during a crisis, people tend to have more positive evaluations of the 
organization.  
Arpan (2002) found that audiences were more willing to accept messages from 
an organization when they perceived the organization’s spokesperson to be more 
credible. People who perceived the organization’s spokesperson to be ethnically and 
ideologically similar to themselves tended to perceive the spokesperson as more 
credible. However, when stakeholders are diverse it may be impossible to have a 
spokesperson who it similar to all of them. 
Coombs (2007a) recommended that spokespeople be able to appear pleasant on 
camera, answer questions effectively (including difficult questions), and be able to 
present information clearly. Although most scholars agree that crisis communication 
should be consistent, Coombs (2007a) explained that consistency does not necessarily 
mean that an organization can only have one spokesperson. In fact, there will often be 
situations when different members of an organization have different areas of expertise. 
In those situations, media inquiries can be directed to the person who is best qualified to 
answer the question. 
Having considered the recommended form of a crisis response, we must now 
focus on the content of a crisis response. 
Crisis response content. The content of a crisis response depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the crisis. Rhetorical theories such as corporate apologia 
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(Hearit, 1994) and image repair theory (Benoit, 1995a, 1997b) have outlined different 
types of responses that organizations can use to defend their reputations in a crisis. 
Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT; Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 
2002) holds that factors such as the type of crisis, crisis severity, and the past history of 
the organization all affect the way stakeholders perceive the situation. The content of a 
crisis response should take these stakeholder perceptions into account. Because the 
content of a crisis response is the most heavily studied area of crisis communication 
(Coombs, 2010a), as well as the primary focus of this dissertation, a more detailed 
discussion of crisis response content will be reserved for the next two sections of this 
chapter. In the meantime, the role of communication in the post-crisis stage of crisis 
management must be addressed. 
Communication After a Crisis 
 Once a crisis is under control, communication helps organizations manage 
information by facilitating organizational learning and performance evaluation 
(Coombs, 2007a, 2010a). The crisis management team should collect and analyze data 
related to the crisis in order to understand exactly what happened and why (Coombs, 
2007a). The team should evaluate the organization’s handling of the crisis to determine 
what changes need to be made before the next crisis. This process requires a willingness 
to learn, not a defensiveness attitude (A. D. Brown & Starkey, 2000; Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993). In some cases, the process of learning from a crisis may lead to changes in 
industry standards and practices, not just changes at the organization involved in the 
crisis (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007).  
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 During the post-crisis stage, communication also helps manage meaning. In 
some cases, grieving for and memorializing victims may be a necessary part of the 
healing process (Seeger et al., 2003). Meaning management also occurs in discourses of 
renewal (Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007). Renewal comes when the leadership of an 
organization can inspire stakeholders to look to the future and find opportunities in the 
aftermath of a crisis. Renewal involves the promise that an organization will rebuild 
itself to be even stronger than it was before the crisis.  
Post-crisis communication may also involve some of the same reputation 
management that occurs during the crisis response phase (Seeger et al., 2003). Holladay 
(2009) found that media reports rarely include statements related to reputation 
management at the beginning of a crisis, but are more likely to report these types of 
statements in later stories. The next two sections of this chapter offer a more detailed 
look at the communication strategies organizations use to manage their reputations 
during and following crises. First, the rhetorical perspective on crisis response will be 
considered, followed by a more social scientific perspective. 
Crisis Response from the Rhetorical Perspective 
Rhetoric is “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in 
beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Burke, 1969, p. 43). Heath (1993) argued 
that rhetoric is “the essence of public relations” because shared meanings define the 
“identities and prerogatives” of organizations and publics (p. 142). The rhetorical 
perspective draws on the work of ancient rhetoricians like Aristotle and Quintilian, as 
well as modern rhetorical scholars such as Kenneth Burke and Chaïm Perelman (Ihlen, 
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2010). Rhetorical discourse is seen as a way for different people and organizations to 
engage in constructive dialogue and debate in the public sphere (Heath, 2000).  
Rhetorical situations arise when there is some exigency that can be addressed 
through the use of rhetoric (Bitzer, 1968). Along with this exigency, each rhetorical 
situation also includes an audience and certain constraints that limit one’s rhetorical 
options. When the exigency is a crisis, organizations may use rhetoric to defend or 
repair their public image (Benoit, 1995a, 1997b), or to encourage their members to 
develop a positive vision for the future after a crisis (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002; Ulmer, 
Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007). Audiences may be customers, stockholders, journalists, 
government regulators, employees, or anyone else affected by the crisis. Constraints 
could arise because of uncertainty about the situation, liability concerns, or the history 
of the relationship between an organization and its stakeholders (Coombs, 2006a, 
Seeger et al., 2003).  
According to Ihlen (2010), “the best-developed line of rhetorical public relations 
research remains the studies of organizational self-defense and image restoration during 
or after crises” (p. 63). One rhetorical approach, discourse of renewal (Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Sellnow, 2007) has already been mentioned in connection with post-crisis 
communication. Three other rhetorical approaches—corporate apologia, corporate 
impression management, and image repair theory—are discussed next.  
Corporate Apologia 
The term apologia refers to speech in defense of oneself (Hearit, 2006). When 
individuals or organizations are accused of wrongdoing, they have certain rhetorical 
options at their disposal. In a seminal article defining the genre of apologia, Ware and 
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Linkugel (1973) identified four rhetorical strategies for defending oneself against 
accusations of wrongdoing: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence.  
Denial. Denial is an attempt to say that one is not responsible for an offense—
either because one did not commit the offense, or because one did not intend to commit 
the offense.  
Bolstering. Bolstering means making oneself look better by identifying with 
something the audience values, or pointing out one’s good qualities.  
Differentiation. Differentiation refers to parsing or carefully distinguishing 
between what one is accused of doing, and what actually happened. This strategy can be 
used to show that an offense was not as bad as it first appeared.  
Transcendence. Finally, transcendence occurs when one asks the audience to 
step back and look at the big picture. Perhaps the argument is that an offense was 
committed for some greater good. Perhaps there are other issues that are more 
important, so the offense should be overlooked. 
Although Ware and Linkugel (1973) developed their theory of apologia to apply 
to individuals (especially public figures), Dionisopolous and Vibbert (1988) suggested 
that apologia could be used in a corporate setting, as well. Ice (1991) used this theory to 
analyze Union Carbide’s rhetoric after its plant in Bhopal, India leaked toxic gas, killing 
more than 2000 people. Ice found that the company used all four apologia strategies at 
different points in its crisis response. Overall, Union Carbide’s rhetoric was aimed at 
reassuring employees, stockholders, and the U.S. government, but showed much less 
concern for the victims in India or the government of that country. 
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Hearit (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999) has been the leading scholar in applying 
apologia to corporate communication. As mentioned previously, one way for crises to 
threaten an organization is by raising questions about the organizations’ social 
legitimacy (Hearit, 1995). Apologia is a kind of public ritual that helps move an 
organization through a cycle of “charge, guilt, and restoration” in order to reestablish its 
social legitimacy (Hearit, 1999, p. 300).  
Hearit (1994, 1996, 1997) expanded on Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) typology of 
apologia strategies. Hearit (1994) observed that organizations often respond to crises by 
issuing carefully worded statements of regret. These statements “convey sorrow to 
diffuse public hostility” (1994, p. 117), but do not take responsibility for the crisis.  
Hearit (1994) also used the concept of dissociation—taken from Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)—to describe the way organizations try to distance themselves 
from wrongdoing. Dissociation involves making distinctions between opinion and 
knowledge, between an individual and the group, or between the act and its essence 
(Hearit, 1994). For example, when Chrysler was accused of tampering with odometers 
to sell used cars as if they were new cars, the company argued that critics did not 
understand all the facts (opinion/knowledge dissociation). When Toshiba was caught 
illegally selling technology to the Soviet Union, it blamed one of its subsidiaries 
(individual/group dissociation). After Volvo was found to have faked a commercial by 
adding structural support to its cars so a monster truck could drive over them, Volvo 
argued that the commercial was actually a dramatization of a real event that had 
happened before (act/essence dissociation). Hearit’s concept of dissociation is similar in 
some ways to Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) concept of differentiation.  
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More recently, Hearit and Brown (2004) explained that these three types of 
dissociation can represent three ways of dealing with guilt. The opinion/knowledge 
dissociation is related to denying guilt. This dissociation allows an organization to claim 
that its accusers do not have all the facts, and the organization is not really guilty of 
what it has been accused of doing. The individual/group dissociation is a kind of 
scapegoating, or transferring guilt to another party. The organization blames certain 
members for a misdeed, but claims the organization, as a whole, should not be held 
responsible. Finally, the act/essence dissociation is related to accepting guilt. In this 
case, an organization may admit that it committed a bad act, but use a strategy of self-
mortification and corrective action to prove its misdeeds do not represent the true nature 
(i.e., essence) of the organization. More will be said about mortification and corrective 
action later. 
Hearit (1996) found that sometimes organizations can launch counter-attacks 
against their accusers. A prime example is General Motor’s response to an NBC 
Dateline program that showed a GM pick-up truck exploding in a side-impact collision. 
GM accused NBC of misleading the American people by putting an incendiary device 
in the truck to ensure it would explode. GM sued NBC and ultimately received a public 
apology. 
Some of Hearit’s work does overlap with Ware and Linkugel (1973). For 
instance, Hearit (1997) examined the use of transcendence in corporate apologia. When 
Johnson Controls was sued in 1990 for discrimination against women, the company 
argued that it had a good reason for not allowing women to work in certain parts of its 
factory. Specifically, certain areas contained high levels of lead that would be harmful 
39 
to fetuses. By arguing that its policy was intended to protect women and children, 
Johnson Controls tried to change the way the public perceived its policy. Ultimately, 
Johnson Controls lost in court, and Hearit (1997) suggested that transcendence 
strategies only work when those strategies do not also serve the organization’s own 
financial interest.  
As rhetorical genres, apologia and corporate apologia include various strategies 
for defending oneself or one’s organization against charges of wrongdoing. Apologists 
do not necessarily use just one type of apologia per crisis. For instance, Kramer and 
Olson (2002) observed that President Bill Clinton employed a constantly evolving 
apologia strategy as more and more accusations were made about his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky. Hearit and Brown (2004) also found that when Merrill Lynch was 
accused of misleading investors in 2002, the company initially tried to deny the charges, 
then tried to scapegoat certain employees, and only admitted it has made serious 
mistakes after its other rhetorical strategies failed.  
While Hearit’s (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999) work has primarily focused on 
helping organizations regain social legitimacy, Rowland and Jerome (2004) argued that 
organizations also use apologia to maintain their public image once a crisis has past. 
Image maintenance involves “showing that the organization is generally caring, decent, 
and so forth, apart from the specifics of the situation necessitating the apologia” (p. 
195). For instance, even when an organization is not to blame for a crisis, the 
organization may appear to be a better corporate citizen if it takes responsibility for the 
situation. Image maintenance apologia can be combined with image restoration 
apologia in most crisis situations. 
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Rowland and Jerome (2004) suggested four categories for image maintenance 
apologia. First, organizations can demonstrate concern for victims. Showing concern is 
important even if the organization is not responsible for the crisis. Second, 
organizations can bolster the organization’s values. Although Ware and Linkugel 
(1973) identified bolstering as a basic apologia strategy, Rowland and Jerome (2004) 
argued that bolstering “will not get an organization of out of the wrongdoing” (p. 201) 
but will help the organization maintain its image once the crisis has been resolved.  
A third type of image maintenance apologia is the denial of intent to do harm 
(Rowland & Jerome, 2004). Whether an organization responds to a crisis by accepting 
or rejecting responsibility, it can almost always argue that the harm was unintentional. 
Finally, a fourth type of image maintenance apologia involves reassuring stakeholders 
that the organization is working to prevent the problem from reoccurring—even if the 
organization did not cause the problem in the first place. 
Along with corporate apologia, there are other rhetorical approaches to crisis 
response. The next approach to be considered is Allen and Caillouet’s (1994) theory of 
impression management. 
Corporate Impression Management 
 Like Hearit’s (1995) theory of corporate apologia, Allen and Caillouet’s (1994) 
theory of corporate impression management emphasizes the importance of an 
organization’s social legitimacy. Crises can raise doubts in the minds of stakeholders 
about whether “an organization is good or has a right to continue operating” (Allen & 
Caillouet, 1994, p. 45). Seven types of response can be used to manage stakeholder’s 
impression of the organization. These responses are described below: 
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 Excuse. Excuses include denials of intention, volition, and agency. A denial of 
intention obviously means that the organization did not mean for a crisis to happen. A 
denial of volition means that the organization had no control over what happened. A 
denial of agency means that some other action was the cause of the crisis. 
 Justification. Justification involves the acceptance of some responsibility for a 
crisis, combined with an effort to make the organization’s behavior seem less offensive. 
Justification tactics include denying that anyone was seriously injured, suggesting that a 
victim deserved the injury, arguing that others have done worse things, or maintaining 
that the crisis is not as bad as others claim it is. 
 Ingratiation. Ingratiation means trying to increase stakeholders’ approval of the 
organization. Ingratiation is similar to Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) concept of 
bolstering. It includes reminding stakeholders of the organization’s good qualities and 
trying to identify with or flatter stakeholders. For instance, if an organization talks about 
how much it cares for the environment or how much it values its customers, it is 
engaging in ingratiation.   
 Intimidation. Intimidation is the threat or implication than an organization will 
use its power and resources against its critics. One example of intimidation is 
threatening to sue an accuser.  
Apology. When an organization apologizes for a crisis, it accepts full 
responsibility and accepts punishment.  
Denouncement. Denouncement involves blaming some external entity for the 
crisis. Often organizations denounce activist groups for the media for inventing the 
crisis or at least blowing the crisis out of proportion. 
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Factual distortion. Allen and Caillouet’s (1994) final impression management 
strategy is to argue that the facts of a crisis are being misrepresented or taken out of 
context.  
Allen and Caillouet (1994) conducted a content analysis of 799 statements made 
by a recycling facility accused of environmentally unfriendly practices. The authors 
found that ingratiation was the most commonly used strategy, and that different 
strategies were directed at different stakeholder groups. For instance, the recycling 
facility used ingratiating the most when communicating with the government or 
regulators, but used a denouncement more often when addressing competitors, 
suppliers, or special interest groups.  
In a follow up study involving the same recycling facility, Caillouet and Allen 
(1996) found different impression management strategies were more prevalent in 
certain types of communication. Although ingratiation was the most common strategy 
across all communication, denouncements were more likely to appear in press releases, 
newspaper stories, and internal correspondence. Company brochures used ingratiation 
almost exclusively. Interestingly, there was a significant difference between the 
company’s official statements and employees’ personal statements in interviews with 
the researchers. While the company relied mostly on ingratiation, the employees tended 
to offer justifications. Caillouet and Allen (1996) suggested that when an organization is 
accused of wrongdoing, employees may feel the need to defend the organization as a 
way of defending themselves.  
Corporate impression management has not been used as widely in public 
relations scholarship as corporate apologia. However, as Coombs (2006a) noted, 
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impression management theory has “expanded the list of crisis response options and 
reinforced the notion that different crisis responses can be targeted to different 
stakeholders” (p. 179). The third major rhetorical approach to crisis communication is 
Benoit’s (1995a, 1997b) image repair theory. 
Image Repair Theory 
Benoit’s (1995a, 1997b) image repair theory (IRT) draws upon the genre of 
apologia, as well as theories from other scholars such as Kenneth Burke and Erving 
Goffman. Although Benoit (1995a) originally called his approach image restoration 
theory, he later wrote that he preferred the term image repair theory because completely 
restoring one’s image to its pre-crisis state is not always possible (Benoit, 2000). IRT 
posits that people naturally value their public image, and use communication to defend 
or rebuild that image when it is threatened. When an individual or organization is 
accused of an offensive act, there are five basic ways to respond: denial, evasion of 
responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (Benoit, 
1995a, 1997b). Each of these concepts is described below. 
Denial. Benoit’s (1995a, 1997b) notion of denial is slightly narrower than Ware 
and Linkugel’s (1973). For Benoit, denial is a claim that the individual or organization 
did not perform an offensive act, or that someone else actually performed the act (i.e. 
scapegoating). Unlike Ware and Linkugel (1973), Benoit does not include denials of 
responsibility (e.g., claiming an offense was accidental) in this category.  
Evasion of responsibility. When individuals or organizations cannot deny an 
offensive act, they may try to evade responsibility for the act. Responsibility can be 
evaded by claiming the act was an accident, was provoked by another actor, or was 
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based on good intentions. Another type of responsibility evasion is the strategy of 
defeasibility. Defeasibility arguments are based on the idea that the actor lacked the 
information or ability necessary to avoid an offensive act.  
Reducing offensiveness. If individuals or organizations must take responsibility 
for an offensive act, they can seek to reduce the offensiveness of the act in several ways. 
Three of these tactics—bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence—are taken 
directly from Ware and Linkugel (1973). Other options include minimizing the offense 
(i.e., arguing that the offense is not as serious as an accuser claims), attacking the 
accuser, or offering compensation to victims of the offensive act.  
Corrective action. Corrective action is often a more costly image repair 
strategy. Corrective action involves “restoring the state of affairs existing before the 
offensive action” (Benoit & Pang, 2008, p. 251), or taking steps to prevent the offense 
from reoccurring in the future. For organizations, corrective action might include 
replacing defective products, retraining employees, installing new equipment, or 
developing new oversight procedures.  
Mortification. The term mortification comes from the work of Kenneth Burke 
(1961) and refers to a symbolic death used to purge oneself of guilt (Benoit, 1995a). 
Mortification requires individuals or organizations to throw themselves upon the mercy 
of their stakeholders by apologizing and seeking forgiveness. 
Benoit (1995a) conducted several case studies to illustrate the way organizations 
have used various image repair strategies. One example is the rhetoric used by Exxon 
after the Valdez oil spill in 1989. Exxon used a blame shifting strategy (a type of denial) 
when it tried to scapegoat the captain of the Valdez. Exxon also tried to reduce the 
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offensiveness of the crisis by minimizing the environmental damage and bolstering its 
own cleanup efforts. Finally, Exxon tried to publicize the corrective action it was 
taking. Benoit (1995a) criticized the organization’s response because many of Exxon’s 
claims did not match its actions. As Benoit observed, “image restoration attempts are 
unlikely to succeed when the evidence available to the audience contradicts those 
claims” (1995a, p. 130). Benoit also noted that Exxon might have been able to evade 
responsibility with a defeasibility argument (e.g., claiming it did not have enough 
information at the beginning of the crisis). However, the company did not use this 
strategy. 
Benoit and his colleagues have conducted many other studies on image repair. 
Not all of this research focuses on organizations. Some of these studies examine the 
image repair strategies of political figures (Benoit, 2006; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; 
Benoit & Henson, 2009; Benoit & McHale, 1999; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004), foreign 
governments (Peijuan, Ting, & Pang, 2009; Zhang & Benoit, 2004), celebrities (Benoit 
1997a, Brazeal, 2008), or religious leaders (Legg, 2009). However, a number of IRT 
studies do analyze the rhetoric of organizations in crisis (Benoit, 1995b; Benoit & 
Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson 
& Benoit, 1996, 1999). 
All of the studies listed in the preceding paragraph found multiple image repair 
strategies in the rhetoric of individuals and organizations. Interestingly, the one strategy 
that appeared in every single study was bolstering. This finding may be explained by 
the fact that certain strategies can be combined effectively and other strategies cannot. 
For instance, Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) noted that denial and corrective action “do 
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not work effectively in tandem unless they respond to different accusations” (p. 50). 
Organizations cannot claim there is no problem and then offer to fix the problem. By 
contrast, organization can deny or admit a problem, and still try to bolster their image 
by pointing out good things they have done or identifying with the values of their 
stakeholders. Coombs (2007a) has argued that bolstering is supplemental to other crisis 
response strategies. 
Aside from bolstering, the image repair strategies used by individuals and 
organizations appear to vary depending on the situation. Like the apologia literature 
(Hearit & Brown, 2004; Kramer & Olson, 2002), IRT research suggests that people 
often start by denying accusations, and then adjust their strategy as the ongoing crisis 
forces them to do so. For example, when the Food and Drug Administration claimed 
that breast implants made by Dow Corning were rupturing and causing breast cancer, 
the company initially responded with a categorical denial (Brinson & Benoit, 1996). 
However, over time Dow Corning admitted there might be side effects with some breast 
implants, and finally acknowledged that it had made errors and agreed to pay out a large 
legal settlement. 
A number of IRT studies have concluded that when individuals or organizations 
are responsible for a crisis, the best way for them to repair their image is through 
mortification and corrective action (Benoit, 1997a; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brazeal, 
2008; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004). Mortification (i.e., 
apologizing) is certainly easier when there is no liability involved (Benoit, 1997a). 
However, organizations must realize that their reputations have real value. Apologizing 
and taking corrective action may be expensive, but it may be even more expensive for 
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an organization to compromise its social legitimacy. Furthermore, trying to deny 
responsibility for one’s actions is risky because when the truth comes out, the offender 
will have compounded the offense by lying (Benoit & Brinson, 1994).  
Limitations of the Rhetorical Perspective 
Together, corporate apologia and image repair represent a major body of 
literature in public relations (Ihlen, 2010). However, the rhetorical approach taken in 
these studies has certain drawbacks. Generally, this line of research relies on case 
studies, which can illustrate theory but cannot test it (Coombs, 2010a). Benoit (1997a) 
acknowledged this limitation: “It is difficult to assign causality unambiguously to 
discourse, or to particular strategies in discourse; so many factors influence the 
audience's attitudes that it is hard to disentagle [sic] particular influences” (p. 263). 
Coombs and Schmidt (2000) argued that public relations is a social science, and 
therefore must be able to test causal relationships between variables. Recently, crisis 
communication research within the field of public relations has moved toward more 
quantitative methods such as surveys, content analyses, and especially experiments to 
test theories developed by rhetorical scholars (Coombs, 2010b).  
Another critique of the rhetorical approach to crisis communication is that it 
focuses almost exclusively on the organization’s perspective. Kent (2010) argued that 
crisis communication research ought to pay more attention to how crises affect 
stakeholders. Coombs (2010c) concurred, and noted that experiments are one of the best 
ways to understand how stakeholders perceive crisis situations and organizational 
responses. The next section considers this body of literature. 
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Crisis Response from the Social Scientific Perspective 
Studying crisis communication from a social scientific perspective helps 
scholars move beyond simply describing what organizations have said or done in crises, 
to prescribing strategies that are likely to work in particular situations (Dardis & Haigh, 
2009). Coombs (2010c) referred to this type of research as “evidence-based” instead of 
“speculative“ (p. 720). Social scientific crisis communication research has included the 
experimental testing of image repair strategies, as well as the development of Coombs’ 
(2007b) situational crisis communication theory and the application of contingency 
theory (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997) to crisis situations. Each of these 
lines of research is discussed below. 
Testing Rhetorical Strategies 
Although most of Benoit’s work on crisis communication has involved 
rhetorical criticism and case studies, he has also conducted some experimental research. 
Benoit and Drew (1997) asked students to imagine a friend had offended them in one of 
five different ways (e.g., failure to pick up a roommate after work, losing a friend’s 
cassette tape, etc.). For each offense, 14 image repair strategies were offered and 
students rated the appropriateness and effectiveness of each response. Appropriateness 
was defined as whether a recipient was offended by the image repair message. 
Effectiveness was defined as whether a message led the recipient to form a more 
positive image of the offender. Mortification and corrective action were the two 
strategies rated highest for appropriateness as well as effectiveness. The least 
appropriate strategies were denial, provocation, minimization, bolstering, and attacking 
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the accuser. The least effective strategies were differentiation, denial, provocation, 
minimization, and bolstering.  
A study by Coombs and Schmidt (2000) sought to test the findings of a case 
study conducted by Brinson and Benoit (1999). Brinson and Benoit (1999) analyzed the 
image repair strategies used by Texaco in 1996 of the company was accused of 
discriminatory business practices. According to the case study, Texaco used bolstering, 
shifting blame, corrective action and mortification strategies, and these strategies were 
effective (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). Coombs and Schmidt (2000) tested this conclusion 
by presenting college students with the facts of the Texaco case and then giving 
students one of five responses based on Texaco’s actual crisis communication. These 
responses were based on (a) bolstering, (b) shifting blame, (c) corrective action, (d) 
mortification, or (e) a combination of bolstering, sifting blame, and corrective action. 
Contrary to their expectations, Coombs and Schmidt (2000) did not find 
significant differences between most of the image repair strategies they tested. 
Participants in the experiment were less likely to believe the blame shifting strategy 
than to believe the other strategies. However, the other strategies were equivalent to 
each other in their effects on organizational reputation, on participants’ willingness to 
accept the organization’s account, and on potential supportive behavior (e.g., saying 
nice things about the organization to other people). Based on these findings, Coombs 
and Schmidt (2000) argued that scholars should be cautious about claiming that 
particular image repair strategies produce certain effects based on case studies, alone. In 
some instances, any of a number of rhetorical strategies may be equally effective. 
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Dardis and Haigh (2009) tested Benoit’s (1995a) five image repair strategies in 
an experiment involving a hypothetical product recall. The authors found that a strategy 
of reducing offensiveness (minimizing the crisis and bolstering the company’s image) 
produced the highest evaluations of company reputation, ability, credibility, and 
positioning, as well as the most positive attitude toward the company. Denial was the 
least effective strategy, overall.   
Sheldon and Sallot (2009) also conducted an experiment involving a 
hypothetical scenario. This scenario involved a politician trying to repair his image after 
making racially insensitive remarks. Three image repair strategies were tested: 
mortification, bolstering and corrective action. The experiment also manipulated 
whether the politician had a history of supporting or opposing civil rights. Sheldon and 
Sallot (2009) found that mortification was the most effective strategy for politicians to 
use after making this kind of mistake. Corrective action by itself was least effective. 
Surprisingly, the politician’s performance history did not make a difference.  
Performance history is an important factor in Coombs’ (2007b) situational crisis 
communication theory. This theory is discussed next. 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
 Technically, Benoit’s (1995a, 1997b) image repair theory is a taxonomy of crisis 
response strategies, “not a true theory in the sense of making predictions” (Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000). Coombs has developed situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT) to predict which types of crisis response will be effective at managing an 
organization’s reputation in various crises (Coombs, 1995, 1998, 2007a, 2007b 2010b; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Although SCCT acknowledges that public safety must be 
51 
the first priority in crisis response, reputation management is the main focus of SCCT 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  
SCCT is based in attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1985, 
1995, 2006) and predicts that different types of crises will cause stakeholders to 
attribute different levels of responsibility to an organization (Coombs, 2007b). By 
understanding how stakeholders perceive the organization’s role in a crisis, crisis 
managers can select the most appropriate response strategy to protect or rebuild the 
organization’s reputation (Coombs, 1995, Coombs & Holladay, 2002). This subsection 
briefly discusses attribution theory as the theoretical foundation of SCCT, then outlines 
three key concepts of SCCT: crisis type, intensifying factors, and crisis response 
strategies. Finally, the role of affect in SCCT is addressed. 
 Attribution theory. Attribution theory (AT) is a broad term for studying the 
“perception or inference of cause” (Kelley & Michela, 1980, p. 458). Heider (1944) 
wrote, “When we have a disagreeable experience, or a pleasant one, we may locate its 
origin in another person, in ourselves, or in fate” (p. 358). Weiner (1985) explained that 
there are three dimensions to attributions. The first, locus of causality, refers to whether 
a cause is internal or external to a person. This is the dimension reflected in Heider’s 
quotation. For example, people can get into car accidents because they are driving 
recklessly (internal locus) or because other drivers are being reckless (external locus). 
The second dimension of attribution is stability (Weiner, 1985). Stable causes 
are permanent, while unstable causes may come and go. For instance, a sailboat might 
cross a lake quickly because the lake is small (stable cause) or because the wind is 
particularly strong (unstable cause).  
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The third dimension of attribution is controllability (Weiner, 1985). When 
causes are unstable they can change, and people may or may not have control over that 
change. One illustration is the difference between effort and fatigue. People might 
perform poorly at a job because of lack of effort or fatigue. However, people have more 
control over how much effort they expend when working than they have over feelings 
of fatigue. 
Although Weiner (1985) was only certain of three dimensions of attribution, he 
suggested that intentionality might deserve to be regarded as a fourth dimension. 
Intentionality refers to whether or not an actor meant to do something. Intentionality 
and control are not the same. A person might not intend to hit a pedestrian while 
driving, but that person might have been speeding—a behavior that is controllable. 
Coombs incorporated the concept of intentionality into SCCT (Coombs, 1995; Coombs 
& Holladay, 1996). 
When people commit an offense, they often use excuses to keep other people 
from being upset with them (Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). In a series of 
studies, Weiner, et al. (1987) found that people consider “good” excuses to be those that 
involve external, uncontrollable, and unintentional factors. “Bad” excuses are those that 
involve internal, controllable, and intentional factors. For example, a good excuse for 
being late is that one got stuck in traffic (external, uncontrollable, unintentional), while 
a bad excuse is that one stopped along the way to do something else (internal, 
controllable, intentional).  
Because people naturally seek to understand why things happen (Heider, 1944), 
stakeholders in a crisis situation are likely to make judgments about the cause of the 
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crisis (Coombs, 1995). According to Coombs (1995), stakeholders who perceive the 
locus of causality as internal to an organization, and perceive that causality as stable, 
controllable, or intentional will attribute responsibility for the crisis to the organization. 
On the other hand, if stakeholders believe the cause of a crisis was external, unstable, 
uncontrollable, or unintentional, these stakeholders will generally attribute less 
responsibility to the organization. SCCT holds that different types of crises produce 
different attributions of responsibility (Coombs, 2010b).  
Crisis type. Coombs’ taxonomy of crisis types has evolved over the years. 
Initially, Coombs (1995) described crises using a 2x2 matrix involving two levels of 
locus (internal or external) and two levels of intention (intentional or unintentional). 
Accidents are internally caused crises that are unintentional. Transgressions are internal 
and intentional crises, such as knowingly selling a defective product. Terrorism refers to 
crises intentionally causes by external actors. Finally, a faux pas is an unintentional 
offense that is used by external actors to criticize or attack an individual or an 
organization. Sheldon and Sallot’s (2009) study of a politician who made racially 
insensitive statements provides an example of the faux pas type of crisis. 
Coombs and Holladay (1996) tested the attributions people made in accident and 
transgression situations. Consistent with SCCT, people attributed more responsibility to 
an organization for a transgression than for an accident, and transgressions produced 
greater reputational damage than accidents. 
More recently, Coombs and Holladay (2002) identified 13 crisis types and used 
hierarchical cluster analysis to group these crisis types into three clusters. The cluster 
analysis was based on two variables: organizational reputation and crisis responsibility. 
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Thus, the crises in each cluster produce similar attributions of responsibility and pose 
similar threats to an organization’s reputation. Coombs and Holladay (2002) labeled 
these clusters the victim cluster, the accidental cluster, and the preventable cluster.  
The first cluster is called the victim cluster, and includes natural disasters, false 
rumors, workplace violence, and product tampering or malevolence (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). In this cluster, the organization is a victim along with its stakeholders. 
Because organizations have little control over these situations, stakeholders are less 
likely to attribute responsibility to the organization and, thus, these crises pose only a 
mild threat to the organization’s reputation. 
The second cluster is called the accidental cluster (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
Technical breakdown, accidents are accidents caused by equipment failure. A 
“megadamage” crisis is a type of technical breakdown accident “that produces 
significant environmental damage” (p. 170) such as an oil spill. Technical breakdown 
product harm crises are product recalls caused by equipment failure. Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) also included challenges in this cluster. Challenges are stakeholder 
claims that the organization is operating inappropriately. An example would be an 
activist group complaining that an organization does not use environmentally friendly 
practices. The common link between these types of crisis is that organizational actions 
did lead to the crisis, but these actions were unintentional. Attributions of responsibility 
in the accidental cluster are likely to be somewhat greater than attributions of 
responsibility in the victim cluster. Therefore, reputational threat is somewhat greater, 
too. 
55 
The third crisis cluster is the preventable cluster (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
Crises in this cluster arise because the organization acted inappropriately, violated the 
law, or knowingly placed people at risk. Examples include human breakdown accidents, 
human breakdown product harm, and organizational misdeeds. The severity of an 
organizational misdeed depends on whether or not stakeholders were injured and 
whether or not laws were broken. Organizations ought to be able to prevent crises in 
this cluster. Therefore, when these preventable crises arise, stakeholders attribute a high 
level of responsibility to the organization and the threat to the organization’s reputation 
is severe.  
In addition to the crisis type, there are intensifying factors that also affect the 
attributions stakeholders make in crisis situations (Coombs, 2010b). 
 Intensifying factors. An organization’s performance history affects the 
attributions of responsibility made during a crisis (Coombs, 2006a). An organization’s 
performance history includes its crisis history and its prior relational reputation 
(Coombs, 2007b). Both factors are discussed below. 
 Crisis history. Crisis history refers to whether or not an organization has gone 
through similar crises in the past (Coombs, 2010b). A history of past crises helps 
“establish a pattern of ‘bad behavior’ by an organization” (p. 39) and tends to increase 
attributions of responsibility. Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that people attributed 
more responsibility to organizations that had experienced multiple crises than to 
organizations going through their first crisis. Multiple crises also produced lower 
evaluations of organizations’ reputations.  
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Coombs (2004) tested attributions of responsibility for two crises from the 
victim cluster (workplace violence and product tampering) and two crises from the 
accidental cluster (technical breakdown product harm and technical breakdown 
accident). Each crisis scenario was combined with one of three crisis history conditions: 
history of crises, no history of crises, and no information about crisis history. As 
expected, when an organization had a history of crises, people attributed more 
responsibility to the organization and had a less favorable perception of the 
organization’s reputation. Surprisingly, people attributed roughly the same level of 
responsibility to an organization with a crisis-free history and to an organization with an 
unknown crisis history. Coombs suggested that because people expect organizations to 
operate without crises, people who do not know the crisis history of an organization 
simply assume the organization has not gone through any crises. 
 Prior relational reputation. The other intensifying factor in SCCT is prior 
relational reputation, which is defined as the way an organization has treated 
stakeholders in the past (Coombs, 2007b). Coombs and Holladay (2001) found that in 
crisis situation, people attribute more responsibility to organizations that have a 
negative relationship history with their stakeholders. Similar to Coombs’ (2004) finding 
regarding crisis history, Coombs and Holladay (2001) found no significant difference 
between organizations with positive relationship histories and no relationship histories. 
Coombs and Holladay (2006) conducted two studies to see if a positive 
organizational reputation could create a halo effect to shied organizations during crises. 
The results indicated that a positive pre-crisis reputation reduced attributions of 
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responsibility and improved post-crisis reputation. However, this effect was only 
present if the pre-crisis reputation was very positive.  
 SCCT holds that different types of crises, combined with the intensifying factors 
of crisis history and prior relational reputation determine how much responsibility 
people attribute to an organization in crisis (Coombs, 2007b). SCCT helps crisis 
managers understand how stakeholders are likely to view a crisis. Based on this 
understanding, crisis managers can select the appropriate crisis response strategy to 
protect their organization’s image.   
Response strategies. Drawing upon the corporate apologia, impression 
management, and image repair literature, Coombs (1998) developed a continuum of 
crisis responses ranging from defensive to accommodative. According to Marcus and 
Goodman (1991), accommodative strategies involve admitting a problem exists, 
accepting responsibility for it, and taking steps to fix the situation. Defensive strategies 
include denying a problem exists, trying to reassure people about an organization’s 
performance, and taking action to return to normal as quickly as possible.  
Coombs’s (1998) continuum began with attacking the accuser as the most 
defensive strategy, and progressed to denial, excuse, justification, ingratiation, 
corrective action, and finally, full apology as the most accommodative strategy. 
Coombs (2006b) added several more responses—scapegoat, concern, compassion, 
regret—and used hierarchical cluster analysis to identify three response clusters. 
Coombs (2007a) modified the list of responses again and grouped the responses into the 
following four clusters, which he called postures: 
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Denial posture. The denial posture seeks “to remove any connection between 
the crisis and the organization” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 139). This posture includes 
attacking the accuser, denying that any crisis exists, and blaming people outside the 
organization for the crisis (i.e., scapegoating).  
Diminishment posture. The diminishment posture seeks to reduce attributions of 
responsibility for the crisis by showing that the organization did not have control over 
the crisis or at least over the negative effects of the crisis (Coombs, 2007a). Strategies 
within the diminish posture are excusing (e.g., denying intent to do harm, or claiming 
no control) and justification (e.g., minimizing the damage or claiming that victims 
deserved what happened to them). 
Rebuilding posture. The rebuild posture uses words and actions “to benefit 
stakeholders and to offset the negative effects of the crisis” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 140). 
These strategies are compensation (i.e., providing money or other assistance to victims) 
and apologizing (i.e., publicly taking responsibility and asking for forgiveness).  
Bolstering posture. Strategies in the bolstering posture “seek to build a positive 
connection between the organization and the stakeholders” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 141). 
These strategies include reminding stakeholders about the good work an organization 
has done in the past, praising stakeholders (i.e., ingratiation), and explaining how the 
organization, itself, is a victim of the crisis. The bolstering posture supplements the 
other three postures. As Coombs (2007a) noted, bolstering strategies often seem 
egocentric or self-serving when used alone. However when combined with denial, 
diminishment, or rebuilding, bolstering can be effective. 
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According to SCCT, different types of crises call for different types of response 
(Coombs, 2007b). When attributions of responsibility are low, as in natural disasters, 
rumors, or product tampering crises, the denial posture is likely to be effective. In 
accidental crises, excuses or justifications may work to diminish the organization’s 
responsibility. However, in preventable crises like organizational misdeeds or product 
recalls caused by human error, compensation and apologies may be required to rebuild 
the organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2007b). Because strategies such as 
compensation and apologizing tend to be the most expensive for an organization 
(apologizing is often expensive because it involves accepting liability), these strategies 
are not generally used except when necessary (Coombs, 2007a; Coombs & Holladay, 
2008).  
Coombs and Holladay (1996) found support for SCCT’s key idea—namely, that 
crisis responses should be matched to crisis type based on attributions of responsibility. 
In their experiment, Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that matching crisis response 
to crisis type as prescribed by SCCT produced the most positive evaluations of 
organizations’ reputations. Also consistent with SCCT was Coombs and Schmidt’s 
(2000) finding that accommodative/rebuilding strategies like corrective action and 
apologizing were effective in an organizational misdeeds crisis (i.e., a crisis involving 
high attribution of responsibility). 
Affect. Attribution theory notes that judgments of responsibility often produce 
strong emotions like anger (Weiner, 2006). Coombs and Holladay (2007) found that 
attributions of responsibility produced anger, and this anger made people less likely to 
do business with an organization and more likely to engage in negative word-of-mouth 
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toward an organization. Choi and Lin (2009a) analyzed online consumer responses to a 
Mattel toy recall and found evidence of several emotions including anger, worry, fear, 
disgust, relief, and sympathy. Fediuk, Coombs, and Botero (2010) have argued that both 
crisis responsibility and crisis severity are related to feelings of anger and outrage in 
stakeholders and victims, and future research should test this connection. 
 SCCT is the most dominant social scientific theory in crisis communication, but 
another important theory is contingency theory. This theory is considered next. 
Contingency Theory 
 J. E. Grunig’s (1992) landmark study of excellence in public relations concluded 
that two-way symmetrical communication is generally the most effective and ethical 
approach to public relations. Historically, public relations has focused on persuading 
stakeholders to do what an organization wants them to do (J.E. Grunig, 1989b; J. E. 
Grunig & Hunt, 1984). By contrast, the two-way symmetrical approach seeks mutual 
understanding between organizations and their stakeholders (J. E. Grunig & Hunt, 
1984). In the two-way symmetrical model of public relations, organizations do not 
simply try to change their stakeholders, but are open to being changed by those 
stakeholders.  
 Critiquing J. E. Grunig’s (1992) theory, Cancel et al. (1997) argued that no 
single approach to public relations could be the most effective all the time. Rather, the 
best way to practice public relations depends on many factors. “It depends upon the 
ethical implications in the situation. It depends on what is at stake. It depends upon how 
credible the public is. It depends upon a whole lot of things” (p. 33).  
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According to Cancel et al. (1997), public relations practices exist along a 
continuum from advocacy (i.e., trying to persuade stakeholders to do what the 
organization wants) to accommodation (i.e., giving stakeholders what they want). 
Through an extensive review of existing research, as well as interviews with public 
relations professionals (Cancel, Mitrook, & Cameron, 1999), contingency theorists have 
identified 87 internal and external variables that could determine what public relations 
approach is taken in different situations (G. T. Cameron, Pang, & Jin, 2008). Examples 
of internal variables include characteristics of the organization (culture, economic 
stability, etc.), characteristics of the public relations department (staff size, funding, 
etc.), as well as characteristics of top management (management style, understanding of 
public relations, etc.). Examples of external variables include different types of threats 
to an organization (litigation, bad publicity, etc.), the industry environment (amount of 
competition, available resources, etc.), the general political and social environment 
(degree of support for business), and the nature of external stakeholders or publics (size, 
credibility, etc.). For a complete list, see Cancel et al. (1999). 
 As Coombs (2010b) observed, contingency theory was proposed as a grand 
theory of public relations that “could be applied to any aspect of public relations” (p. 
24). Indeed several studies have used contingency theory to study crisis communication. 
An experiment by Lyon and Cameron (2004) found that in hypothetical crisis 
situations people had more positive attitudes toward organizations with good 
reputations that those with bad reputations. People were also more willing to do 
business with, to invest in, and to recommend organizations with good reputations than 
organizations with bad reputations. Additionally, the study found that apologies 
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produced more positive attitudes and behavioral intentions than denials. However, there 
was no interaction between reputation and crisis response. 
In another experiment, Turk et al. (2012) extended Lyon and Cameron’s (2004) 
research by testing the variable of CEO visibility (visible/invisible) along with 
organizational reputation (good/bad) and crisis response (denial/apology). Turk et al. 
(2012) found that CEO visibility, a good pre-crisis reputation, and an apologetic crisis 
response each improved attitudes toward an organization. CEO visibility and a good 
reputation also made people more likely to do business with an organization, although 
apologies did not make a difference.  
Perhaps the most important finding from Turk et al.’s (2012) study was that 
CEO visibility, reputation, and response type interacted in an unexpected way. Overall, 
the most positive attitudes and strongest intentions to do business with an organization 
were associated with a visible CEO, a good pre-crisis reputation, and a defensive rather 
than apologetic crisis response. This finding may indicate that when organizations have 
positive reputations and strong leadership, they can deny accusations more effectively 
and thus escape responsibility for crises.  
Jin, Pang, and Cameron (2006) used a content analysis of news reports to see 
how the government of Singapore responded the SARS crisis in 2003. Jin et al. (2006) 
adapted Coombs’ (1998) continuum of crisis responses (from defensive to 
accommodative) to fit contingency theory’s advocacy-accommodation continuum 
(more defensive strategies were regarded as advocacy strategies). Jin et al. (2006) found 
that the government used advocacy more at the beginning of the crisis and gradually 
moved toward accommodation as the crisis progressed. 
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Jin and Cameron (2007) conducted an online survey with public relations 
professionals and found that these professionals perceived external threats (e.g., news 
stories criticizing a company’s product) as more difficult and costly to deal with than 
internal threats (e.g., managing employee layoffs). Furthermore, long-term threats were 
considered more difficult and costly to deal with than short-term threats. Interestingly, 
the professionals in the study were more likely to recommend accommodative strategies 
like apologizing or changing the organization’s position when dealing with external and 
long-term threats, as opposed to internal and short-term threats. 
 An experiment by Hwang and Cameron (2008) revealed that stakeholders’ 
perceptions of an organization’s leader influence the kind of crisis response 
stakeholders expect. For instance, when stakeholders perceive the leader of an 
organization to be autocratic, they expect more advocacy in the organization’s crisis 
response. By contrast, when stakeholders perceive a leader to be more democratic, they 
expect a more accommodative response. In a follow up study, Hwang and Cameron 
(2009) reported that what stakeholders expect based on an organization’s leadership 
style is moderated by the severity of the crisis. More severe threats lead to greater 
expectations of accommodative crisis response than less severe threats, regardless of a 
leader’s style. 
 Coombs (2010b) suggested that contingency theory and SCCT could be 
integrated to better understand crisis communication. Because contingency theory is so 
broad it can identify numerous variables that might affect crisis communication. 
However, SCCT and contingency theory provide a valuable framework for integrating 
these variables and modeling the crisis communication process.  
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 The preceding discussion of rhetorical and social scientific approaches to crisis 
communication has demonstrated that apologies are only one of several ways 
organizations can respond to crises. Nevertheless, apologies are considered the most 
appropriate and effective responses in many situations (Benoit & Drew, 1997; Len-Rio 
& Benoit, 2004). Apologies are also “the most complex and perhaps controversial of the 
crisis response strategies” (Coombs, 2007a, p. 141), and have sparked particular interest 
among crisis communication researchers (Coombs et al., 2010). For these reasons, a 
more detailed discussion of apologies is warranted. The next section considers 
apologies from various theoretical perspectives and reviews specific research on the 
role of apologies in crisis communication. 
Understanding Apologies 
 Although public relations scholars have certainly studied apologies (e.g., Benoit 
& Brinson, 1994; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Hearit, 1994, 2006; Kauffman, 2008; Lee 
& Chung, 2012), the concept of an apology has received as much or more attention 
from other academic disciplines. Psychologists (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Exline et al., 
2007; McCullough et al., 1997, 1998), sociologists (Tavuchis, 1991), philosophers (N. 
N. Smith, 2008), linguists (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984) political scientists (Blatz et 
al., 2009; Eisinger, 2011) and psychiatrists (Lazare, 2004) have all studied what 
apologies are and how apologies function. This section begins by reviewing the work on 
apology within public relations literature and noting certain problems and 
inconsistencies with this line of research. Next, various understandings of apologies 
from outside the field of public relations are considered. Finally, these outside 
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perspectives are compared and contrasted with public relations and crisis 
communication research.  
Apologies in Public Relations Research 
 Public relations research on the effectiveness of apologies in crisis 
communication has found conflicting results. One reason may be that scholars have 
defined and operationalized apologies differently. Both definitions and findings are 
discussed below, along with possible explanations for the conflicting results.  
 Defining apologies in public relations. Among researchers, the term apology 
has more than one meaning (Coombs et al., 2010). For Benoit (1995a), an apology—or 
mortification—requires the accused to “admit responsibility for the wrongful act and 
ask for forgiveness” (p. 79). Benoit argued that apologies will often be accompanied by 
corrective action (e.g., fixing the problem or preventing it from recurring), but 
corrective action is a distinct image repair strategy, not part of an apology. 
Hearit (2006) generally agreed with Benoit’s (1995a) definition of an apology, 
explaining, “the apologist admits guilt, often couples it with a statement of regret, and 
asks for forgiveness” (p. 31). Hearit went on to describe both the content and manner of 
an ideal ethical apology. Ideally, the content of an apology ought to include: (1) an 
explicit acknowledgement of wrongdoing, (2) a full acceptance of responsibility, (3) an 
expression of regret, (4) an effort to identify with injured stakeholders, (5) a request for 
forgiveness, (6) an attempt at reconciliation with stakeholders, (7) full disclosure of 
information related to the offense, (8) an explanation of what happened, (9) an offer to 
take corrective action, and (10) an offer of compensation. The manner of an apology 
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should be (1) truthful, (2) sincere, (3) timely, (4) voluntary, (5) addressed to all 
stakeholders, and (6) performed in an appropriate context (pp. 64–73).  
By Hearit’s (2006) standard, there may never have been an ideal apology. 
Nevertheless, these detailed lists help to reinforce Coombs’ (2007a) point that apologies 
are the most complicated type of crisis response. Coombs, himself, argued that 
apologies should “acknowledge the crisis, accept responsibility, include a promise not 
to repeat the crisis, and express concern and regret” (2007a, p. 141).  
In an early study of corporate apologia, Hearit (1994) found that many 
organizations issued carefully worded statements of concern or regret in crisis 
situations. Such statements allow organizations to show sympathy for victims without 
taking responsibility for any wrongdoing. Coombs (2007a) called this type of statement 
a partial apology.  
Some case studies based on IRT have not operationalized apologies or 
mortification the way Benoit (1995a) did. For example, a study by Vlad, Sallot and 
Reber (2006) analyzed the image repair strategies of Merck after the company recalled 
its drug Vioxx. Vlad et al. (2006) described Merck’s strategy as “rectification without 
assuming responsibility” (p. 369). In this case, Merck recalled its unsafe drug and 
compensated people who bought the drug, but never admitted any mistakes or 
misdeeds. Curiously, the authors categorized Merck’s strategy as mortification, 
although this strategy seems more consistent with Benoit’s (1995a) concepts of 
corrective action and compensation. 
There are other examples of this type of confusion. After silicone breast 
implants made by Dow Corning were linked to breast cancer, the company admitted it 
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made errors, but never said it was sorry (Brinson & Benoit, 1996). When Firestone 
recalled 6.5 million defective tires in 2000, the company said it was apologizing to the 
American people, but also denied that its tires were defective (Blaney et al., 2002). In 
2005, football player Terrell Owens said he was sorry for a conflict between himself 
and the Philadelphia Eagles, but never accepted any responsibility for the conflict 
(Brazeal, 2008). In all of these case studies, the researchers described the image repair 
strategies in question as mortification. While these crisis responses may have been 
attempts at mortification, they do not fit Benoit’s (1995a) definition very well. 
There are other examples of scholars apparently separating the concept of 
apologizing from the concept of accepting responsibility. In a study of Cardinal Bernard 
Law’s 2002 apology, Kauffman’s (2008) wrote, “Not only did [Cardinal Law] 
apologize but he also admitted errors” (p. 260). This statement implies that apologies do 
not necessarily contain admissions of error. Blaney et al. (2002) and Brazeal (2008) also 
treated the mere words “sorry” or “I apologize” as examples of mortification, despite 
the fact that the offenders in these studies never actually accepted responsibility for 
their misdeeds. 
At times, experimental research on apologies in crisis communication has also 
operationalized apologies in surprising ways. Benoit and Drew (1997) asked college 
students to imagine a friend had committed one of four offenses and to evaluate 14 
different responses their friend might give. One offense involved a friend spilling 
something on the student’s coat. The mortification response for this offense was, “I’m 
sorry, it’s my fault,” while the compensation response was, “It’s my fault. I know, I’ll 
take you to a basketball game—will that make up for it?” (p. 161). In this study, the 
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operationalization of mortification was consistent with IRT, but the operationalization 
of compensation contained elements of mortification, too.  
An experimental study by Coombs and Holladay (2008) operationalized an 
organizational apology thus: “We at Marcus Oil and Chemical Company accept 
responsibility for last night’s explosion. We hope those who were affected by the 
incident can forgive us” (p. 256). This operationalization fits perfectly with Benoit’s 
(1995a) definition of an apology. However, this operationalization does not match 
Coombs’ (2007a) definition because it lacks a promise to prevent the crisis from 
recurring, as well as an expression of concern. 
Perhaps a better approach has been followed by two studies that empirically 
tested the relative importance of accepting responsibility and expressing remorse or 
sympathy (Lee & Chung, 2012; Pace et al., 2010). Both of these studies found that 
effective apologies need explicit acknowledgement of responsibility. Pace et al. (2010 
found that expressions of remorse also made apologies more effective. However, Lee 
and Chung (2012) did not find that expressions of sympathy made apologies more 
effective.  
The preceding examples illustrate that public relations and crisis literature has 
not always been consistent when defining or operationalizing the concept of an apology. 
This inconsistency creates a certain degree of confusion and makes it hard for scholars 
and practitioners to know how to apply this line of research. Another difficulty arises 
because findings on the effectiveness of apologies sometimes conflict with one another.  
 Findings related to apologies in public relations. A number of studies in the 
public relations and communication literature have tested the effectiveness of apologies 
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and found differing results. Case study research has generally argued that apologies are 
effective and desirable when organizations or public figures need to repair their image 
(e.g., Benoit, 1997a; Benoit & Brinson, 1994, Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004). Experimental 
research has offered mixed results. For instance, Benoit and Drew (1997) found that 
people considered mortification the most appropriate and effective strategy, but the 
experiment used interpersonal offenses, not organizational crises. Sheldon and Sallot 
(2009) found apologizing to be more effective than bolstering or corrective action in 
repairing a politician’s reputation after a faux pas. On the other hand, when Coombs and 
Schmidt (2000) tested Texaco’s image repair strategies empirically on college students, 
they found no significant differences between mortification, corrective action, 
bolstering, shifting blame, or a combination of these strategies.  
Lyon and Cameron (2004) reported that apologies were more effective than 
denials at producing positive attitudes toward an organization. However, this 
experiment relied on hypothetical news reports that were substantially different from 
each other. The news report that contained the apology manipulation also contained 
several instances of bolstering that were not present in the denial version of the news 
story. This difference might pose a threat to the study’s validity.  
As mentioned previously, Turk et al. (2012) found apologies to be more 
effective than denial at producing positive attitudes about an organization. However, 
when organizations had good reputations before a crisis, and highly visible leadership 
during a crisis, denial became a more effective strategy than apologizing.  
Coombs and Holladay (2008) argued that comparing apologies to denials is 
misleading because few situations in real life allow organizations to choose between 
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these two strategies. Based on SCCT, a denial strategy only works in certain situations, 
and an apology is only necessary in certain situations. Organizations can realistically 
deny some accusations, but not others. Therefore, Coombs and Holladay tested 
apologies against two more similar strategies: expressions of sympathy and offers of 
compensation.  
Coombs and Holladay’s (2008) experiment used a student sample and a real-life 
crisis involving an oil company. The researchers gave each student a description of the 
crisis and one of the response manipulations. No significant differences were found 
between the sympathy, compensation, and apology conditions in evaluations of the 
organization’s reputation, anger, negative word-of-mouth intentions, or willingness to 
accept the organization’s account of what happened. All three responses were equally 
effective. 
Pace et al. (2010) created a hypothetical scenario in which an apartment 
management company was caught refusing to return security deposits to college 
students. In the company’s response to the situation, accepting responsibly and 
expressing remorse were manipulated separately. Both variables contributed to the 
effectiveness of the company’s apology by improving the company’s reputation and 
reducing students’ anger.  
A similar study by Lee and Chung (2012) manipulated the level of responsibility 
taking in the apology (active/passive) and the expression of sympathy in the apology 
(high/low). Like Pace et al. (2010), Lee and Chung found that college students felt less 
anger toward an organization that actively took responsibly for a crisis than an 
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organization that only passively accepted responsibility. However, the two levels of 
sympathy did not produce significantly different levels of anger among the students. 
The widely divergent findings in these apology studies pose a challenge for 
crisis communication researchers. Several possible explanations for these finding are 
offered next. 
Explaining the confusion in apology research. As discussed above, one source 
of confusion in apology research may be the different definitions and 
operationalizations used in different studies. Other issues may include different types of 
crises or offenses used in experimental studies, as well as different participants used in 
these studies. For instance, several studies that support the effectiveness of apologies 
are based on individual rather than organizational offenses (e.g., Benoit, 1997a; Benoit 
& Drew, 1997; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004; Sheldon & Sallot, 2009). Hearit (2006) 
suggested that one major difference between individual apologies and organizational 
apologies is that individual apologies come directly from the wrongdoer while 
organizational apologies often come from a spokesperson or representative of the 
organization. Perhaps apologies are more effective when they come from individuals 
who are speaking on their own behalf. 
As SCCT points out, there are many types of crises that are likely to produce 
different attributions of responsibility (Coombs, 2007b). Comparing a study based on an 
industrial accident with a study based on an organizational misdeed would be a mistake 
since SCCT predicts that apologies will fit some situations better than others. 
Furthermore, some studies have used real crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000; Turk et al., 2012) while others have used hypothetical scenarios (Lyon 
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& Cameron, 2004; Sheldon & Sallot, 2009). Different crisis scenarios may help explain 
different findings. 
Coombs (2012) suggested that one important variable in apology research is the 
distinction between victims and non-victims. While organizations in crisis must worry 
about the perceptions of victims and non-victims, people who have actually suffered 
because of an organization’s actions may react differently to apologies than people who 
are just watching the crisis play out in the media. Most experimental apology studies 
use non-victims (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Lee & Chung, 
2012; Sheldon & Sallot, 2009). Researchers cannot ethically make people victims for 
the sake of an experiment (Coombs, 2012), nor is there a way to control experimental 
conditions when studying real-life crisis victims. Nevertheless, Benoit and Drew (1997) 
did try to have their experimental participants imagine themselves as victims of 
hypothetical offenses. This approach could be one reason Benoit and Drew (1997) 
found stronger support for the use of apologies in image repair.  
An interesting study by Choi and Lin (2009b) found that law professors were 
able to distinguish between organizational apologies that took responsibility for a crisis 
and expressions of sympathy that did not take responsibility. However, college students 
could not distinguish between apologies and sympathy. This finding may help explain 
why Coombs and Holladay (2008) found no difference between sympathy, 
compensation, and apologies. For people who are not attuned to issues of liability, any 
accommodative response may work like an apology.  
Hearit (2006) suggested that because of liability concerns organizations will 
rarely acknowledge responsibility for a crisis. Instead, “compensation has become the 
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new apology” (p. 209). The amount of money an organization is willing to pay to 
resolve a crisis is a reflection of how much responsibility the organization takes for the 
crisis. If Hearit’s theory is correct it could help explain why some studies do not find 
apologies to be more effective than other accommodative crisis responses.  
In order to achieve a better understanding of what apologies are and how they 
work, the next subsection considers research on apologies from other disciplines. 
 Apologies in Other Disciplines 
 This section discusses various perspectives on apologies from beyond the field 
of public relations or crisis communication. These perspectives help to illuminate what 
apologies are and how apologies function. After considering various definitions of 
apologies, this subsection will draw on symbolic, linguistic, sociological, psychological, 
and psychiatric perspectives to help explain the ways in which apologies work. Finally, 
these theories will be compared to theories from within the disciplines of public 
relations and crisis communication. 
 Definitions of an apology. Multiple scholars have noted an evolution in the way 
people use the term apology (N. Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). N. Smith (2008) 
observed that the concept of apologizing has changed “from the ancient notion of a 
legal defense to the modern notion of contrition for wrongdoing” (p. 9). In Plato’s 
Apology, for instance, Socrates is not sorry for what he has taught, but is trying to 
persuade the Athenians to agree with him. However, today “we associate apologizing 
with repentance, confession, remorse, blame, and moral defenselessness” (N. Smith, 
2008, p. 8).  
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According to Quinion, (1998), this shift began soon after the term apology first 
appeared in English (Quinion, 1998). People started using the word when they wanted 
to excuse themselves for an unintended offense, and eventually came to use the term to 
signify their regret for an offense. Quinion noted that one of the first examples of the 
term apology being used to express regret was in Shakespeare’s Richard III. By the 
eighteenth century, the meaning of apology had changed so thoroughly that people 
began using the Latin term apologia to refer to communication in defense of oneself.   
The sociologist Goffman (1971) described an apology as “a gesture through 
which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and 
the part that dissociates itself from the delict [i.e., the violation of one’s duty] and 
affirms a belief in the offended rule” (p. 113). In other words, apologies demonstrate 
that an offense is not really representative of the offender as a person (Schlenker & 
Darby, 1981). This understanding of apologies is consistent with Hearit’s (1994) notion 
of the act/essence distinction.  
Apologies are a way of repairing damaged relationships. Tavuchis, another 
sociologist, explained that an apology “is a relational concept and practice…whose 
meaning resides not within the individual (although its effects may), but in a social 
bond between the Offender and Offended” (1991, p. 47.). According to the psychiatrist 
Lazare (2004), apologies are encounters “between two parties in which one party, the 
offender, acknowledges responsibility for an offense or grievance and expresses regret 
or remorse to a second party, the aggrieved” (p. 23). In other words, apologies can only 
be offered when the offender and the victim have some connection to one another. This 
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point will be considered in more detail later within the context of apologies to non-
victims. 
The purpose of apologizing is to obtain forgiveness “as a prelude to reunion and 
reconciliation” (Tavuchis, 1991, p. 22). Forgiveness helps to heal the relationship 
between an offender and victim and “enables them to resume harmonious comunication 
[sic]” (North, 1987, p. 503). The psychologist McCullough and his colleagues (1998) 
explained that offenses naturally make victims want to avoid their offenders or seek 
revenge against them. Therefore, forgiveness is defined as a reduction in these 
avoidance or revenge seeking motivations.  
Elements of an apology. Different scholars have different views on what 
constitutes a complete or ideal apology. Tavuchis (1991) required that apologies contain 
an acknowledgement of one’s offense and an expression of sorrow or regret. Tavuchis 
also suggested that apologies normally include a pledge to “abide by the rules” in the 
future (p. 8). These elements can be found in most other conceptualizations of 
apologies. Davis (2002), a philosopher, argued that a “Consummate Apology” has 
“doxastic, affective, and dispositional elements” (p. 170). The doxastic (i.e., belief) 
element is the acknowledgment of the offense, the affective element is the feeling of 
self-reproach, and the dispositional element is the intention not to repeat the offense. 
Lazare (2004) agreed that apologies require acknowledgment of the offense and an 
expression of remorse, but he identified two additional elements: offering an 
explanation and making reparations.  
Some theories of ideal apologies are even more detailed. The philosopher N. 
Smith (2008) proposed that a “categorical apology” (pp. 28-107) should include a 
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remarkable 11 elements: (1) corroborating facts, (2) accepting blame, (3) identifying 
each harm, (4), identifying the moral principle behind each harm, (5) expressing support 
for each of those moral principles, (6), recognizing the victim as a moral interlocutor, 
(7) expressing regret, (8) performing the actual apology—not just thinking or feeling it, 
(9) promising not to repeat the offense and offering reparations, (10), apologizing with 
the proper intentions, and (11) displaying proper emotions. 
Speech act theory (J. L. Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) holds that certain types of 
communication are acts, in and of themselves, and that each speech act requires 
particular elements and conditions to be performed. Illocutionary force indicating 
devices are words or phrases that explicitly state what a people are trying to accomplish 
through their communication (Searle, 1969). For example, to say “I promise” designates 
a statement as a promise. To say “I apologize” demonstrates that the speaker means to 
offer an apology.  
Following speech act theory, Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) proposed five 
necessary elements in apologies: (1) an illocutionary force indicating device such as 
“I’m sorry,” “I apologize,” or “Pardon me,” (2) an explanation of why the offense 
occurred, (3) an acknowledgement of responsibility, (4) an offer of repair, and (5) a 
promise of forbearance (i.e., an assurance that the offense will not happen again). In this 
approach, the illocutionary force indicating device is an expression of regret or remorse. 
Psychologists Scher and Darley (1997) challenged Blum-Kulka and Olshtain’s 
(1984) model and argued that explanations are a kind of excuse making, not part of an 
apology. Explanations seek to change the way a victim sees the situation or the offense, 
itself. Apologies are meant to change the way a victims sees the offender. Thus, Scher 
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and Darley proposed four components in the apology speech act: (1) the illocutionary 
force indicating device, or expression of remorse, (2) the acknowledgement of 
responsibility, (3) the promise of forbearance, and (4) the offer of repair. Scher and 
Darley tested these four components experimentally and found that each component 
made a unique contribution to the perceived appropriateness of an interpersonal 
apology.  
Having considered how various disciplines define apologies and what 
components make up an apology, we move to discuss several views on how apologies 
function.  
Functions of an apology. In the diverse literature on apologies, there are at least 
four different ways in which apologies are thought to function. First, apologies promote 
healing by meeting psychological needs within victims. Second, apologies influence the 
attributions other people make about the offender’s motives and identity. Third, 
apologies invite victims to empathize with the offender and thus move toward 
forgiveness. Fourth, apologies act rhetorically and ritualistically to symbolize the 
rejection of misdeeds and the commitment to be a different person. 
Meeting psychological needs. As a trained psychiatrist, Lazare (2004) 
emphasized the clinical and psychological benefits of apologizing. He identified seven 
needs victims have that can be addressed through apologies. These needs are: 
Restoration of self-respect and dignity, assurance that both parties have shared 
values, assurance that the offenses were not their fault, assurance of safety in 
their relationships, seeing the offender suffer, reparation for the harm caused by 
the offense, [and] having meaningful dialogues with the offenders. (p. 44) 
 
Genuine apologies can be therapeutic for victims. In fact, victims of medical 
malpractice who receive apologies tend to feel less anger, more trust, better 
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relationships with their healthcare provider, and less need to file lawsuits (Robbennolt, 
2009). Robbennolt reported that patients often sue health care provides just to get an 
explanation of what happened. From this perspective then, explanations are a necessary 
part of a complete apology. 
Changing attribution. Attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Weiner, 
1985, 2006) has already been discussed in the context of SCCT. However, SCCT is not 
the only theoretical approach that has used AT to explain how apologies work. Early 
psychological studies on apologies found that both adults and children associated 
responsibility for an offense with the need to apologize (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; 
Schlenker & Darby, 1981). In a series of experimental studies, Weiner, Graham, Peter, 
and Zmuidinas (1991) found that apologies changed the way people perceived the moral 
character of an offender. Offenders who admitted their guilt were generally evaluated 
more positively than those who tried to deny it.  
Weiner (2006) noted that apologies seem incompatible with attribution theory, 
at first. After all, if people attribute responsibility based on locus of causality, 
controllability, and intentionality, then an apology that accepts responsibility for an 
offense should make attributions of responsibility worse. However, Weiner explained 
that apologies “break the link between the act and the attribution to enduring 
characteristics of the person” (p. 120). According to this theory, apologies work by 
changing perceptions of the stability dimension of responsibility. The offender is no 
longer a bad person, but a person who did a bad thing at a particular moment in time. 
When attributions change, emotional reactions often change, as well. People 
tend to feel anger towards those who are responsible for wrongdoing, but pity for those 
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who are victims of circumstances beyond their control (Weiner, 2006). Anger’s role as 
a mediating variable between attributions and behavioral intentions has already been 
mentioned in connection with Coombs and Holladay’s (2007) research. However, there 
is another mediating variable that may explain how apologies lead to forgiveness. This 
variable is empathy.      
Empathy. Instead of focusing on changing attributions, McCullough and his 
colleagues have focused on the role of empathy in producing forgiveness (McCullough 
et al., 1997, 1998, McCullough, Root, Tabak, & Witvliet, 2009). Empathy involves both 
the cognitive process of taking another person’s perspective and the feeling of sympathy 
or concern for that person (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). McCullough et al. argued, 
“empathy for the offending partner is the central facilitative condition that leads to 
forgiving” (1997, p. 322). Victims who can take the perspective of their offenders are 
more likely to forgive their offenders, less likely to seek revenge, and less likely to 
avoid their offenders. An apology can help a victim understand the regret an offender 
feels for committing an offense. McCullough et al. (1997, 1998) used structural 
equation modeling to demonstrate that feelings of empathy mediate the relationship 
between apologies and forgiveness in interpersonal relationships (McCullough et al., 
1997, 1998).  
Symbolic ritual. Tavuchis (1991) argued that all groups share certain values or 
behavioral expectations. Offensive acts symbolize that an offender does not share the 
group’s values (whatever group it may be) and should be excluded from the group. 
However, apologies symbolize that an offender wishes to reaffirm the group’s values 
and be readmitted to membership in good standing. As mentioned already, Goffman 
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(1971) saw apologies as a way of symbolically dividing oneself into “a blameworthy 
part and a part that stands back and sympathizes with the blame giving” (p. 113). People 
who perform this ritual properly prove that they deserve to be “brought back into the 
fold” (p. 113). Burke’s (1961) theory of mortification requires a symbolic sacrifice to 
purge an offender of guilt. Because apologies are “difficult and potentially humiliating” 
(Tavuchis, p. 9) they can serve this sacrificial function. 
By comparing and contrasting the many perspectives on apologies found outside 
public relations research we can move toward a clearer and more consistent 
understanding of the role apologies fill in crisis communication. 
Comparing and Contrasting 
 There are two areas where the public relations literature on apologies differs 
significantly from the outside literature on apologies. The components that comprise a 
complete apology are different, and the way apologies function is somewhat different. 
Both of these issues are addressed below, along with a discussion of why organizational 
apologies may differ from individual apologies.  
Apology components. Among scholars outside public relations, there is fairly 
widespread agreement that apologies ought to include an acknowledgement of 
responsibility, an expression of remorse, and a promise not to repeat the offensive act 
(Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Gill, 2000; Lazare, 2004; Scher & Darley, 1997; N. 
Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). Most writers also consider an offer of reparations to be 
part of an apology (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 2004; Scher & 
Darley, 1997; N. Smith, 2008;), although some authors do not consider this component 
to be essential (Gill, 2000; Tavuchis, 1991). Among public relations and crisis 
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communication scholars, both IRT (Benoit, 1995a) and SCCT (Coombs, 2007b) hold 
that apologies involve admissions of responsibility and expressions of remorse, but not 
necessarily promises of forbearance or offers of reparations. Promises of forbearance 
and offers of reparations are categorized as corrective action or compensation, not 
mortification or apologizing.  
Which approach is right? It seems likely that organizational apologies involve 
more than just acknowledging responsibility and expressing remorse. As mentioned 
previously, Hearit (2006) suggested that for organizations with liability concerns, “the 
acknowledgement of the wrongdoing comes not in the apology but instead in the 
compensation” (p. 210). Hearit believed the general public assumes that an organization 
willing to compensate victims is accepting at least some responsibility for the crisis.  
Interestingly, a series of experiments with Japanese college students found that 
victims consider an apology more sincere when the apology costs the offender 
something (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). Costly signaling theory, which was developed 
by evolutionary biologists (Johnstone, 1997; E. A. Smith & Bliege Bird, 2005), holds 
that when animals send signals to one another, costlier signals (e.g., signals that require 
more effort or sacrifice) are interpreted as more reliable. Thus, in the context of 
interpersonal apologies, the theory suggests that costly apologies help to prove an 
offender is truly sorry. Perhaps a similar dynamic is at work in organizational apologies. 
If so, this dynamic might help to explain Coombs and Holladay’s (2008) finding that 
offering compensation is just as effective as apologizing. Subjects may have perceived 
the compensation to be tantamount to an apology. 
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Scher and Darley (1997) used an experiment to show that interpersonal 
apologies are made up of an expression of remorse, an expression of responsibility for 
an offense, a promise of forbearance, and an offer of reparations. Each of these 
elements uniquely contributes to the perceived appropriateness of an apology. 
Organizational communication research has shown demonstrated that these four-
component apologies are equally effective at producing forgiveness whether issued by 
organizations or individuals (Bisel & Messersmith, 2012). However, Bisel and 
Messersmith did not test the effectiveness of less comprehensive organizational 
apologies (i.e., one, two, or three-component apologies).  
Other communication scholars have tested expressions of remorse and 
expressions of responsibility, finding both components to be important (Pace et al., 
2010). Still, there do not seem to be any studies that have tested the unique effect of 
promised of forbearance or offers of reparations in organizational apologies. This gap in 
the literature is problematic if Hearit’s (2006) theory is correct and offers of reparation 
can substitute for expressions of responsibility in some cases.  
Apology functions. While literature outside public relations has identified at 
least four ways apologies function—meeting victims’ psychological needs, changing 
attributions, producing empathy, or completing a symbolic ritual—public relations and 
crisis communication literature has focused mostly on the symbolic function (e.g., 
Hearit, 2006) or the attribution function (Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2008) 
of apologies. Public relations scholars have paid little attention to meeting the 
psychological needs of victims or producing empathy through apologies. Empathy has 
not been included as a dependent or mediating variable in experiments conducted by 
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public relations scholars. Although emotions like anger have been examined (e.g., 
Coombs & Holladay, 2007), there has been no real attempt to see if organizational 
apologies promote healing in crisis victims (Kent, 2010).  
Perhaps public relations scholars do not use the concept of forgiveness as a 
dependent variable because they consider forgiveness to be a uniquely interpersonal act. 
However, if forgiveness is defined as a reduced motivation to avoid or to seek revenge 
against an offender (McCullough et al., 1998), the concept of forgiveness might be 
adapted to an organizational context. Public relations scholars have used negative word 
of mouth intention and future purchasing intentions as dependent variables in crisis 
studies (Coombs & Holladay, 2007, 2008; Lyon & Sallot, 2004; Turk et al., 2012). If 
stakeholders decide not to do business with an organization because of an offense or a 
crisis, this behavior seems to constitute avoidance. If stakeholders engage in negative 
word of mouth regarding an organization, this behavior could be considered a type of 
revenge.  
Based on this analysis, forgiving an organization could be conceptualized as a 
willingness to (a) keep doing business with an organization and (b) not to say bad things 
about the organization. Evidence suggests that reducing stakeholders’ anger toward an 
organization can lead to this kind of forgiveness (Coombs & Holladay, 2007). However, 
more research is needed to see if stakeholders can be made to feel empathy for an 
organization and whether or not that empathy leads to forgiveness. 
Individual vs. organizational apologies. Scholars cannot afford to assume that 
interpersonal and organizational apologies are made up of the same components or 
function the same way. Communicating with another individual is much more natural 
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than communicating with a large organization (Hallahan, 2000). Individuals feel 
empathy for one another, but may struggle to feel empathy for a collective, as in the 
case of an organization (Bisel & Messersmith, 2012). Furthermore, individuals share 
different types of relationships with each other than they share with organizations (Bisel 
& Messersmith, 2012). If the purpose of an apology is to restore a relationship 
(Goffman, 1971; Tavuchis, 1991), different types of relationships may call for different 
types of apology. Therefore, the next section of this chapter considers the types of 
relationships that can exist between organizations and their stakeholders.  
Relationships Between Organizations and Stakeholders 
 Public relations scholars emphasize the importance of building and maintaining 
relationships between organizations and stakeholders (Ledingham, 2006). Ferguson 
(1984) suggested that the study of these relationships is what distinguishes public 
relations from other academic disciplines. L. A. Grunig, Grunig, and Ehling (1992) 
argued that public relations’ primary value lies in helping organizations develop 
“quality, long-term relationships with strategic constituencies” (p. 86). Cutlip, Center, 
and Broom (1994) defined public relations as “the management function that establishes 
and maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics 
on whom its success or failure depends” (p. 6). Although these statements reflect a 
certain managerial bias, other perspectives such as dialogic theory (Kent & Taylor, 
2002) also suggest that open and honest relationships are central to the practice of 
public relations.  
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This section discusses the way relationships between organizations and 
stakeholders have been defined, as well as how these relationships affect crisis 
communication. 
Defining Relationships 
Although this dissertation has been using the term stakeholders rather than 
publics, most public relations scholars refer to the organization-public relationship 
(OPR) when discussing this concept. Broom et al. (1997) developed a definition of the 
OPR by reviewing literature from the fields of interpersonal communication, 
psychotherapy, interorganizational relationship theory, and systems theory. Broom and 
his colleagues found that literature from interpersonal communication and 
psychotherapy tended to treat relationships as subjective realities (i.e., defined by the 
perceptions of the parties), while interorganizational relationship theory and systems 
theory literature emphasized the objective reality of relationships (i.e., observable 
interactions between parties). Broom et al. acknowledge both subjective and objective 
dimensions to the relationship construct, but criticized the subjective approach because 
so many “measures of relationships rely on participants’ perceptions, as if those reports 
were valid indicators of the relationships under study” (1997, p. 85). Instead, Broom et 
al. held that researchers “can study relationships as phenomena distinct from the 
perceptions held by parties in the relationship” (p. 95). 
Indeed, Broom et al.’s (1997) desire for objectivity can be seen in their proposed 
OPR model. According to this model, relationships are defined by exchanges, 
transactions, communications, and “other interconnected activities” (p. 94). Subjective 
perceptions are not considered part of the relationship, itself, but are treated as 
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antecedents to the relationship. Perceptions, expectations, motivations, social norms, 
and needs for resources all lead people into (or out of) a relationship, but according to 
Broom and his colleagues, these factors do not constitute the relationship. 
Ledingham and Bruning (1998) defined the OPR as “the state which exists 
between an organization and its key publics in which the actions of either entity impact 
the economic, social, political and/or cultural well-bing of the other entity (p. 62). Once 
again, this definition seems to base the OPR on objective and observable effects each 
party has on the other, not on the perceptions of organizational members or 
stakeholders.  
Interestingly, Ledingham and Bruning (1998) operationalized the OPR more 
subjectively. They developed five variables that reflect the strength of the OPR: trust, 
openness, involvement, investment, and commitment. These variables were measured in 
terms of stakeholder perceptions, not objective measurements. Ledingham and Bruning 
(1998) found that these variable predicted customer loyalty to a company. One key 
finding was that a company’s investment in the community produced greater customer 
loyalty, but only when customers knew about that investment. Thus, for Ledingham and 
Bruning, the OPR does appear to have an important subjective dimension. 
J. E. Grunig and Huang (2000) proposed a three-part model of the OPR, with 
antecedents to the relationship, strategies for maintaining the relationship, and outcomes 
of the relationship. Unlike Broom et al. (1997), J. E. Grunig and Huang (2000) defined 
OPR antecedents as ways in which organizations or publics affect each another. For 
instance, organizations can affect publics, publics can affect organizations, or 
organization and publics together can affect third parties. Maintenance strategies 
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include both symmetrical communication strategies such as openness, sharing tasks, or 
integrative negotiation, as well as asymmetrical strategies like contending, 
compromising, or accommodating. Relational outcomes are defined in terms of control 
mutuality, commitment, satisfaction, trust, and goal attainment.  
Hon and Grunig (1999) developed a survey scale to measure the quality of the 
OPR in terms of its outcomes. This scale relies on stakeholder reports (i.e., subjective 
perceptions) and has been widely used in public relations research. The four primary 
dimension of this scare are control mutuality, trust, satisfaction, and commitment.  
Control mutuality. Control mutuality refers to the power each party has to 
influence a relationship. Hon and Grunig (1999) argued, “For the most stable, positive 
relationship, organizations and publics must have some degree of control over the 
other” (p. 19). Control does not have to be equal, but if one party tries to dominate the 
other, communication will tend to break down and satisfaction will decrease. On the 
other hand, when each party has at least some control over the situation, it will be easier 
for organizations and stakeholders to work together.  
Trust. Trust refers to confidence in another party, as well as one’s willingness 
to be open with that party (Hon & Grunig, 1999). Hon and Grunig identified three 
subdimensions of trust. Integrity refers to an organization’s ethics – whether or not 
publics perceive it as “fair and just” (p. 19). Dependability is based on confidence that 
an organization will keep its promises. Competence is determined by the perception that 
an organization is able to do what it says it will do.  
Satisfaction. Satisfaction may be considered the favorable feelings of one party 
toward another, based on positive expectations being met and reinforced (Hon & 
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Grunig, 1999). Satisfaction results when the benefits of a relationship are greater than 
its costs. Hon and Grunig also suggested that satisfaction should increase if one party 
believes another party is working hard to maintain a good relationship.  
Commitment. For Hon and Grunig (1999), commitment is “the extent to which 
one party believes and feels the relationship is worth spending energy to maintain and 
promote” (p. 20). Continuance commitment is the intention to perform certain actions in 
the future that will maintain or strengthen a relationship. Affective commitment is a 
positive emotional orientation toward a relationship. 
In addition to these four dimensions of the OPR, Hon and Grunig (1999) divided 
relationships into two basic types: exchange relationships and communal relationships. 
Exchange relationships. Exchange relationships are based on reciprocity.  
Parties provide benefits to one another because they have received (or expect to receive) 
benefits for themselves (Hon & Grunig, 1999). This type of relationship is associated 
with marketing relationships between businesses and their customers. Exchange 
relationships are perfectly valid, but tend to be weaker than communal relationships.  
Communal relationships. Unlike exchange relationships, communal 
relationships are based on mutual concern, not reciprocity (Hon & Grunig, 1999). From 
an organization’s perspective, communal relationships are part of social responsibility. 
An organization ought to behave in a way that benefits the community, even if it does 
not receive immediate or direct benefits. In the long run, communal relationships should 
provide many benefits because these relationships improve cooperation between the 
organization and its stakeholders. Furthermore, communal relationships generally 
produce more trust, satisfaction, and commitment than exchange relationships.   
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Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR scale has been used to study a wide range of 
relationships, including relationships between universities and students (Hon & 
Brunner, 2002; Ki & Hon, 2007b), between manufacturers and retailers (Jo, 2006) 
between non-profit organizations and donors (O’Neil, 2007; Waters, 2008) and between 
consumers and brands (Kim & Chan-Olmsted, 2005). The reliability and validity of the 
scale has been tested with exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (Ki & Hon, 
2007a). Although, technically, this scale measures outcomes of the OPR, it is often used 
as a proxy for the OPR, itself. This scale is also one way the OPR has been studied in 
crisis communication research. 
Relationships and Crisis Communication 
 Coombs (2000) theorized that positive relationships between organizations and 
stakeholders should help organizations survive crisis situations. If stakeholders have a 
positive history with an organization, those stakeholders should attribute less 
responsibility for a crisis to the organization. After all, these stakeholders know that the 
crisis is not typical of the organization. On the other hand, negative relationships are 
likely to result in greater blame being placed on an organization in crisis situations. 
Coombs and Holladay (2001) found support for the hypotheses that negative 
relationship histories predict greater attributions of responsibility for a crisis. 
 One interesting possibility is that a crisis might cause more reputational damage 
to an organization with good stakeholder relationships. (Coombs, 2000). This situation 
could arise if the OPR leads to particularly high expectations among stakeholders. For 
example, when Apple’s iPhone 4 had antenna problems that caused the device to drop 
calls, the company initially tried to minimize the problem. This strategy might have 
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worked for a less-respected company. However, Apple customers expected Apple 
products to be virtually flawless and eventually forced the company to take corrective 
action (Gross, 2012). 
 Empirical evidence supports the importance of the OPR in crisis situations. 
Huang (2001) found that relationship quality between an organization and its 
stakeholders affected the way those stakeholders approached conflict with the 
organization. Stakeholders who felt a stronger relationship with the organization were 
more cooperative in resolving conflict.  
The OPR can also influence which crisis response are most effective. In his 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Caldiero (2006) surveyed students about their past 
relationships with two organizations. Students were then given reports of a fraud crisis 
involving these organizations, followed by various crisis responses ranging from 
defensive to accommodating. Students who had positive relational histories with an 
organization were more accepting of defensive responses than stakeholders with 
negative relational histories.   
A study by K. A. Brown and White (2011) suggests that the OPR can be more 
important than the image repair strategies organization’s use. This study measured 
students’ OPR with their university, and then presented students with a fictional crisis 
and four possible responses. Students who had more positive relationship with the 
university attributed less responsibility to the university regardless of crisis response. 
Even more surprising was that the researchers found no significant differences in 
attribution of responsibility between the four crisis responses (scapegoating, justifying, 
apologizing, bolstering). K. A. Brown and White concluded “maintaining positive 
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relationships with stakeholders is more important than any individual crisis response 
strategy” (2011, p. 88).  
The OPR can also be treated as an outcome of crisis communication. Huang 
(2008) surveyed crisis managers at Taiwanese companies and found that, at least from 
the perspective of these managers, different ways of responding to crises led to different 
levels of trust and relational commitment. Interestingly, this study found that the form 
of the crisis response (e.g., timeliness, consistency) mattered more than the content 
(e.g., specific responses).   
Research on interpersonal apologies suggests that relationship quality matters. 
According to McCullough and Witvliet (2002), “people are more willing to forgive in 
relationships in which they feel satisfied, close, and committed” (p. 450). Based on the 
work of Coombs (2000) and K. A. Brown and White (2011), it seems logical to assume 
that OPR will influence stakeholders’ reactions to organizational apologies, too. 
However, there are also significant differences between the way people interact with 
other individuals and the way people interact with organizations (Bisel & Messersmith 
2012; Hallahan, 2000). These connections need empirical testing.  
The final section of this chapter draws upon the preceding literature review to 
develop several hypotheses and research questions that will guide the rest of this 
dissertation.  
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 This dissertation seeks to advance public relations theory by determining what 
components constitute an effective organizational apology. Although any change 
produced by an apology could be called an effect, the term effectiveness is used here to 
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mean that the apology helps the organization achieve its goals. These goals are to repair 
the organization’s public image and its relationship with stakeholders. In this context, 
the stakeholder perspective is considered to be the most important perspective. No 
matter what scholars or crisis managers think ought to constitute an apology, 
stakeholders are the ones who must decide how to react to an organization’s crisis 
communication. In particular, this dissertation seeks to understand how victims of a 
crisis perceive an organizational apology. Coombs (2012) noted that most apology 
research studies non-victims, which may explain why apologies are sometimes found to 
be no more effective than other responses. 
The existing literature suggests two factors that will likely influence a 
stakeholder’s perception of an organizational apology. These factors are the 
components that make up the apology (i.e., the wording) and the quality of the 
stakeholder’s relationship with the organization prior to the crisis. Both of these factors 
are considered in turn. 
Apology Components 
 Interpersonal apologies have four unique components (Scher & Darley, 1997). 
These components are an expression of remorse, an acknowledgement of responsibility 
for the offense, a promise of forbearance, and an offer of reparations. Pace et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that expressions of remorse and acknowledgements of responsibility are 
both important in organizational apologies. Furthermore Bisel and Messersmith (2012) 
found that when all four components are included, organizational apologies are as 
effective as interpersonal apologies. However, no study has yet verified the unique 
importance of the promise of forbearance or the offer of reparations in an organizational 
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apology, nor whether offers of reparations can take the place of acknowledgements of 
responsibility as Hearit (2006) suggested. 
 Researchers have used a number of variables to measure the effectiveness of 
different crisis responses. These variables include whether or not the organization is 
perceived to have apologized (Choi & Lin, 2009b), whether or not stakeholders are 
willing to accept the organization’s account of the situation (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000), 
perceptions of the organization’s reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002), negative word 
of mouth intentions (Coombs & Holladay, 2008), emotional reactions (Lee & Chung, 
2012; Pace et al., 2010), purchase intentions (Lyon & Cameron, 2004), and the amount 
of responsibility attributed to the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
Organizational apologies are likely to influence all of these variables, either directly or 
indirectly. Organizational apologies are also expected be related to OPR quality. This 
dissertation tests the following hypotheses: 
H1: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ perception that an organization has apologized for a 
crisis. 
H2: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of the 
crisis.  
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H3: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ perceptions of the organization’s reputation. 
H4: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ perceptions of OPR quality after a crisis. 
H5: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be negatively 
associated with victims’ anger toward the organization in a crisis.  
H6: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ empathy toward the organization in a crisis. 
H7: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be negatively 
associated with victims’ negative word of mouth intentions after a crisis.  
H8: (a) Expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) 
promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations will each be positively 
associated with victims’ intention to make purchases from the organization in 
the future.  
As discussed previously, attribution theory seems to imply that because 
apologies involve accepting responsibility they should increase attributions of 
responsibility. However, empirical findings suggest that interpersonal apologies can 
95 
have the opposite effect (Weiner, 2006). Therefore, the following research question is 
posed:   
RQ1: How are (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations related 
to the amount of responsibility victims attribute to the organization in a crisis?  
Organization-Stakeholder Relationships 
 Research indicates that people are more forgiving toward other individuals 
(McCullough & Witvliet, 2002) and more willing to work with organizations (Huang, 
2001) when they have good relationships beforehand. K. A. Brown and White (2011) 
found that the OPR was a better predictor of how stakeholders responded to an 
organization in crisis than the content of the organization’s communication. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses are presented:  
H9: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be positively associated with victims’ 
perceptions that the organization has apologized. 
H10: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be positively associated with victims’ 
willingness to accept the organization’s account of a crisis.  
H11: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be positively associated with victims’ 
perceptions of the organization’s reputation.  
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H12: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be positively associated with victims’ 
perceptions of the OPR after a crisis.  
H13: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be negatively associated with victims’ 
anger after a crisis.  
H14: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be positively associated with victims’ 
empathy for the organization after a crisis.  
H15: Victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, control mutuality) will be negatively associated with attributions 
of responsibility.  
 According to Hon and Grunig (1999), the OPR can either be an exchange 
relationship or a communal relationship. However, there does not appear to be any 
research testing how these types of relationships might affect a stakeholder’s reaction to 
an organizational apology. For this reason, the following research question is presented: 
RQ2: Does the type of OPR victims have with an organization (exchange vs. 
communal) affect the way victims react to organizational apologies?  
Perhaps the ultimate measure of how stakeholders—especially victims—
perceive their relationship with an organization after a crisis is how stakeholders intend 
to act toward the organization. Understanding the link between the OPR and crisis 
communication requires an understanding of which factors lead stakeholders to act 
favorably toward the organization. Thus, another research question is posed: 
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RQ3: What factors are the strongest predictors of victims’ (a) negative word of 
mouth intentions and (b) future purchase intentions after a crisis? 
In all likelihood, some of the variables discussed above are better thought of as 
mediating variables, as opposed to dependent variables. For instance, Coombs and 
Holladay (2007) found that anger was a mediating variable between attributions of 
responsibility and negative word of mouth. McCullough et al. (1998) reported that 
empathy mediated the relationship between apologies and forgiveness in interpersonal 
relationships. Therefore, two more research questions will be addressed: 
RQ4: To what extent does anger mediate the relationship between (a) 
perceptions that the organization has apologized, (b) victims’ willingness to 
accept the organization’s account of the crisis, (c) perceptions of the 
organization’s reputation, (d) perceptions of OPR quality after a crisis, or (e) 
attributions of responsibility and victims’ negative word of mouth or future 
purchase intentions?  
RQ5: To what extent does empathy mediate the relationship between (a) 
perceptions that the organization has apologized, (b) victims’ willingness to 
accept the organization’s account of the crisis, (c) perceptions of the 
organization’s reputation, (d) perceptions of OPR quality after a crisis, or (e) 
attributions of responsibility and victims’ negative word of mouth or future 
purchase intentions?  
Other Factors in Effective Apologies 
 The preceding hypotheses and research questions focus on testing or exploring 
relationships between variables suggested by the literature. However, because only a 
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few studies have taken the stakeholder’s perspective on organizational apologies, there 
may be other factors that determine what constitutes an effective organizational 
apology. For instance, although the literature suggests four main components to an 
apology, stakeholders may not consider all of these components to be essential to 
organizational apologies. Furthermore, stakeholders may look for additional 
components of organizational apologies that go beyond the four components discussed 
already. The next two research questions consider these possibilities: 
RQ6: To what extent do stakeholders—without prompting—include the four 
apology components (expressions of remorse, acknowledgement of 
responsibility, promise of forbearance, and offer of reparation) when they 
conceive of effective organizational apologies? 
RQ7: Are there additional components that stakeholders expect to find in 
organizational apologies? 
 These hypotheses and research questions guide the remainder of this 
dissertation. The next chapter describes the methodology used in addressing these 
hypotheses and research questions.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
The previous chapter reviewed key literature on crisis communication, 
apologies, and relationships between organizations and stakeholders. In order to 
understand how organizational apologies can preserve or repair organization-
stakeholder relationships in crisis situations, it is vital to understand how stakeholders 
perceive organizational apologies. Specifically, we need to know what words or 
components constitute an effective organizational apology from the perspective of 
people who are suffering due to an organizational crisis.  
Existing literature reveals four components that make up an interpersonal 
apology: expressions of remorse, acknowledgements of responsibility, promises of 
forbearance, and offers of reparations (Scher & Darley, 1997). Because these 
components have only been partially studied in the context of organizational apologies 
(Bisel & Messersmith, 2012; Pace et al., 2010), this dissertation conducted empirical 
tests to determine how organizational stakeholders perceived each of these components 
in the context of an organizational crisis.  
At the same time, the differences between organizations and individuals made it 
foolish to assume that the four components of an interpersonal apology are the only 
components of an organizational apology. Perhaps stakeholders expect organizational 
apologies to contain elements that interpersonal apologies do not. Exploring this 
possibility required a more inductive approach. Therefore, a total of three studies were 
conducted to address the hypotheses and research questions put forward in the previous 
chapter. By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, these studies allowed 
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for triangulation of the data (Frey et al., 2000) and a more complete picture of the way 
stakeholders perceive organizational apologies. 
This chapter outlines the methodology of all three studies, including the 
sampling and recruitment of participants, the procedures followed, the design of the 
manipulations, and the measures employed. Data screening procedures and respondent 
profiles are reported in this chapter, as well. 
Study 1: Apology Component Experiment 
 Hypotheses 1-8 predicted that the four apology components identified by Scher 
and Darley (1997) would each be significantly related to (H1) victims’ perceptions that 
an organization had apologized, as well as (H2) victims’ willingness to accept the 
organization’s account of the crisis, (H3) perceptions of the organization’s reputation, 
(H4) perceptions of OPR quality, (H5) anger, (H6) empathy, (H7) negative word of 
mouth intentions, and (H8) future purchase intentions. RQ1 asked what relationship 
existed between the four apology components and attributions of responsibility to the 
organization. 
Hypotheses 9-15 predicted victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, 
satisfaction, commitment, and control mutuality) would be significantly associated with 
(H9) perceptions that the organization had apologized, (H10) willingness to accept the 
organization’s account, (H11) perceptions of the organization’s reputation, (H12) 
perceptions of the OPR after the crisis, (H13) anger toward the organization, (H14) 
empathy for the organization, and (H15) attributions of responsibility.  
RQ2 asked whether the type of relationship victims had with the organization 
(communal vs. exchange) would affect the way victims reacted to an organizational 
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apology, and RQ3 asked what factors would be the strongest predictors of victims’ 
behavioral intentions toward and organization (negative word of mouth and future 
purchasing) following a crisis. RQ4 and RQ5 asked what extent anger and empathy 
(respectively) mediated the relationships between dependent variables. Study 1 sought 
to test all of these hypotheses and research questions. 
Study 1 measured the effects of Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology 
components on stakeholders’ perception that an organization had apologized for a crisis, 
as well as stakeholders’ attitudes and behavioral intentions toward the organization. 
Theory predicted each apology component would contribute to the perception that an 
organization had apologized and would have a unique influence on stakeholders’ other 
reactions to the organization. Deductively testing causal relationships this way required 
an experimental design (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). Experiments use random 
assignment of participants to control for confounding variables and rule out alternative 
causes (Frey et al., 2000; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For this reason, experimental 
research has become increasingly popular in the study of crisis communication 
(Coombs, 2010c).  
This experiment was conducted online using a 2x2x2x2 fully crossed between-
subjects factorial design. Each factor represented one of the four apology components 
with two levels (present or absent), resulting in 16 possible combinations. This section 
discusses how data were collected and analyzed for Study 1.  
Recruitment 
 Although many studies in crisis communication have relied on student samples 
due to their convenience and cost-effectiveness (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008; 
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Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Lee & Chung, 2012; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Pace et al., 
2010), student samples are not always generalizable to the rest of the population (Bello, 
Leung, Radebaugh, Tung, & van Witteloostuijn, 2009). Therefore, in an effort to 
increase external validity, this experiment used a sample comprised primarily of 
working adults. 
 Because experiments use random assignment to control for individual 
differences, random sampling is not a requirement (Frey et al., 2000). To achieve a 
diverse non-student sample for this study, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website 
(https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome) was used to recruit participants. MTurk is a 
crowdsourcing website where volunteers complete small tasks in exchange for 
micropayments (Mason & Suri, 2012). MTurk has proven to be a reliable platform for 
conducting social scientific research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Compared 
to traditional online samples, MTurk offers easier access, greater diversity, and lower 
cost (Mason & Suri, 2012).  
MTurk also offers greater participant diversity than student samples. Buhrmester 
et al. (2011) reported that MTurk participants are older (M = 32.8 years, SD = 11.5) and 
more ethnically diverse (36% non-White) than college student samples. MTurk 
participants come from all 50 states and are more evenly split between female and male 
(55% female) than most student samples, too. One limitation of this sample is that 
MTurk participants are probably more technologically savvy than average, given that 
MTurk participants use the Internet to earn money.  
 MTurk allows “requesters” to post “Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs),” which 
“turkers” or “providers” may choose to complete (Mason & Suri, 2012, p. 4). HITs can 
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be completed on the MTurk website, but requesters can also post links to external sites, 
such as online survey sites. Requesters submit payment to Amazon, which collects a 
10% surcharge and distributes payments to providers. If requesters are not satisfied with 
the work, they can withhold payment. Many HITs pay only a few cents, and past studies 
have found that providers are often willing to work for an effective hourly rate between 
$1.38 and $4.80 an hour (Mason & Suri, 2012). Despite this low cost, researchers have 
shown that the quality of data provided by MTurk meets or exceeds “the psychometric 
standards associated with published research” (Buhrmester et al., 2011, p. 5). Based on 
these factors, Study 1 recruited participants from MTurk. 
 The sample size for this study was set at 800, with approximately 50 participants 
in each of the 16 groups. Based on Friendly’s (n.d.) online power calculator, this sample 
size allowed an effect size of d = 0.2 to be detected with a power of .806 and an alpha of 
.05. 
Procedure 
 The online experiment was conducted using MTurk and SurveyMonkey 
(http://www.surveymonkey.com). All procedures were approved by the University of 
Oklahoma Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to the beginning of the study. 
Participants were recruited via a HIT posted on MTurk, and a reward of $1.51 was 
offered. Given that the experiment took 10-15 minutes to complete, $1.51 was 
consistent with typical rates on MTurk (Mason & Suri, 2012). Also, because providers 
on MTurk could search for HITs based on the value of the reward, the $1.51 reward 
appeared ahead of any HITs that paid $1.50 or less. 
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Providers who chose to participate in the study clicked on a link and were taken 
to a page hosted by SurveyMonkey. Here, participants read an informed consent sheet, 
filled out a pre-questionnaire, read the experimental stimuli, and completed a post-
questionnaire. Participants were given a code to enter on the MTurk HIT page as a 
means of verifying their participation. Participants who completed the survey and 
entered the code receive their $1.51 reward.  
 Study 1 used a hypothetical scenario in which participants’ personal information 
was stolen from an online retailer’s database. Such data breaches are occurring with 
alarming frequency (Levin, 2011) and have affected different types of organizations, 
including banks (Dash, 2011), governments (R. Brown, 2012), and university databases 
(Lewin, 2010). In one high profile case, Sony had to apologize to users of its 
PlayStation Network after the network was breached and customer information was 
stolen (Bilton, 2011). Therefore, the scenario used in this study offered strong external 
validity. Because the MTurk participants were assumed to be technologically savvy, the 
hypothetical scenario was expected to be relevant to their personal experiences. 
 An interesting aspect of the scenario used in this study was that responsibility 
for the crisis was somewhat ambiguous. When an organization’s files are hacked, the 
organization is certainly a victim of the hacker. However, organizations that collect and 
store their stakeholders’ personal information have a duty to protect that information. 
Therefore, using Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) typology of crisis clusters, this 
hypothetical crisis could be categorized with the victim cluster or with the preventable 
cluster. Using this type of ambiguous scenario allowed Study 1 to test whether different 
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organizational apologies would influence the way stakeholders attributed responsibility 
for the crisis. 
 Participants began by completing a pre-questionnaire. Because the OPR was one 
of the variables to be measured in this study, the online experiment asked participants to 
enter the name of a company they had done business with online. SurveyMonkey 
automatically used this answer to populate future questions about the organization. This 
technique is similar to one used in marketing research (e.g., Yoon, Choi, & Sohn, 2008) 
to measure customer relations. By requiring participants to think about an organization 
with which they had an actual relationship, the OPR questions became somewhat less 
hypothetical. Furthermore, because different participants could choose different 
organizations, there was room for plenty of variance in the OPR data.  
 Asking participants to choose an organization with which they had some pre-
existing relationship also made it easier for participants to imagine themselves as the 
victims of a crisis, instead of just onlookers. Coombs (2012) argued that more research 
on apologies should consider the perspective of crisis victims. The author assumed that 
if participants had done business with an organization online, those participants would 
find it more plausible that their personal information could be stolen from that 
organization’s database. 
 Once participants had selected an online retailer, they completed a pre-
questionnaire measuring OPR, past shopping behavior, and demographics (see 
Appendix A for all questionnaire items). For the next step, participants were informed 
that the company they selected had sent them an e-mail. The text of this e-mail was 
displayed on the screen and described a data breach involving the participant’s personal 
106 
information. Along with informing participants about the situation, the message 
contained an apology stimulus and an invitation to contact the company for more 
information.  
There were 16 different apology conditions, based on the four separate elements 
of an ideal apology. The complete text of all 16 conditions is provided in Appendix B. 
These elements, or factors, were (a) expression of remorse, (b) acknowledgement of 
responsibility, (c) promise of forbearance, and (d) offer of reparations. Each factor had 
two levels (present, absent). Thus, the experiment followed a 2x2x2x2 factorial design. 
Although Scher and Darley’s (1997) study used a within-subjects design to test the four 
components of an interpersonal apology, the present study used a between-subjects 
design to minimize learning or order effects. Each participant read one of the sixteen 
apologies featuring between zero and four apology elements. The wording of these 
elements was adapted from Scher (1989) and from actual organizational apologies 
(Brodkin, 2007). Because SurveyMonkey randomly assigned participants to one of the 
apology conditions, the cells sizes were not perfectly even. The groups ranged in size 
from 43 to 57 participants. 
After reading the apology e-mail, participants completed a post-questionnaire 
containing manipulation checks, as well as measures of perceived apology, account 
acceptance, organizational reputation, OPR, anger, empathy, attribution of 
responsibility, negative word of mouth intention, and future purchase intention. These 
measures are discussed next. 
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Measures 
 The experiment included a 43-item pre-questionnaire and a 71-item post-
questionnaire (See Appendix A). Unless otherwise noted, all items were measured on a 
7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). For the pre-
questionnaire, participants were asked to enter the name of an online retailer from 
whom they had made at least one purchase. Participants were also asked how often they 
shopped with and bought products from that retailer. Next, participants were asked to 
enter demographic information (sex, race, age, education, income, and employment 
status). 
 Participants’ perceptions of their relationship with the online retailer were 
measured using 34 items adapted from Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR scale. This scale 
is designed to measure the dimensions of trust, control mutuality, commitment, and 
satisfaction. It also measures whether a relationship is a communal relationships or an 
exchange relationship.  
 After participants viewed the apology stimuli, they were given the post-
questionnaire. Four items served as manipulation checks. Examples include “The 
organization promised this situation would not happen again” and “The organization 
offered to repair the damage caused by this situation.” For each statement, the name of 
the organization chosen by the participant replaced the generic term “The organization.”  
Perceived apology (PA) was measured with four items adapted from Choi and 
Lin (2009b). Participants responded to statements such as “The organization apologized 
for the situation” and “The organization sought forgiveness.”   
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To measure account acceptance (AA), four items were adapted from Blumstein 
et al. (1974). These items included “The organization’s response was sincere” and “The 
organization’s response was appropriate.”  This scale has been used previously in crisis 
communication research (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 2008) and found to be reliable.  
Five items were adapted from Coombs and Holladay (2002) to measure 
organizational reputation (OR). Examples are “The organization is concerned with the 
well-being of its customers” and “The organization is basically DISHONEST.” Coombs 
and Holladay’s original items used the word publics instead of customers. However, in 
a pre-test, the word publics was found to be confusing. The word customer was 
determined to be a good substitute because it is a more familiar term and because the 
stakeholders of interest in this study are, in fact, customers. 
Attributions of responsibility (AR) were measured with five items adapted from 
Coombs and Holladay (2002, 2007). Items included “The blame for this situation lies 
with the organization” and “The cause of this situation was something that was 
manageable by the organization.” Although Coombs and Holladay used the word crisis 
in these items, the word situation was substituted here to avoid loaded language.  
Anger was measured with a five-item scale adapted from Lee and Chung (2012). 
Participants were asked, “To what extent do you feel _____ toward the organization?” 
The five emotions tested were angry, mad, irritated, annoyed, and outraged. These items 
were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).  
To test participants’ feelings of empathy, four items from Coke et al. (1978) and 
McCullough et al. (1998) were employed. These items were measured the same way the 
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anger items were measured. They included “To what extent do you feel concern for the 
organization?” and “To what extent do you feel empathetic toward the organization?” 
Three items adapted from Coombs and Holladay (2008) were used to assess 
participants’ negative word of mouth intentions. These items were “I would encourage 
friends or relatives NOT to do business with this organization,” “I would say negative 
things about this organization to other people,” and “I would recommend this 
organization to someone who asked my advice” (reverse coded).  
Finally, future purchase intentions were measured with three items adapted from 
Coombs and Holladay (2007) and from Jorgensen (1996). Examples include “I would 
do business with this organization in the future” and “I would not shop with this 
organization anymore” (reverse coded). Participants also completed Hon and Grunig’s 
(1999) OPR scale again in the post-questionnaire 
Sample Demographics 
 The invitation to participate in Study 1 was posted on MTurk. Less than 24 
hours later, 820 participants had completed the study. Although the HIT only called for 
800 participants, some participants completed the study without entering the 
confirmation code or their MTurk usernames, thus allowing extra participants to take 
part in the study. Three participants were found to have completed the study twice, 
based on their usernames and IP addresses. These duplicate cases were excluded, 
leaving 817 valid cases.  
 The sex of the participants was evenly split between female (49.3%, n = 403) 
and male (49.9%, n = 408), with six participants choosing not to answer (0.7%). 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 75 years old with a mean of 32.82 (SD = 11.95) 
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and a median of 29. The most prevalent race was White/Caucasian (76.3%, n = 623), 
followed by Asian/Pacific Islander (9.8%, n = 80), Black/African American (6.0%, n = 
49), Hispanic (4.3%, n = 34) and Native American (1.2%, n = 10). The other 21 
participants (2.6%) chose not to answer” 
A majority of the sample (54.4%, n = 526) had at least some college, while 
33.8% (n = 276) had a high school education. Six participants (0.7%) reported that they 
did not have a high school diploma, and nine participants (1.1%) chose not to respond.    
Thirty-four percent of the sample (n = 278) reported an annual household 
income between $30,000 and $60,000. Another 34.1% (n = 279) earned less than 
$30,000 per year, and 28.3% (n = 231) earned more than $60,000 annually. There were 
also 29 participants (3.5%) who chose not to answer. 
Most participants were employed either full-time (36.1%, n = 295) or part-time 
(27.7%, n = 226). Another 14.6% (n = 119) were students and 11% (n = 90) were 
looking for work. The remaining 9% (n = 73) were retired, disabled, or not looking for 
employment. Fourteen participants (1.7%) elected not to respond.  
A majority of participant entered Amazon as the online retailer with whom they 
had done business in the past (n = 474). The second most popular choice was Walmart 
(n = 50), and the third most common response was eBay (n = 28). Because participants 
were recruited via Amazon’s MTurk website, and because the instructions for Study 1 
used Walmart as an example, participants were likely primed to think about these 
retailers.  
Participants reported visiting the retailer’s website 12.13 times per month (SD = 
25.92), although this number was positively skewed by a handful of participants who 
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claimed to visit their chosen retailer’s site more than 100 times per month. The median 
number of monthly visits was six, and the mode was 10. Participants also reported 
making an average of 15.43 (SD = 25.43) purchases per year from the retailer. This 
number was also positively skewed. The median number of purchases was eight and the 
mode was 10. 
Data Screening 
 Data analysis was performed using SPSS 21. As recommended by Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001), the data were screened for missing variables, outliers, normality, 
linearity, and homogeneity of variance. Less than 0.5% of data were missing. Group 
mean substitution was used to impute the missing data. Group mean substitution is not 
as conservative as substituting the overall mean of a variable, but it preserves more of 
the variance in that variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In this instance, the 16 
experimental conditions were used to group the data. Missing values were imputed 
according to the mean of the appropriate variable for each experimental group. 
Outliers were found for only three variables. One outlier was found for age, 
eight outliers were found for the number of monthly visits to an organization’s website, 
and 21 outliers were found for the number of annual purchases made on an 
organization’s website. Because these variables were not central to the analysis, no 
further action was taken to deal with these outliers.  
 Normality was assessed by examining histograms for each variable, as well as 
skewness and kurtosis statistics. Histograms revealed that all but two variables had 
unimodal distributions. The only exceptions were manipulation checks. The items “The 
organization promised this situation would not happen again,” and, “The organization 
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offered to repair the damage caused by this situation,” were bimodal. Because only 
some participants were exposed to manipulations that included promises of forbearance 
or offers of reparations, these bimodal distributions were to be expected.  
According to A. Cameron (2004), skewness and kurtosis may range from +2 to -
2 in normal distributions. Only two variables failed to meet this criterion. One item 
from the satisfaction scale and one item from the organizational reputation scale had 
kurtosis values above 3.0. These two variables were ultimately dropped from their 
respective scales.  
Scatterplots did not reveal any curvilinear relationships between variables, so 
the assumption of linearity was considered satisfied. Fmax was used to assess 
homogeneity of variance. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), as long as sample 
sizes are within a ratio of 4 to1 or less, “an Fmax as great as 10 is acceptable” (p. 80). 
Because the ratio between the largest and smallest cells was 1.33 to 1, and the highest 
Fmax was only 4.09, assumption of homogeneity of variance was satisfied. The next step 
was to validate the measurement scales used in the study. 
Scale Validation 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted with AMOS 21 (Arbuckle, 
2012) to validate the scales used in Study 1. According to Levine (2005), “CFA is used 
when the researcher has an expectation of how the items will factor, and CFA is used to 
test this expectation against the data” (Levine, 2005, p. 336). Because the questionnaire 
items used in Study 1 were all adapted from existing scales, CFA was deemed more 
appropriate than exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Measurement models were created 
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for all multi-item scales and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was used to estimate 
all models.  
Model fit was assessed based on three fit indices: the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), 
the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA). Garver and Mentzer (1999) have recommended using these indices in 
structural equation modeling. All three indices range from 0 to 1. Values of .90 or 
higher for the TLI and CFI indicate an acceptable fit to the data. For the RMSEA, a 
value of .08 or lower is desirable.  
The first measure tested was Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR scale. According to 
Hon and Grunig, there are four OPR outcomes (trust, control mutuality, commitment, 
and satisfaction) and two OPR types (communal relationship and exchange 
relationship). Therefore, a measurement model was tested using six latent variables (see 
Figure 1). However, the covariance matrix was not positive definite, suggesting a 
multicollinearity problem (Byrne, 2001). Indeed, an inspection of the model revealed 
correlations ranging from .86 to .97 between the latent variables of trust, control 
mutuality, commitment, and satisfaction. These high correlations suggest that OPR 
outcome may be a single construct, rather than four distinct constructs. This model also 
fit the data poorly (χ2/df = 6.96, p < .001; TLI = .86; CFI = .82; RMSEA = .09).  
 Because of the high correlations between trust, control mutuality, commitment, 
and satisfaction, a revised model was tested where all four constructs were combined 
into one latent OPR variable (see Figure 2). The covariance matrix for this model was 
positive definite, although model fit was still poor (χ2/df = 7.849, p < .001; TLI = .83; 
CFI = .85; RMSEA = .09). Three questionnaire items were removed from the model 
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due to factor loadings below .50. The standardized residual covariance matrix was also 
examined, because standardized residuals greater than ±2.0 can indicate specific parts of 
a model that fit poorly (T. A. Brown, 2006). Using this standard, six more questionnaire 
items were removed from the model (see Figure 3). This final OPR model was an 
acceptable fit to the data (χ2/df = 5.72, p < .001; TLI = .92; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .08). 
Based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC), this model (AIC = 1041.34) was also 
more parsimonious than the previous model (AIC = 3057.45). 
 The next group of measures tested were the six variables related to apology 
reactions: perceived apology (PA), account acceptance (AA), attribution of 
responsibility (AR), organizational reputation (OR), anger, and empathy (see Figure 4). 
A measurement model containing these six latent variables was found to be an 
unsatisfactory fit to the data (χ2/df = 7.24, p < .001; TLI = .86; CFI = .87; RMSEA = 
.09). However, after examining the factor loadings and the standardized residual 
covariance matrix, one item each was removed from the OR, anger, and empathy scales 
(see Figure 5). This revised model was a good fit to the data (χ2/df = 4.96, p < .001; TLI 
= 92; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .07) and its AIC (1300.90) was much lower than the initial 
model’s AIC (2376.05), indicating a marked improvement in parsimony. 
 The final measurement model tested the scales for negative word of mouth 
intention (NWOM) and future purchase intention (FPI). In the initial measurement 
model, these constructs were tested as separate latent variables (see Figure 6). This 
model was not a good fit to the data (χ2/df = 19.58, p < .001; TLI = .94; CFI = .97; 
RMSEA = .15). More importantly, the two latent variables had an almost perfect 
negative correlation (r = -.98), suggesting that these two constructs did not provide 
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discriminant validity. Rather, both variables seemed to be measuring a single 
underlying construct of behavioral intention. The model was respecified with one latent 
variable (see Figure 7). Furthermore, based on an examination of the standardized 
residual covariance matrix, one NWOM item was removed. The final model fit the data 
quite well (χ2/df = 6.53, p < .001; TLI = .99; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .08). The final model 
(AIC = 52.66) was also more parsimonious than the initial model (AIC = 182.66).  
 Scales were modified based on the results of the CFA, and Cronbach’s alpha 
was calculated to verify the reliability of each scale. Reliabilities ranged from .76 to .97. 
The items retained in each scale were averaged to create new variables (see Table 1). 
Two NWOM items were reverse coded and combined with the three FPI items to create 
a new behavioral intention variable, in which higher scores reflected more positive 
intentions toward the organization. Correlations between the key study variables are 
reported in Table 2. 
Data from Study 1 were used to test all 15 hypotheses, as well as RQs 1-5. RQs 
6 and 7 were addressed through two additional studies. The next two sections describe 
Study 2 and Study 3.  
Study 2: Apology Writing Assignment 
 Study 2 used qualitative content analysis to explore what stakeholders consider 
to be the key elements of an organizational apology. This study asked participants to 
write the kind of organizational apology they would like to receive in a crisis situation. 
With this technique, Study 2 sought to capture any components of an apology that may 
be unique to organizational apologies. This technique is similar to the technique Scher 
(1989) used in his unpublished doctoral dissertation. However, Scher’s method was not 
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explained thoroughly and produced 30 content categories that were often overlapping. 
This section describes the participants, procedures, and analysis used in Study 2. The 
study was reviewed and approved by the IRB before being conducted. 
Participants 
 As with Study 1, participants were recruited through MTurk. One hundred 
participants were recruited to ensure reliability of the findings. Participants were given 
$1.51 as a reward for participating.  
 More males (55%, n = 55) than females (45%, n = 45) took part in Study 2. 
Most participants were White/Caucasian (75%, n = 75). Eight (8%) were Asian/Pacific 
Islander, seven (7%) were Black/African American, seven (7%) were Hispanic, and two 
(2%) were Native American. One participant chose not to answer.  
 Participants were relatively young. The largest group of participants (45%, n = 
45) was between 18 and 29 years old. Thirty-one participants (31%) were 30-39, 11 
(11%) were 40-49 and 11 (11%) were 50-59. Just two participants reported their age as 
60 or older. 
 The sample was generally well educated. More than half of the participants 
(53%, n = 53) had at least a 4-year college degree. Another 11 (11%) participants had 
some college, and 35 (35%) had a high school diploma. Only one participant had not 
finished high school. 
 Thirty-eight (38%) participants reported an annual household income between 
$30,000 and $60,000. Another 38 (38%) earned more than $60,000 per year, and 29 
(29%) earned less than $30,000 per year. Two (2%) participants preferred not to report 
their income. 
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 Nearly half of the participants (44%, n = 44) were employed full-time, and 25% 
(n = 25) were employed part-time. Just 9% (n = 9) were students, and 11% (n = 11) said 
they were currently seeking employment. There were also seven (7%) participants who 
were unemployed but not looking for work. One participant (1%) was retired and three 
(3%) chose not to answer.  
Procedure 
 Similar to the first study, participants in Study 2 linked to a SurveyMonkey page 
where they read an informed consent form. Those who agreed to participate were given 
the following instructions:  
Please think of a company with whom you have done business online. This 
company may be an online-only retailer (e.g., Newegg.com) or a company that 
does business online AND through brick and mortar stores (e.g., Wal-Mart). The 
only requirement is that you have made an online purchase from this company at 
some point in the past. 
 
Once you have thought of the company, please imagine that you received the 
following e-mail from this company: 
 
Dear friend,  
Our computer administrators recently discovered that hackers have 
illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of our customers. Your account is one that may be affected.  
 
Your task is to write the rest of this e-mail. Please write an effective apology 
from the company—the kind of apology that you would be willing to accept if 
this situation really happened to you. Please make the apology long enough to be 
realistic. Simply typing one or two words will not be accepted.  Just make sure 
you write an apology that would satisfy you as a customer, considering that your 
personal information had apparently been stolen. 
 
Below these instructions was text box for participants to write the organization’s 
apology. Following the writing assignment, participants were asked to provide 
demographic information and were given a code to verify their participation. 
Participants who entered this code on the MTurk HIT page receive their $1.51 payment.  
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Analysis 
 One hundred written apologies were collected and these apologies served as the 
units of analysis. Although these apologies could have been broken down into smaller 
units of analysis (sentences, phrases, etc.), the goal was to see how many different 
apology components each stakeholder would include in an organizational apology. 
Apology length ranged from 27 to 336 words (M = 108). All apologies were analyzed 
using a modified version of Glaser’s (1965) constant comparative method. According to 
Glaser, “the constant comparative method is concerned with generating and plausibly 
suggesting (not provisionally testing) many properties and hypotheses about a general 
phenomenon” (p. 438). The constant comparative method begins with placing 
qualitative data into categories. As Spiggle (1994) explained, “The essence of 
categorization is identifying a chunk or unit of data…as belonging to, representing, or 
being an example of some more general phenomenon” (p. 493).  
Once data were categorized, the properties of each category were examined for 
their theoretical significance. In this study, existing research on apologies and image 
repair was allowed to inform the analysis. However, new categories were also allowed 
to emerge from the data. This information was used to address RQ6 and RQ7. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 4.  
 Study 3: Apology Suggestions 
 Producing professional communication is not easy. Due to concerns that the 
participants in Study 2 might be unable or unwilling to generate enough qualitative data, 
another study was conducted. Study 3 addressed the same research questions as Study 
2, but with a slightly different approach. In this study, participants were asked to write 
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five suggestions or tips for a good organizational apology. This section describes the 
participants, procedures, and analysis used in Study 3. All procedures and study 
materials went through the IRB approval process before data were collected. 
Participants 
 Like the first two studies, Study 3 recruited participants from MTurk. One 
hundred participants were recruited and participants were given $1.51 as a reward for 
taking part in the study. 
 More males (53%, n = 53) than females (47%, n = 47) participated in Study 3. 
Seventy-three participants (73%) were White/Caucasian, 10 (10%) were Black/African 
American, six (6%) were Hispanic, four (4%) were Asian/Pacific Islander, and three 
(3%) were Native American. Four participants chose not to respond. 
 Most participants were under 40 years old, with 37 (37%) between the ages of 
18 and 29 and 31 (31%) between 30 and 39. Thirteen (13%) participants were 40-49, 12 
(12%) were 50-59, and seven (7%) were 60 or older. 
 A majority of participants had at least a bachelor’s degree (61%, n = 61). 
Another 15 (15%) had some college, and 23 (23%) had a high school diploma. One 
participant declined to answer.  
 Just over one third of the sample reported an annual household income between 
$30,000 and $60,000 (37%, n = 37). Almost the same number of participants earned 
more than $60,000 (38%, n = 38). Only 19 (19%) participants reported an annual 
income below $30,000, and six (6%) participants did not answer.  
 Participants were mostly employed, either full-time (41%, n = 41) or part-time 
(29%, n = 29). Eleven (11%) participants identified themselves as students, eight (8%) 
120 
were unemployed but looking for work, and five (5%) were retired. Only two (2%) 
participants reported that they were unemployed but not seeking work, and four (4%) 
did not respond.  
Procedure 
 After participants read the recruitment message on MTurk, they followed a link 
to SurveyMonkey where they completed Study 3. Once participants had read an 
informed consent form, they were given instructions for a short writing assignment:  
Please think of a company with whom you have done business online. This 
company may be an online-only retailer (e.g., Newegg.com) or a company that 
does business online AND through brick and mortar stores (e.g., Wal-Mart). The 
only requirement is that you have made an online purchase from this company at 
some point in the past. 
 
Once you have thought of the company, please imagine that you received the 
following e-mail from this company: 
 
Dear friend,  
Our computer administrators recently discovered that hackers have 
illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of our customers. Your account is one that may be affected.  
 
Now imagine that the rest of the email contains an apology from the company 
for what happened. Your task is to create a list of tips or suggestions for how the 
company can make its apology effective. An effective apology is one that you, 
as a customer, would be willing to accept. Please write at least five tips below. 
You are free to write more than five if you wish. 
 
 Participants were given a text box in which to write their suggestions. Once they 
were finished, participants entered their demographic information and received a code 
to confirm their participation. Participants who entered the code on MTurk received 
$1.51.  
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Analysis 
 The suggestion lists ranged from 17 words to 450 words (M = 105). The unit of 
analysis for this study was each participant’s suggestion list, not the individual 
suggestions. This approach was taken because the primary goal of Study 3 was the same 
as Study 2—to see how many different components stakeholders believed 
organizational apologies should include. Both studies treated the entirety of what each 
stakeholder wrote as the unit of analysis, allowing for an easier comparison of 
stakeholder opinions between studies.  
The suggestion lists were coded using the same modified constant comparative 
method described for Study 2. Once again, existing theory informed the analysis, but 
new categories were permitted to emerge, as well. The data from Study 3 was analyzed 
along with the data from Study 2 to find as many themes as possible across the 
stakeholders in both studies. Once major themes were identified, each stakeholder’s 
apology (Study 2) or suggestion list (Study 3) was coded. The frequency of these codes 
was compared to identify any differences between the findings of Study 2 and Study 3. 
These findings of both studies were combined to address RQ6 and RQ7. 
Summary of Methodology 
 In summary, this dissertation used both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
determine what elements or components make up an organizational apology. Using 
multiple methods allows researcher to triangulate the findings and achieve a deeper 
understanding of the phenomena in question (Frey et al., 2000). Study 1 used a 2x2x2x2 
factorial experiment to test the effects of four apology components identified in the 
literature review on nine dependent variables: perceive apology, account acceptance, 
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organizational reputation, organization-public relationship quality, anger, empathy, 
negative word of mouth intention, future purchase intention, and attribution of 
responsibility. Study 1 also tested the effect of pre-crisis OPR quality on the dependent 
variables.   
  Study 2 used a modified version of Glaser’s (1965) constant comparative 
method to analyze organizational apologies written by stakeholders. Study 3 used the 
same approach to analyzed stakeholder-generated suggestions for effective 
organizational apologies. These qualitative studies helped illuminate the quantitative 
findings from Study 1. These studies also looked for any additional elements that 
stakeholders expect from organizational apologies. Chapter 4 reports the results of 
Study 1. Chapter 5 reports the results of Study 2 and Study 3. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
understand what constitutes an effective organizational apology from the stakeholder’s 
perspective. In particular, this dissertation sought to study the perceptions of victims of 
organizational crises. One quantitative study and two qualitative studies were conducted 
to address a series of 15 hypotheses and seven research questions. This chapter reports 
the quantitative results of Study 1. 
 Study 1 was a 2x2x2x2 between subjects experiment that tested the relationship 
between Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology components and nine dependent 
variables. Study 1 also tested the effect of the OPR on stakeholder reactions to an 
organizational apology. The preceding chapter has already described the respondent 
profile for Study 1, as well as the data screening and scale validation procedures 
followed. This chapter reports the results of the statistical analyses used to test all 15 
hypotheses and five of this dissertation’s seven research questions. Manipulation checks 
were performed first. 
Manipulation Checks 
 The four apology factors in Study 1 were (a) expressions of remorse, (b) 
acknowledgements of responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of 
reparations. Participants were asked to respond to four statements that served as 
manipulation checks. Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were performed to 
test these manipulations. According to Perdue and Summers (1986), in factorial designs 
the researcher cannot simply test for a significant main effect of the manipulation factor 
on the manipulation check. Just because the manipulation factor has an effect on the 
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manipulation check does not mean it is the only factor that has an effect on the 
manipulation check. Therefore, the researcher must also check to see if other factors 
have significant (i.e., confounding) effects on the manipulation check. Ideally, the 
manipulation factor should be the only factor with a significant effect on the 
manipulation check. However, as long as the effect sizes of any confounding factors are 
small, Perdue and Summers argued that “their statistical significance probably should 
not be of great concern” (p. 323). The results for each factor are discussed below. 
Remorse Manipulation Check 
The first manipulation check stated, “The organization expressed regret for 
what happened.” This manipulation check was designed to validate the expression of 
remorse condition. The four-way ANOVA found a significant main effect for the 
remorse condition on the manipulation check, F(1, 801) = 210.18, p < .001, η2 = .21. As 
seen in Table 3, the other factors had statistically significant effects on the manipulation 
check, as well, although their effect sizes were smaller. The acceptance of responsibility 
condition, F(1, 801) = 61.47, p < .001, η2 = .07, the promise of forbearance condition, 
F(1, 801) = 18.64, p < .001, η2 = .02, and the offer of reparations condition, F(1, 801) = 
21.57, p < .001, η2 = .03 all had very small effects on the manipulation check. 
Interaction effects were found between remorse and responsibility, F(1, 801) = 53.48, p 
< .001, η2 = .06, between responsibility and forbearance, F(1, 801) = 4.78, p = .03, η2 = 
.01, and between forbearance and reparations, F(1, 801) = 6.78, p = .01, η2 = .01. 
However, these effects were deemed too small to cause problems with the analysis. 
125 
Responsibility Manipulation Check 
The second manipulation check stated, “The organization took responsibility for 
what happened.” This check was intended to verify the effect of the acceptance of 
responsibility condition, but was unsuccessful. The ANOVA did find a significant main 
effect for the responsibility condition on the manipulation check, F(1, 801) = 55.50, p < 
.001, η2 = .07 (see Table 4). However, the effect was small and main effects were also 
found for the other experimental conditions. Remorse, F(1, 801) = 28.50, p < .001, η2 = 
.03, forbearance, F(1, 801) = 66.96, p < .001, η2 = .03, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 
63.17, p < .001, η2 = .07 all had significant effects on the manipulation check. The 
interaction effects between remorse and responsibility, F(1, 801) = 7.70, p = .01, η2 = 
.01, as well as responsibility and forbearance, F(1, 801) = 9.23, p = .002, η2 = .01 were 
statistically significant, too.  
Perdue and Summers (1986) explained that manipulation checks fail for two 
reasons. The primary reason is that an experimental condition does not adequately 
manipulate the variable in question. However, another possibility is that “the 
manipulation check measure itself is confounded and/or unreliable” (p. 323). In this 
case, both explanations could have merit. The manipulation was operationalized as, “We 
know our customers trust us with their private information and we have let you down.” 
Perhaps a better manipulation would have expressed the responsibility-taking more 
explicitly. For instance, a statement like, “We take responsibility for our mistake,” 
would have been more direct. At the same time, the manipulation check only stated that 
the organization took responsibility, which could be done through word or actions. The 
manipulation check might have been stronger if it had stated that the organization “said 
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it took responsibility.” In any event, results related to the responsibility condition should 
be interpreted cautiously. 
Forbearance Manipulation Check 
The third manipulation check stated, “The organization promised this situation 
would not happen again.” This statement was used to test the validity of the promise of 
forbearance condition. The ANOVA revealed a strong main effect for the forbearance 
condition on the manipulation check, F(1, 801) = 561.36, p < .001, η2 = .41 (see Table 
5). Although the other factors also had significant main effects, these effects were 
extremely small. Remorse, F(1, 801) = 8.26, p = .004, η2 = .01, responsibility, F(1, 801) 
= 4.80, p = .03, η2 = .01, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 6.69, p = .01, η2 = .01, barely 
affected the manipulation check. Similarly, interaction effects between remorse and 
responsibility, F(1, 801) = 10.99, p = .001, η2 = .01, and between forbearance and 
repair, F(1, 801) = 13.18, p < .001, η2 = .02 were significant but very small. Thus, the 
promise of forbearance manipulation was successful. 
Reparations Manipulation Check 
The fourth and final manipulation check stated, “The organization offered to 
repair the damage caused by this situation.” This manipulation check was used to 
validate the offer of reparations condition. The ANOVA revealed a sizeable main effect 
for reparations on the manipulation check, F(1, 801) = 767.00, p < .001, η2 = .49 (see 
Table 6). No significant effects were found for remorse or responsibility, although a 
small effect was found for forbearance, F(1, 801) = 6.78, p = .01, η2 = .01. There were 
also statistically significant interaction effects between remorse and responsibility, F(1, 
801) = 4.57, p = .03, η2 = .01, as well as between remorse and forbearance, F(1, 801) = 
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4.88, p = .03, η2 = .01. Nevertheless, the effect sizes were too small to pose any threats 
to validity. The reparations manipulation was deemed successful.  
Overall, the manipulations for forbearance and reparations were highly 
effective, and the manipulation for remorse was acceptable. The only manipulation that 
was ineffective was the manipulation for responsibility. This limitation should be kept 
in mind going forward. The next section reports the tests of H1-8 and RQ1. 
Effects of Apology Components 
Based on research from Scher and Darley (1997), and Bisel and Messersmith 
(2012), H1-8 predicted that the four apology components (remorse, responsibility, 
forbearance, and reparations) would each be significantly related to perceptions that an 
organization has apologized (PA), account acceptance (AA), perceptions of the 
organization’s reputation (OR), post-crisis organization-public relationship quality 
(OPR), anger, empathy, negative word of mouth intention, and future purchase 
intention. RQ1 asked how the four apology components would affect attribution of 
responsibility (AR). These eight hypotheses and one research question were tested using 
four-way ANOVAs. 
H1 Results 
H1a-d predicted that (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
positively associated with victims’ perception that an organization had apologized for a 
crisis (PA). Significant main effects on PA were found for remorse, F(1, 801) = 106.48, 
p < .001, η2 = .12, responsibility, F(1, 801) = 108.11, p < .001, η2 = .12, forbearance, 
F(1, 801) = 24.99, p < .001, η2 = .03, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 48.82, p < .001, η2 = 
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.06 (see Table 7). Thus, H1a-d were all supported. Although none of the effect sizes 
were very large, the effect sizes for remorse and responsibility were approximately four 
times larger than the effect size for forbearance and twice as large as the effect size for 
reparations. Expressions of remorse and acknowledgments of responsibility had a 
greater influence on whether victims believed the organization had apologized than 
promises of forbearance or offers of reparations. 
As seen in Table 8, the experimental condition that produced the lowest PA 
score was the control condition with no apology components (M = 2.42, SD = 1.41), 
followed by the condition with only a promise of forbearance (M = 3.51, SD = 1.73). 
The conditions with the highest PA scores were the condition with remorse, 
responsibility and reparations (M = 5.83, SD = 1.30), as well as the condition with all 
four apology components (M = 5.76, SD = 1.03).  
Small interaction effects were found between remorse and responsibility, F(1, 
801) = 28.52, p < .001, η2 = .03, and between responsibility and forbearance, F(1, 801) 
= 7.33, p = .01, η2 = .01. When an acknowledgement of responsibility was absent, 
adding an expression of remorse to the apology caused the PA score to increase from 
3.51 (slightly disagree) to 5.06 (agree), a difference of 1.55. However, when 
responsibility was present, the difference between an expression of remorse (5.56) and 
no expression of remorse (5.07) was only 0.49 (see Figure 8).  
Similarly, when the promise of forbearance was absent, the acknowledgment of 
responsibility became more important. Without forbearance, the no responsibility 
condition (M = 3.91) produced a much lower PA score than the responsibility condition 
(M = 5.20). However, when the apology contained a promise of forbearance, the no 
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responsibility condition produced a PA score of 4.67 and the responsibility condition 
produced a PA score of 5.43. Thus, adding responsibility to an apology was less 
important if the apology contained a promise of forbearance. 
Scher and Darley (1997) found a linear relationship between how many 
components an apology contained and how apologetic an offender was perceived to be. 
An examination of the means for each cell (see Table 8) suggested that a similar trend 
might be present in the present data. To test the effect of the number of apology 
components on PA, a trend analysis was conducted. PA showed significant linear, F(1, 
812) = 196.64, p < .001, and quadratic, F(1, 812) = 29.68, p < .001, trends, with more 
apology components producing higher PA scores.  
As seen in Figure 9, the PA score was only 2.42 when no apology components 
were present, indicating that participant did not perceive that the organization had 
apologized. Scheffe post-hoc comparisons revealed that adding one apology component 
caused the mean PA score to rise significantly (M = 4.02, p < .001). Adding a second 
(M = 5.04, p < .001) and third (M = 5.57, p = .002) apology component also produced 
significant increases in the mean PA score. However, adding a fourth apology 
component did not produce a statistically significant increase in the mean PA score (M 
= 5.76, p = .95). Although the general trend was that more apology components 
produced greater perceptions that an organization had apologized, the trend began to 
level off after three apology components were present. 
Overall, each of the four apology components contributed to victims’ 
perceptions that an organization had apologized. However, the apology components 
with the greatest effect were the expression of remorse and the acknowledgement of 
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responsibility. More apology components tended to increase perceptions that an 
organization had apologized.   
H2 Results 
H2a-d predicted that (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
positively associated with victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of 
the crisis (AA). Main effects were found for remorse, F(1, 801) = 29.36, p < .001, η2 = 
.04, responsibility, F(1, 801) = 14.71, p < .001, η2 = .02, forbearance, F(1, 801) = 14.15, 
p < .001, η2 = .03, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 107.73, p < .001, η2 = .12, supporting 
H2 (see Table 9). As seen in Table 10, the experimental groups with the lowest AA 
scores were the control group with no apology components (M = 3.56, SD = 1.50) and 
the group that received only an acknowledgment of responsibility (M = 4.15, SD = 
1.64). The groups with the highest AA scores were the group exposed to the remorse, 
forbearance, and reparations components (M = 5.82, SD = 1.04), and the group exposed 
to all four apology components (M = 5.95, SD = 1.25).   
One interaction effect was found between remorse and responsibility, F(1, 801) 
= 6.85, p = .01, η2 = .01. When the apology did not contain an acknowledgement of 
responsibility, adding an expression of remorse caused the AA score to increase from 
4.53 to 5.27. However, when responsibility was present, adding remorse only increased 
the AA score from 5.13 to 5.39 (see Figure 10).  
Overall, each apology component had a statistically significant—albeit small—
positive effect on victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of the crisis. 
The offer of reparations had the largest effect.  
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H3 Results 
H3a-d predicted that (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
positively associated with victims’ perceptions of the organization’s reputation (OR). In 
support of H3, main effects were found for remorse, F(1, 801) = 7.18, p = .01, η2 = .01, 
responsibility, F(1, 801) = 14.11, p < .001, η2 = .02, forbearance, F(1, 801) = 10.68, p = 
.001, η2 = .01, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 29.92, p < .001, η2 = .04 (see Table 11). The 
control condition with no apology components produced the lowest OR score (M = 
4.40, SD = 1.22), and the condition with all four apology components produced the 
highest OR score (M = 5.77, SD = 0.99; see Table 12).  
Two interaction effects were found. The interaction between remorse and 
forbearance was significant, F(1, 801) = 4.05, p = .05, η2 = .01. When the apology did 
not contain a promise of forbearance, adding an expression of remorse was associated 
with an increase in the OR from 5.04 to 5.42. However, when a promise of forbearance 
was present, adding an expression of remorse made almost no difference at all (see 
Figure 11).  
The interaction between responsibility and reparations was also significant, F(1, 
801) = 5.32, p = .02, η2 = .01. When offers of reparations were absent, including an 
acknowledgment of responsibility in an apology produced a rise from 4.90 to 5.38 in 
OR. When reparations were present, adding responsibility only increased the OR from 
5.52 to 5.63.  
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Consistent with H3a-d, each of the four apology components had a statically 
significant positive effect on victims’ perceptions of the organization’s reputation. 
Offers of reparations had the greatest influence, but all effect sizes were small. 
H4 Results 
H4a-d predicted that (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
positively associated with victims’ perceptions of OPR quality after a crisis. Significant 
main effects were found for remorse, F(1, 801) = 5.46, p = .02, η2 = .01, responsibility, 
F(1, 801) = 6.08, p = .01, η2 = .01, forbearance, F(1, 801) = 11.08, p = .001, η2 = .01, 
and reparations, F(1, 801) = 20.93, p < .001, η2 = .03 (see Table 13). As seen in Table 
14, the lowest post-crisis OPR score was found for the control condition with no 
apology components (M = 4.10, SD = 1.52). The highest OPR score was found for the 
condition with all four apology components (M = 5.50, SD = 0.95). No significant 
interactions were found. Thus, support was found for H4a-d, although the effect sizes 
for all four apology components were quite small.  
H5 Results 
H5a-d predicted (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
negatively associated with victims’ anger toward the organization in a crisis. Main 
effects were not significant for remorse, F(1, 801) = 0.07, p = .80, responsibility, F(1, 
801) = 0.12, p = .73, or forbearance, F(1, 801) = 3.00, p = .08 (see Table 15). Thus, 
H5a-c were not supported. However, a significant main effect was found for 
reparations, F(1, 801) = 28.47, p < .001, η2 = .03. Offers of reparations led to a 
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reduction in anger, supporting H5d. As seen in Table 16, the condition with the 
strongest feelings of anger was the control condition with no apology components (M = 
3.98, SD = 1.99). The condition with all four apology components did not produce the 
lowest levels of anger (M = 2.99, SD = 1.72). Rather, the condition that included 
responsibility, forbearance, and reparations produced the least anger (M = 2.66, SD = 
1.39).   
One significant interaction effect was found. The interaction between remorse 
and forbearance had a small but significant effect on anger, F(1, 801) = 6.38, p = .01, η2 
= .01. Expressions of remorse and promises of forbearance, by themselves, each 
reduced anger more than the combination of remorse and forbearance (see Figure 12). 
This finding was surprising because theory suggests that more complete apologies 
should produce lower levels of anger. Perhaps the combination of remorse and 
forbearance increased the perceived severity of the crisis. If so, these perceptions of 
greater severity could have made this combination of components less effective at 
reducing anger. Once again, however, this effect was extremely small. 
Overall, the only apology component that had any meaningful influence on 
victims’ feelings of anger was the offer of reparations. 
H6 Results 
H6a-d predicted (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
positively associated with victims’ empathy toward the organization in a crisis. Just as 
with anger, empathy was not affected by remorse, F(1, 801) = 2.63, p = .11, 
responsibility, F(1, 801) = 1.50, p = .22,  or forbearance, F(1, 801) = 0.49, p = .48 (see 
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Table 17). However, reparations did significantly increase victims’ feelings of empathy 
toward the organization, F(1, 801) = 16.19, p < .001, η2 = .02. Thus, H6a-c were not 
supported, but H6d was supported.  
Interestingly, none of the experimental groups felt much empathy toward the 
organization (see Table 18). The experimental condition that produced the least 
empathy was the control condition with no apology components (M = 2.03, SD = 1.02), 
while the condition that produced the most empathy was the condition that included 
remorse, responsibility, and reparations (M = 3.05, SD = 1.63). When all four apology 
components were present, empathy levels only reached 2.66 (SD = 1.13) on a 7-point 
scale.  
A small but significant interaction was found between remorse and 
responsibility, F(1, 801) = 5.49, p = .02, η2 = .01. When an apology contained an 
acknowledgment of responsibility, an expression of remorse was associated with a 
slight decrease in empathy (see Figure 13). However, when responsibility was absent, 
the presence of remorse led to a small increase in empathy from 2.38 to 2.64.  
Overall, participants felt very little empathy toward the organization, regardless 
of how the apology was worded. Only the offer of reparations produced a significant 
increase in empathy. 
H7 and H8 Results 
H7a-d predicted that (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations would each be 
negatively associated with victims’ negative word of mouth intentions after a crisis. 
H8a-d predicted that each of the four apology components would be positively 
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associated with victims’ intention to make purchases from the organization in the 
future. As discussed in Chapter 3, factor analysis indicated that negative word of mouth 
intention and future purchase intention were actually the same construct. Therefore, 
these scales were combined and averaged to create the dependent variable of behavioral 
intention. This variable was used to test H7 and H8. 
The four-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for forbearance, F(1, 
801) = 11.13, p = .001, η2 = .01, and reparations, F(1, 801) = 22.52, p < .001, η2 = .03 
(see Table 19). However, neither remorse, F(1, 801) = 2.19, p = .14, nor responsibility, 
F(1, 801) = 3.71, p .054 had a significant effect on behavioral intention. Thus, H7/8a 
and H7/8b were not supported. H7/8c and H7/8d were supported, although the effect 
size for both IVs was small.  
As seen in Table 20, victims’ behavioral intention toward the organization was 
weakest in the control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.82). Every other group reported a 
behavioral intention score of 5.00 or higher, with the highest scores coming from the 
remorse + forbearance + reparations condition (M = 6.06, SD = 1.05) and the four-
component apology condition (M = 6.02, SD = 0.93).  
No interaction effects were found for behavioral intention. Promises of 
forbearance and offers of reparations both made victims somewhat more likely to do 
business with an organization in the future, and less likely to say negative things about 
the organization to other people. Expressions of remorse and acknowledgements of 
responsibility did not have significant effects on behavioral intention.  
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RQ1 Results 
RQ1 asked how (a) expressions of remorse, (b) acknowledgements of 
responsibility, (c) promises of forbearance, and (d) offers of reparations were related to 
the amount of responsibility victims attributed to the organization for the crisis. The 
four-way ANOVA produced a model that was non-significant overall, F(15, 801) = 
1.16, p = .30, indicating that the apology components were not related to attribution of 
responsibility. As seen in Table 21, the control condition with no apology components 
produced the highest attributions of responsibility (M = 4.66, SD = 1.14), while the 
offer of reparations alone produced the lowest attributions of responsibility (M = 3.98, 
SD = 1.20). The next section examines the effects of pre-crisis OPR and victims’ 
reactions to organizational apologies.  
Effects of Pre-Crisis OPR Quality 
 H9-13 predicted that the quality of the relationship stakeholders had with an 
organization before a crisis would affect the way these stakeholders reacted to the 
organization’s apology. Because Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR scale distinguishes 
between communal relationships exchange relationships, RQ2 asked how each of these 
relationship types would affect stakeholders’ reactions after the stakeholders became 
victims of an organizational crisis. RQ3 asked which factors, overall, were the strongest 
predictors of victims’ behavioral intentions after a crisis. Simple regression analysis was 
performed to test H9-13 and to address RQ2 and RQ3. The findings are discussed 
below. 
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H9 Results 
 H9 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR (i.e., trust, 
satisfaction, commitment, control mutuality) would be positively associated with 
victims’ perceptions that the organization had apologized (PA). As discussed in Chapter 
3, factor analysis indicated that the OPR was a one-dimensional construct rather than 
four distinct constructs. Therefore, PA was regressed on pre-crisis OPR, communal 
relationship, and exchange relationship. The overall model was statistically significant, 
but only explained 7% of the variance in PA, F(3, 813) = 19.73, p < .001, R2 = .07 (see 
Table 22). Pre-crisis OPR was a positive predictor of PA (β = .26, p < .001), supporting 
H9. Neither communal relationship nor exchange relationship was statistically 
significant.  
H10 Results  
H10 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
positively associated with victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of 
the crisis (AA). AA was regressed on pre-crisis OPR, communal relationship, and 
exchange relationship. The overall model was statistically significant, F(3, 813) = 
33.93, p < .001, R2 = .11 (see Table 23). However, the model explained just 11% of the 
variance in AA. As predicted by H10, pre-crisis OPR was a positive predictor of AA (β 
= .30, p < .001). Neither of the relationship types were significant predictors of AA. 
H11 Results 
 H11 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
positively associated with victims’ perceptions of the organization’s reputation (OR). 
OR was regressed on pre-crisis OPR, communal relationship, and exchange 
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relationship. The model was statistically significant and explained 34% of the variance 
in OR, F(3, 813) = 142.39, p < .001, R2 = .34 (see Table 24). Pre-crisis OPR was a 
positive predictor of OR (β = .39, p < .001), supporting H11. The Communal 
relationship type was also a positive predictor of OR (β = .24, p < .001), but the 
exchange relationship type was not a significant predictor.  
H12 Results 
 H12 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
positively associated with victims’ perceptions of the OPR after a crisis. Post-crisis 
OPR was regressed on pre-crisis OPR, as well as communal relationship and exchange 
relationship. The model was statistically significant, explaining 44% of the variance in 
post-crisis OPR, F(3, 813) = 212.70, p < .001, R2 = .44 (see Table 25). Pre-crisis OPR 
was a significant positive predictor of post-crisis OPR (β = .65, p < .001). Thus, H12 
was supported. Neither communal relationship nor exchange relationship was 
significantly related to post-crisis OPR.  
H13 Results 
 H13 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
negatively associated with victims’ anger after a crisis. Anger was regressed on pre-
crisis OPR, communal relationship, and exchange relationship. Although the model was 
statistically significant, it only explained 3% of the variance in anger, F(3, 813) = 9.48, 
p < .001, R2 = .03 (see Table 26). Higher pre-crisis OPR predicted slightly lower levels 
of anger (β = -.10, p = .020), lending some support to H13. Both communal relationship 
and exchange relationship were non-significant predictors of anger.  
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H14 Results 
 H14 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
positively associated with victims’ empathy for the organization after a crisis. Empathy 
was regressed on pre-crisis OPR, communal relationship, and exchange relationship. 
The overall model was statistically significant and accounted for 8% of the variance in 
empathy, F(3, 813) = 24.89, p < .001, R2 = .08 (see Table 27). Victims who had more 
positive perceptions of their relationship with the organization before a crisis felt 
significantly more empathy for the organization after a crisis (β = .32, p < .001). H14 
was supported. The two relationship types were not significant predictors of empathy. 
H15 Results 
 H15 predicted that victims’ perceptions of the pre-crisis OPR would be 
negatively associated with attributions of responsibility (AR). AR was regressed on pre-
crisis OPR, communal relationship, and exchange relationship. The overall model was 
statistically significant, but only explained 4% of the variance in AR, F(3, 813) = 11.03, 
p < .001, R2 = .04 (see Table 28). As predicted in H15, victims’ with more positive 
perceptions of the OPR attributed slightly less responsibility to the organization (β = -
.12, p = .004). Also, when victims perceived more of an exchange relationship with the 
organization, they attributed more responsibility to the organization (β = .09, p = .002). 
The communal relationship variable was not a significant predictor of AR. 
RQ2 Results 
 RQ2 asked whether the type of relationship victims had with the organization 
would affect the way victims responded to organizational apologies. As seen in the 
preceding tests of H9-15, relationship type had little effect on the way victims reacted to 
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the organizational apologies. The communal relationship type was a significant positive 
predictor of organizational reputation (β = .24). Also, the exchange relationship type 
was a significant but weak negative predictor of attributions of responsibility (β = .09). 
Besides these two statistically significant findings, neither communal relationships nor 
exchange relationships affected the dependent variables related to apology reaction.  
RQ3 Results 
 RQ3 asked which factors were the strongest predictors of victims’ behavioral 
intentions after a crisis. To answer this question, behavioral intention was regressed on 
PA, AA, OR, AR, anger, and empathy, and post-crisis OPR. The regression model was 
statistically significant and explained 76.1% of the variance in behavioral intention, F(7, 
809) = 367.37, p < .001, R2 = .76 (see Table 29). The only significant predictors of 
behavioral intention were OR, anger, empathy, and post-crisis OPR. Victims who had a 
more positive perception of the organization’s reputation had slightly more positive 
behavioral intentions (β = .07, p = .02). Both anger (β = -.18, p < .001) and empathy (β 
= -.09, p < .001) were negative predictors of behavioral intention. By far, the strongest 
predictor of behavioral intention was post-crisis OPR (β = .75, p < .001). The next 
section tests the possibility that anger and empathy mediate the relationships between 
the other variables in Study 1. 
Mediation Effects  
RQ4 and RQ5 addressed the possibility that anger or empathy might act as 
mediating variables between perceptions that the organization had apologized (PA), 
victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of the crisis (AA), perceptions 
of the organization’s reputation (OR), perceptions of OPR quality after a crisis (OPR), 
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or attributions of responsibility (AR) and victims’ behavioral intentions. Path analysis 
was used to test these relationships. 
As a first step, PA, AA, OR, OPR, and AR were entered into the model, with 
direct paths to behavioral intention (see Figure 14). All path coefficients were 
statistically significant (p < .05). PA (β = -.07, p = .01) and AR (β = -.05, p = .01) were 
both weak negative predictors of behavioral intention. AA (β = .07, p = .03) and OR (β 
= .07, p = .02) were weak positive predictors of behavioral intention. The only strong 
predictor of behavioral intention was OPR (β = .77, p < .001). 
RQ4 Results 
For the second step, anger was added to the model to address RQ4. Paths were 
drawn from PA, AA, OR, OPR, and AR to anger, and another path was added from 
anger to behavioral intention. The path from anger to behavioral intention was 
significant (β = -.18, p < .001). The analysis revealed that the paths from PA and OR to 
anger were non-significant. Also, the paths from AA and AR to behavioral intention 
became non-significant when anger was added as a mediator. All non-significant paths 
were removed from the model (see Figure 15).  
Based on the revised path model, anger did not mediate the relationship between 
PA and behavioral intention, or between OR and behavioral intention. However, AR 
had an indirect negative effect on behavioral intention through anger (β = -.05). The 
more responsibility victims attributed to the organization, the more anger they felt, and 
higher levels of anger were negatively related to behavioral intentions. Because the 
direct path from AR to behavioral intention became non-significant when anger was 
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added to the model, anger can be said to fully mediate the relationship between AR and 
behavioral intention. 
There were also indirect effects for AA (β = .04) and OPR (β = .04) on 
behavioral intention. The more willing victims were to accept the organization’s 
account, and the better OPR quality victims perceived, the less anger victims felt. Anger 
fully mediated the relationship between AA and behavioral intention. However, because 
the direct path from OPR to behavioral intention was still significant (β = .73, p < .001), 
anger was only a partial mediator of that relationship. The mediating role of empathy 
was tested next. 
RQ5 Results 
To address RQ5, empathy was substituted for anger in the path model. The path 
from OR to empathy was non-significant and was removed. All other path coefficients 
were statistically significant (p < .05). As seen in Figure 16, the relationship between 
empathy and behavioral intention was negative and quite weak (β = -.08, p < .001). 
Feeling greater empathy for the organization actually made victims slightly less likely 
to make purchases in the future, and slightly more likely to say negative things about 
the organization to others. Possible explanations for this finding are discussed in 
Chapter 6.   
PA (β = -.01), AA (β = -.01), OPR (β = -.02), and AR (β = -.01) all had weak 
indirect effects on behavioral intention that were mediated by empathy. Thus, empathy 
was a partial mediator of these relationships. However, the extremely small regression 
coefficients suggest that empathy is not a particularly important variable in the 
relationship between crisis victims and organizations.  
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Summary of Quantitative Results 
The data from Study 1 were used to test 15 hypotheses and five research 
questions. All four apology components (remorse, responsibility, forbearance, and 
reparations) were significantly related to victims’ perception that an organization had 
apologized (PA), as well as victims’ account acceptance (AA), perception of the 
organization’s reputation (OR), and perceptions of the post-crisis OPR. Thus, H1-4 
were supported. 
 H5-8 were only partially supported. Offers of reparations were associated with 
lower levels of anger and higher levels of empathy, lending support to H5d and H6d. 
Both promises of forbearance and offers of reparations were associated with more 
positive behavioral intentions, as predicted by H7/8c and H7/8d. In answer to RQ1, the 
apology components did not significantly affect attributions of responsibility. 
 Overall, the four apology components each contributed to effective 
organizational apologies. However, many of the effect sizes were quite small. Also, 
because the manipulation check for the acknowledgement of responsibility treatment 
was unsuccessful, any results related to that variable should be interpreted with caution. 
 Pre-crisis OPR quality was a positive predictor of PA, AA, OR, post-crisis OPR, 
and empathy. Pre-crisis OPR was also a negative predictor of anger and AR. Thus, H9-
15 were supported. RQ2 asked whether relationship type (communal vs. exchange) 
would affect victims’ reactions to an organizational apology. Stronger communal 
relationships were positively associated with OR, and stronger exchange relationships 
were associated with greater AR. Aside from these findings, relationship type was a 
non-factor in the analysis.  
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 RQ3 asked which factors were the strongest predictors of victims’ behavioral 
intentions. OPR quality was the most important factor, by far, although OR, anger, and 
empathy were also significant predictors of behavioral intention. 
 RQ4 and RQ5 explored the potential mediating effects of anger and empathy, 
respectively. Anger mediated the relationships between AR and behavioral intention, as 
well as the relationship between AA and behavioral intention. Anger was also a partial 
mediator of the relationship between OPR and behavioral intention. Empathy was a 
partial mediator of the relationships between PA, AA, OPR, and AA, and behavioral 
intentions. However, these relationships were very weak. Overall, empathy had little 
effect on behavioral intention.  
 In summary, expressions of remorse and acknowledgements of responsibility are 
the most important apology components for making victims feel like an organization 
has actually apologized. However, the offer of reparations is the single most important 
apology component for increasing victims’ account acceptance, enhancing the 
organization’s reputation, improving the organization’s relationship with its 
stakeholders, reducing anger, increasing empathy, and producing more positive 
behavioral intentions toward the organization. Furthermore, the quality of the pre-crisis 
relationship was more powerful than the apology components at predicting all 
dependent variables except the perception of an apology. After a crisis the quality of the 
relationship is the best predictor of how victims intend to behave toward the 
organization.  
 This chapter has reported the quantitative results of Study 1. Chapter 5 will 
cover the qualitative results of Study 2 and Study 3. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
The preceding chapter reported the quantitative results of Study 1, an online 
experiment that tested stakeholders’ reactions to four components of an organizational 
apology. This chapter reports the qualitative findings of Study 2 and Study 3. These 
studies asked stakeholders to imagine that their personal information had been stolen 
from an online retailer’s database, and to write either the kind of apology they would 
like to receive from the organization (Study 2), or a list of suggestions to make the 
organization’s apology effective (Study 3). 
The purpose of these qualitative studies was to provide methodological 
triangulation for Study 1. Although the literature suggested four components to an 
effective apology, RQ6 asked whether stakeholders—without prompting—would 
include those components in an apology that met their expectations. Perhaps there are 
certain components of an organizational apology that stakeholders do not consider 
necessary or important. Furthermore, RQ7 raised the possibility that stakeholders want 
organizational apologies to include additional components beyond the four components 
tested in Study 1.  
Answering these questions required a more inductive approach than Study 1 
offered. Because experiments rely on controlling variables, they require researchers to 
prejudge and predict what variables will be important. Qualitative methods, on the other 
hand, allow researchers to remain open to unexpected findings that may emerge from 
the data (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
Both Study 2 and Study 3 were designed to explore the range of different 
components stakeholders would include in effective organizational apologies. These 
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studies used slightly different techniques to generate data, based on the possibility that 
stakeholders might include different components when writing an actual apology as 
opposed to suggesting various ways to apologize. The unit of analysis for Study 2 was 
the apology and the unit of analysis for Study 3 was the list of suggestions each 
participant wrote. Thus, apology components found anywhere within the data generated 
by a participant were coded once for that participant, regardless of how frequently the 
participant referred to the component.    
Chapter 3 has already described the modified constant comparative method 
(Glaser, 1965) used to analyze the data. Data from each study were analyzed separately 
at first, by identifying the main themes and comparing those themes to existing theory. 
Themes identified in one data set were tested on the other data set to see how well they 
fit. This procedure revealed common themes across both data sets. Although the 
findings for both studies were not identical, they were quite similar. Therefore, this 
chapter will begin by describing these common themes, and will then discuss each 
study’s unique findings. Finally, the findings will be used to answer RQ6 and RQ7.  
Apology Themes 
 Two major themes emerged from the data analysis. First, stakeholders expect 
organizational apologies to communicate that the problem is being fixed. Second, 
stakeholders expect that organizations will use apologies to rebuild relationships with 
stakeholders. These two major themes are related to the concepts of information 
management and meaning management discussed by Coombs (2010a). Fixing the 
problem involves communicating information about what caused a crisis, what the 
organization is doing, and what stakeholders can or should do to protect themselves. 
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Rebuilding the relationship involves communicating that the organization genuinely 
regrets the crisis, identifies with its stakeholders, and cares about the relationship. This 
process seeks to influence the meanings stakeholders attach to a crisis.  
 Under these two major themes are several apology components that can be 
classified as primarily words or behaviors. Figure 17 represents these relationships 
along two axes. Thus, the apology components identified in the qualitative data may be 
placed into one of four quadrants or categories: (1a) Words that fix the problem, (1b) 
behaviors that fix the problem, (2a) words that rebuild the relationship, and (2b) 
behaviors that rebuild the relationship.  
These categories are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. For example, the 
steps an organization takes to fix a problem are likely to help rebuild stakeholder 
relationships, too. The distinction between words and behaviors is not always clear 
because apologies often use words to communicate behaviors. These categories are 
based on the primary function (fixing the problem or rebuilding the relationship) and 
mechanism (words or behavior) of each apology component. These categories are 
meant to serve as a heuristic for understanding how the stakeholders in Study 2 and 
Study 3 described effective organizational apologies. Each of these categories is 
discussed in turn.  
Words that Fix Problems       
 When an organization apologizes for a crisis, stakeholders expect that the 
organization will try to fix the problem. Fixing the problem involves words and 
behaviors. Data from the organizational apologies and suggestion lists written by 
stakeholders revealed three ways organizations can use words to fix problems. First, 
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organizations can acknowledge responsibility for the crisis. Second, organizations can 
provide an explanation for the crisis. Third, organizations can tell stakeholders what 
actions to take to protect themselves. 
 Acknowledging responsibility. Acknowledging responsibility is a fairly 
obvious first step for organizations to take in crises. This apology component has 
already been widely recognized by other scholars (Coombs, 2007a; Hearit, 2006; 
Lazare, 2004; Scher & Darley; 1997, Tavuchis, 1991). Participants in Study 2 and 
Study 3 often contrasted the acknowledgment of responsibility with excuse making. For 
instance, one of the apologies written for Study 2 contained this statement: “In this day 
and time, incidents like this are sure to happen from time to time, however, that does 
not excuse our involvement.” Another apology read, “Although this can happen to any 
business, and even government, we are not taking that attitude.” One of the Study 3 
participants suggested, “Take responsibility and don't pass the blame.” Another wrote, 
“Right or wrong, I would need to hear first and foremost a no excuses sincere ‘we made 
a mistake’ apology.” 
 Acknowledgements of responsibility represent a first step toward fixing the 
problem. If an organization denies responsibility, stakeholders may doubt the 
organization’s commitment to fixing the problem. One Study 2 participant wrote in her 
organizational apology, “We are taking full responsibility for our failure to adequately 
protect your data and we are committed to making up for this error.” Another 
participant imagined the organization saying, “We realize this comes as a dent to our 
credibility but rest assured, we will find a solution where everyone comes out happy.” 
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Organizations that take responsibility are apparently more credible when they promise 
to fix a problem. 
Overall, 18% of the organizational apologies contained explicit 
acknowledgments of responsibility, and 30% of the suggestions lists contained at least 
one suggestion related to acknowledging responsibility (see Table 30). The next way 
organizational apologies can fix problems with words is by offering an explanation. 
Offering an explanation. As discussed in Chapter 2, certain scholars have 
suggested that explanations ought to be included in apologies (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 
1984; Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 2004). However, Scher & Darley (1997) argued that 
explanations are a kind of excuse making and, therefore, not an appropriate part of the 
apology process. Chapter 6 will consider the question of whether explanations are 
compatible with apologies. For now, it is enough to note that many of the participants in 
Study 2 and Study 3 expressed a desire to hear organizations explain how a crisis 
occurred. Explanations serve at least three functions. 
The first function of an explanation is to reinforce an organization’s 
acknowledgment of responsibility. One of the participants in Study 3 suggested, 
“Explain how hackers got into the system in plain English. Make it clear whether the 
system was particularly weak or the hackers were very stealthy.” Another suggestion 
read, “Describe what happened so it doesn’t sound like you’re hiding anything.” 
Evidently, some stakeholders see incomplete explanations of the situation as a way for 
organizations to avoid responsibility or to hide information from stakeholders. 
The second function of an explanation is to help stakeholders understand how 
they may be affected by a crisis. One of the apologies in Study 2 stated:  
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We will be going through the database extensively to find out exactly what 
information of yours has been accessed. When we have confirmation on this we 
will contact you within the next 24 hours to let you know what information of 
yours was accessed. 
 
A suggestion from Study 3 reinforces this point: “The company should explain 
what data they think is compromised (i.e., SSN, birthdate, financial information). They 
should be as specific as possible.”  
The third function of an explanation is to make a promise of forbearance more 
credible. One of the suggestions offered in Study 3 was, “Explain briefly how the 
breach happened and what steps you are taking to ensure this doesn’t happen in the 
future.” Only if an organization understands how a problem occurred can it reasonably 
hope to prevent a recurrence of the problem. Explanations to stakeholders allow 
organizations to demonstrate their understanding of the problem before promising to fix 
it. 
Explanations were included in 12% of the organizational apologies written for 
Study 2, and 42% of the suggestion lists generated for Study 3 (see Table 30). The third 
way in which organizational apologies can fix problems with words is by telling 
stakeholders how to protect themselves. 
Telling stakeholders what actions to take. Like acknowledgements of 
responsibility and explanations, the concept of telling stakeholders what actions to take 
in a crisis is not new. For example, Coombs (2006a) emphasized that the first priority in 
a crisis should be the safety of all stakeholders. Crisis communication should begin by 
informing stakeholders of any actions they can take to protect themselves. According to 
the findings from Study 2 and Study 3, approximately half of the participants would 
consider an organizational apology incomplete if it did not offer this information. 
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In the case of a data breach, stakeholders need information about how to reduce 
their risk of identity theft. One apology urged customers, “For your own protection we 
advise you to contact the issuers of any credit cards you have used in transactions with 
us and inform them of this event.” Another stated, “We strongly encourage you to 
change your current username and password as well as security questions.” A Study 3 
participant suggested that a company should, “Provide information as to what steps its 
customers can do now to prevent the abuse of the compromised information.”  
By telling stakeholders what action to take in a crisis, organizations show care 
and concern for the well-being of their stakeholders. They also empower stakeholders to 
help fix the problem. Fifty-eight (58%) of the apologies in Study 2 and 46 (46%) of the 
suggestion lists in Study 3 made at least one reference to telling stakeholders what 
actions to take (see Table 30).  
Although words are powerful, they were often insufficient to fix a problem. 
Therefore, the next section discusses how organizational apologies can fix problems 
with behaviors. 
Behaviors that Fix Problems 
 An apology is a type of symbolic action—a speech act according to Searle 
(1969) and Tavuchis (1991)—but symbolic actions often need to be accompanied by 
material actions or behaviors. As Hearit (2006) and others have observed, effective 
apologies are typically accompanied by some type of corrective action. Part of the job 
of an organizational apology is to communicate what behaviors the organization is 
engaged in to fix the problem.  
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Benoit (1995a) defined corrective action as either “restoring the situation to the 
state of affairs before the objectionable action” or making changes “to prevent the 
recurrence of the undesirable act” (p. 79). These two types of corrective action are 
directly related to the offer of reparations and promise of forbearance components in an 
apology (Scher & Darley, 1997). Interestingly, the data from Study 2 and Study 3 
suggest a third type of corrective action not discussed by Benoit: mitigating harm. All 
three of these types of corrective action will be described, briefly.  
Mitigating harm. Reducing the negative effects of a crisis is already recognized 
as part of effective crisis management (e.g., Coombs, 2006; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). 
However, literature in the field of public relations has not generally treated the 
mitigation of harm as a type of corrective action (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995; 1998; 
Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998). The findings from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that 
mitigating harm is distinct from other types of corrective action and ought to be 
considered a form of corrective action in its own right. 
In the data analysis process, a number of statements from Study 2 and Study 3 
participants were hard to categorize as offers of reparations or promises of forbearance. 
These statements emphasized the organization’s efforts to mitigate the harm caused by 
the data breach. For example one apology said, “We have removed all customer 
information from our database so that it can no longer be accessed.” Another said, “Our 
company is doing everything possible to ensure that your information is not used by 
hackers to harm you or your family in every [sic] way.” Several suggestions mentioned 
working with law enforcement to catch the hackers. One suggestion read, “Ensure that 
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you are doing everything you can to find the hackers, and make sure that they do not 
use the personal account information from the database.”  
These actions do not match the definition of reparations, nor do they ensure that 
the problem will not recur. Rather, these actions seek to reduce the harm suffered by 
stakeholders. Depending on the type of crisis an organization faces, communicating 
how the organization is mitigating the effects of the crisis is one way to make an 
apology more effective. This type of corrective action was mentioned in 26% apologies 
and 27% suggestion lists (see Table 30). 
Offering reparations. For many scholars, offers of reparations are a vital part 
of complete apologies (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Hearit, 2006; Scher & Darley, 
1997). The results of Study 2 and Study 3 support this view. Offers of reparations can 
be specific or general. One apology stated, “We will make sure to compensate you for 
any time and money you have spent fixing this problem.” Another apology invited 
stakeholders to “Let us know if there is anything we may do to alleviate the issue and 
regain your trust.” Suggestions from Study 3 included, “Offer monetary reimbursement 
if the customer's credit card is falsely charged as a result of the incident,” as well as, 
“Offer to pay for a year of a credit monitoring service.”  
Some of the expectations reflected in these comments may be unrealistic. This 
issue will be discussed in the next chapter. However, the data clearly suggest that 
reparations are an important type of corrective action and a behavior that can fix 
problems. Many of the apologies (43%) and suggestion lists (55%) included offers of 
reparations (see Table 30). The final type of corrective action is preventing recurrences 
of a problem. 
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Preventing recurrences. Preventing the recurrence of a problem begins with a 
promise of forbearance (Scher & Darley, 1997), but requires an organization to follow 
through on that promise. Most of the stakeholder-written apologies contained promises 
of forbearance. One typical example stated, “We have taken immediate action to 
increase our security levels to prevent a repeat breach by unauthorized persons.” A 
suggestion from Study 3 went farther, urging the organization to “Follow through and 
follow up.”   
Another suggestion from Study 3 illustrates the importance of preventing 
recurrences of a problem. The participant wrote, “Explain to me how you’re going to 
prevent the issue in the future. Just saying sorry isn’t enough. I want to know what is 
being done to ensure it doesn’t happen again.” The majority of apologies (65%) 
included promises of forbearance and almost all of the suggestion lists (86%) referred to 
preventing a recurrence of the problem (see Table 30).  
Stakeholders expect organizational apologies to fix problems through words and 
behaviors. However, stakeholders also expect apologies to rebuild the relationship 
between an organization and its stakeholders. This concept is discussed next. 
Words that Rebuild Relationships  
 Just because an organization fixes a problem does not mean the organization 
automatically regains the trust and loyalty of its stakeholders. Stakeholders in Study 2 
and Study 3 identified three ways organizational apologies can use words to rebuild 
stakeholder relationships. Apologies can express genuine remorse, can identify with 
stakeholders, and can request another chance from victims. These three findings are 
discussed in turn.  
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 Expressing genuine remorse. Almost all of the apologies written for Study 2 
contained either the word “apologize” or the word “sorry.” According to speech act 
theory (Scher & Darley, 1997; Searle, 1969), these words serve as illocutionary force 
indicating devices that tell the audience when a statement is intended to function as an 
apology. Therefore, the fact that most study participants used these words is not 
surprising. What is more interesting is the number of participants who used adverbs 
such as “sincerely,” “deeply,” or “truly” to modify “apologize” or “sorry.” Many 
stakeholders seem to want evidence that an apology reflects genuine emotion. Sincerity 
was a also common theme in the Study 3 suggestion lists. 
 Several examples will illustrate the importance of expressing genuine remorse. 
One apology stated, “We are truly sorry that this has happened.” Another said, “We 
would like to offer our heartfelt apology.” Still another said, “We sincerely apologize 
for this issue.” The suggestions from Study 3 included, “Express how saddened you are 
to learn that your safeguards failed to protect the customer,” and “There must be a 
sincere ‘We're sorry,’ somewhere in the statement.”  
 Genuine remorse communicates to stakeholders that an organization values 
them. One Study 3 participant wrote, “The tone of the apology should be sincere. It 
should make the customers believe that the company actually cares about them.” By 
conveying the company’s care and concern for stakeholders, expressions of genuine 
remorse help to rebuild the relationship. Most of the apologies (69%) and a fair number 
of the suggestions lists (28%) included an expression of genuine remorse (see Table 
31).  
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 Identifying with stakeholders. The next way apologies can rebuild 
relationships with words is by allowing organizations to identify with their stakeholders. 
Identification occurs when two parties share common goals, values, or interests (Burke, 
1969). Organizational apologies can foster identification with stakeholders in three 
ways: acknowledging stakeholders’ worth, affirming stakeholders’ values, and 
empathizing with stakeholders’ suffering. All three of these themes were found in the 
data from Study 2 and Study 3.  
 Acknowledging stakeholders’ worth. Many of the apologies written for Study 2 
expressed how much the organization valued its customers. One apology said, “Know 
that your patronage is important to us and we will do anything we need to do to 
continue to prove to you that we mean this.” Another apology included the statement, 
“We are here to serve you, our valued customer.” A Study 3 participant suggested, 
“Mention for how many years you have had me as a customer and would like to keep 
me (makes me feel important in the big picture).” Overall, 24% apologies and 25% 
suggestions lists mentioned the stakeholders’ worth (see Table 31). 
 Affirm stakeholders’ values. Organizations affirm stakeholders’ values by 
communicating that what is important to the stakeholders is also important to the 
organization. Affirming stakeholders’ values is the type of identification most closely 
related to Burke’s (1969) concept of identification. For example, one Study 2 
participant wrote in his apology, “Your privacy and the privacy of our other customers 
is a top priority for us.” Another wrote, “You should be aware that we take the security 
of our customer data seriously.” Although 29% apologies contained an affirmation of 
stakeholders’ values, only two participants in Study 3 mentioned this concept in their 
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suggestion lists (see Table 31). Along with affirming stakeholders’ values, 
organizations can identify with stakeholders by empathizing with stakeholders’ 
suffering. 
 Empathizing with stakeholders’ suffering. Because empathy involves taking 
another person’s perspective and feeling sympathy or concern for that person (Coke et 
al., 1978), empathy can strengthen identification between two parties. In the context of 
an organizational apology, expressions of empathy communicate that the organization 
understands the stakeholders’ perspective. One apology in Study 2 stated, “We take the 
security of our customers' information seriously and understand the frustrations that 
come with finding out your personal information may have been compromised.” 
Another wrote, “We know how stressful and worrying this can be.” 
 A number of the suggestion lists in Study 3 also highlighted the need for 
empathy. One participant suggested: 
First express how you understand the feelings of the customer (being violated in 
terms of privacy, etc.) and express how saddened you are to learn that your 
safeguards failed to protect the customer. Next, state (the obvious) fears that the 
customer must be having (credit scores being impacted, charges incurred, etc.) 
and state a solid plan for what you intend to do about it.  
 
This suggestion illustrates that empathy can be linked to expressions of remorse 
and corrective action. When stakeholders believe that an organization empathizes with 
their suffering, those stakeholders may find it easier to believe that the organization’s 
remorse is genuine and that the organization is motivated to fix the problem. A total of 
13% apologies and 10% suggestion lists referred to empathizing with stakeholders (see 
Table 31).  
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Requesting another chance. The final means of rebuilding relationships with 
words is requesting another chance. This concept is quite similar to asking for 
forgiveness. In fact, requesting another chance seems to function as the organizational 
equivalent to an individual asking for forgiveness. Requesting another chance involves 
either asking stakeholders to accept an apology or asking stakeholders to maintain their 
relationship with the organization. 
As an example of requesting another chance, one apology in Study 2 read, “We 
hope you will forgive us and continue to do business with our company.” Another 
apology stated, “We deeply apologize and hope that you will give us a second chance in 
the near future.” A participant in Study 3 suggested that the organization should, “Ask 
for the client’s continued patronage.”    
Sometimes the request for another chance is implied, not stated directly. For 
instance, in one apology the participant wrote, “Thank you for past business and we 
hope you will remain a loyal customer in the future.” Overall, 36% apologies contained 
either direct or implied requests for another chance, although only four suggestion lists 
mentioned these requests (see Table 31). 
In addition to rebuilding relationships with words, organizational apologies can 
also rebuild relationship with behaviors. This concept is considered next. 
Behaviors that Rebuild Relationships 
 Organizational apologies can be used to communicate certain behaviors that 
may help rebuild the relationships between organizations and stakeholders. These 
behaviors can also reinforce the words that organizations use to rebuild relationships. 
The data from Study 2 and Study 3 indicate that, as part of an apology, organizations 
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should consider providing compensation, as well as fostering personal communication 
with stakeholders. 
 Providing compensation. Compensating the victims of a crisis is not the same 
as corrective action (e.g., offering reparations). Benoit (1995a) explained that the 
difference between corrective action and compensation is that corrective action 
“addresses the actual source of injury” while compensation is “a gift designed to 
counterbalance, rather than to correct, the injury” (p. 79). Indeed, the participants in 
Study 2 and Study 3 clearly distinguished between the two concepts. Many of the 
apologies and suggestions lists included both corrective action and compensation. 
 Most participants suggested that compensation should take the form of a gift 
certificate, coupon, or other special offer from the organization. Because the scenario 
used in Study 2 and Study 3 involved an online retailer, this type of compensation was 
logical. Examples from Study 2’s apologies include, “Everyone affected by this cyber 
attack is eligible for a free $50 gift card to use at our store,” and, “To thank you for your 
understanding, we are offering you 20% off your next order.” An example from Study 3 
is the participant who suggested, “Give me some compensation for having my 
information stolen (some percent off my next purchase).”  
 Benoit (1995a) argued that compensation “functions as a bribe” (p. 78). 
However, the data here indicate that compensation symbolizes how much the 
organization values its stakeholders and how apologetic it is. The following example 
from a Study 2 apology illustrates this point: 
We also want to make you feel good about using our store again. To that degree, 
we have attached to this email a coupon code personally tied to your user 
account that will grant you a 25% off discount on any one item. It's our way of 
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saying how sorry we are for losing your data, and hopefully helping to make 
things up to you.   
 
 Compensation can act as an apology. One Study 2 participant wrote, “Please 
accept this $100 Gift Card as our apology.” Another wrote, “As our apology to you, we 
will be sending out a $25 gift card as our way for saying sorry, and hope that you will 
accept it as a showing of our goodwill” 
 Compensation may help stakeholders feel more appreciated. One apology said, 
“Please accept this coupon code for $25 in free merchandise. We understand that one 
cannot put a dollar value on peace of mind, but we want you to understand how much 
we value you as a customer.” Compensation may even reinforce a promise of 
forbearance, as in this example: “We will be sending you a check as compensation and 
as a promise that this will never happen again.” 
Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) found that apologies seem more sincere when 
they cost the offender something. One of the participants in Study 3 made a similar 
argument when she wrote, “Include a relatively large coupon or gift certificate. I need to 
feel like you're really sorry and nothing says that like coming out of your pocket.”  
 Compensation was a common theme in both studies. Approximately one-third 
(35%) of the apologies included some form of compensation, and 66% of the suggestion 
lists mentioned compensation (see Table 31). However, providing compensation is not 
the only behavior that can help rebuild relationships. Fostering personal communicating 
is discussed next. 
 Fostering personal communication. Public relations theories of symmetry and 
dialogue have long recognized the importance of two-way communication between 
organizations and stakeholders (J. E. Grunig, 1992; Kent & Taylor, 1998, 2002). Data 
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from Study 2 and Study 3 suggest that many stakeholders want organizations to show 
personal concern for stakeholders by offering apologies in a certain way. Organizations 
can foster more personal and less institutional communication with stakeholders by 
making sure an apology comes from a specific person, addresses stakeholders 
appropriately, and facilitates dialogue by inviting stakeholders to contact the 
organization.  
 Communicate from a specific person. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are 
important differences between communicating with organizations and communicating 
with individuals (Hallahan, 2000). For instance, Bisel and Messersmith (2012) 
wondered if individuals could feel the same empathy for an organization that they feel 
for one another. Thus, one action an organization can take when apologizing is to have 
a specific person offer the apology.  
 Several apologies in Study 2 made a point of identifying a specific person in the 
signature. One apology began, “As president of the company, I offer my deepest 
apologies.” Along with humanizing the organization, this approach can also hold 
members of the organization accountable for statements made in the apology. A 
participant in Study 3 suggested: 
Make someone accountable for the issue going forward. Don't sign the 
communication by the company or a department. Sign it by an actual person, by 
name, who can be contacted and followed up with if necessary. And make sure 
they actually are available to send out any follow up information, and handle 
any questions from customers or press.   
 
 Seven apologies and 10 suggestion lists made references to sending the apology 
from an individual instead of the whole organizations (see Table 31). Another way to 
foster personal communication is to address stakeholders appropriately. 
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 Address stakeholders appropriately. In the instructions for Study 2 and Study 3, 
participants were asked to imagine they had received an email about their personal 
information being stolen. This email was addressed, “Dear Friend.” This salutation was 
used because it was generic, but two participants in Study 3 suggested that this 
salutation was not appropriate for the situation. One wrote, “I wouldn't use the term 
‘friend.’ It is a business relationship and up until this point I probably haven't had 
personal contact with the company (phone or in person). Use my last name.” The other 
participant wrote, “Please do not refer to me as friend. I am a customer, not an old 
college buddy.” Three more participants suggested that the apology should be 
personalized, not just a form letter.  
 None of the apologies in Study 2 made any reference to how the apology was 
addressed. One likely explanation is that Study 2 participants were only asked to write 
the second half of an apology email. The salutation was already included in the first half 
of the email. Overall, the way apologies are addressed or signed appears to be less 
important than how apologies create opportunities for future communication. 
 Invitation to contact the organization. Crises create uncertainty (Ulmer, 
Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007), and stakeholders may have questions or concerns after 
receiving an organizational apology. Apologies, by themselves, are examples of one-
way communication. However, apologies can start a conversation when organizations 
use them to introduce two-way communication opportunities. When organizations 
create ways for stakeholders to communicate with them during a crisis, these 
organization are engaging in a behavior that can rebuild the relationship.  
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Many of the apologies written for Study 2 included invitations to contact the 
organization. Most invitations were generic (e.g., “Feel free to contact our customer 
service department if you have further questions and concerns.”), but one apology 
invited stakeholders to “drop me an email personally.” Several participants in Study 3 
suggested that the organization should set up a phone number where victims could call 
with questions. One participant specifically suggested that the phone number have “a 
person on the other side.”  
 Overall, 13% apologies contained an invitation to contact the organization and 
10% suggestion lists recommended this action (see Table 31). By offering reasonable 
compensation and communicating with stakeholders in more personal ways, 
organizations can rebuild relationship through their behaviors. 
 This section has described the major findings and common themes in Study 2 
and Study 3. The next section will address certain differences between the two studies. 
Comparing the Results of Study 2 and Study 3 
 The findings from Study 2 and Study 3 were more similar than they were 
different. Ninety-nine (99%) apologies and 100 (100%) suggestion lists contained at 
least one apology component related to fixing the problem (see Table 30). Ninety-nine 
(99%) apologies and 99 (99%) suggestion lists also contained at least one statement or 
suggestion designed to rebuild the relationship (see Table 31). However, within these 
broad categories there were certain differences between specific apology components. 
This section compares the results of both studies and suggests that methodological 
differences between the studies may account for these differences.  
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Differences in Fixing Problems 
 Participants in Study 3 were more likely to mention acknowledgements of 
responsibility (30%) than participants in Study 2 (18%). There are at least two possible 
explanations for this difference. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, the hypothetical 
scenario in these studies involved somewhat ambiguous responsibility. While the 
organization had a responsibility to protect its customers’ data, the hackers were the 
ones primarily responsible for the security breach. Perhaps Study 3 participants found it 
easier to suggest that the organization take responsibility in the abstract, while Study 2 
participants found it harder to craft a meaningful statement of responsibility in the face 
of this ambiguity.  
 Another possible explanation lies in the connotation of the word “apologize.” 
Chapter 2 addressed the fact that, even among scholars, this word is not defined or 
operationalized consistently. The analysis of Study 2’s data followed Scher and 
Darley’s (1997) understanding of apologies as illocutionary force indicating devices, 
not acknowledgements of responsibility. Statements such as “We apologize for this 
lapse in our security,” were coded as acknowledgements of responsibility, but 
statements such as, “We apologize for this incident,” were not. Perhaps in some cases, 
participants intended the word “apologize” to function as an acknowledgement of 
responsibility. Understanding the purpose of a statement is easier in the context of a 
suggestion (Study 3) than in the context of a hypothetical message (Study 2). 
 There was also a difference between Study 2 and Study 3 in how frequently 
explanations were included. Nearly half (42%) of the suggestion lists in Study 3 called 
for explanations, but only 12% of the apologies in Study 2 included anything that could 
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be categorized as an explanation. Once again, the different methodologies of the two 
studies may account for this difference. Study 3 participants could easily suggest that 
the organization ought to explain the situation, but Study 2 participants had to imagine 
the details of such an explanation before they could write it into an organizational 
apology. 
 Both of these differences between Study 2 and Study 3 involve fixing problems 
with words. There was remarkable consistency between the two data sets when it came 
to behaviors that fix problems. Perhaps stakeholders had instinctive or cultural 
understandings of the need to fix problems with words (which the Study 3 participants 
were able to express), but find it difficult to produce messages that include this type of 
communication (as Study 2 participants were asked to do). The next subsection 
discusses differences between Study 2 and Study 3 related to rebuilding relationships. 
Differences in Rebuilding Relationships 
  Participants in Study 2 and Study 3 differed in how often they referred to 
expressions of genuine remorse and in how often they referred to compensation. 
Expressions of genuine remorse appeared in 69% of the apologies, compared to 28% of 
the suggestion lists. By contrast, 66% of the suggestion lists mentioned compensation, 
but only 35% of the apologies included compensation. 
 Perhaps Study 2 participants included remorse more often because doing so was 
a natural part of writing an apology. Many participants wrote, “We are truly sorry,” or 
“We sincerely apologize.” These phrases may be such an integral part of most apologies 
that it was second nature for Study 2 participants to use them. On the other hand, many 
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Study 3 participants may have taken for granted these phrases and left remorse off their 
suggestion lists. 
 The fact that Study 3 participants were almost twice as likely as Study 2 
participants to mention compensation may be explained by the fact that Study 2 
participants had to be more specific about what kind of compensation the organization 
was offering. Many Study 3 participants wrote suggestions such as, “Offer a gift card of 
some sort,” or, “Take money off of next purchase.” Study 2 participants tended to go 
into greater detail. One wrote, “In appreciation for your time and inconvenience, we 
will send you an e-gift card within five working days.” Perhaps the extra effort needed 
to include compensation in an actual apology made Study 2 participants less likely to 
mention compensation. 
 Despite a few differences, the findings of Study 2 and Study 3 were quite 
consistent, overall. The next section uses the findings to address RQ6 and RQ7. 
Answering the Research Questions 
 The purpose of Study 2 and Study 3 was to understand what constitutes an 
effective organizational apology in the minds of stakeholders, apart from any prompting 
by the experimental manipulations of Study 1. The qualitative data from these studies 
were used to answer RQ6 and RQ7. This section addresses each question in turn. 
RQ6 Results 
 Scher and Darley (1997) reported that four apology components (expressions of 
remorse, acknowledgements of responsibility, promises of forbearance, and offers of 
reparations) each had a unique effect on how individuals reacted to interpersonal 
apologies. RQ6 asked to what extent an organization’s stakeholders—without 
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prompting—would include these four apology components when they conceived of an 
organizational apology. All four apology components were found in Study 2 and Study 
3. However, the components were not mentioned with equal frequency, and were not 
usually all present in the same apology or suggestion list. 
 Most of the apologies written for Study 2 included expressions of remorse 
(69%), but only 28% of the suggestion lists mentioned this components. 
Acknowledgement of responsibility appeared in 18% apologies and 30% suggestion 
lists. Promises of forbearance were found in 65% apologies and 86% suggestion lists. 
Approximately half (43%) of the apologies and half (55%) of the suggestion lists 
included offers of reparations. 
Only six of the apologies in Study 2 contained all four apology components. Just 
one suggestion list in Study 3 mentioned all four components. Thus, in answer to RQ6, 
many stakeholders do consider at least some of Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology 
components to be part of an effective organizational apology, but few of the participants 
in these studies felt that effective apologies needed all four components. Overall, 
stakeholders mentioned acknowledgements of responsibility the least of the four 
components and mentioned promises of forbearance or preventing recurrences of a 
problem the most. Stakeholders also mentioned other apology components beside the 
four identified by Scher and Darley. These components provide an answer to RQ7. 
RQ7 Results 
In addition to Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology components, participants 
in Study 2 and Study 3 mentioned offering explanations, telling stakeholders what 
actions to take, mitigating harms, identifying with stakeholders, providing 
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compensation, and demonstrating personal concern through communication as 
components of effective organizational apologies. Of these six components, only two 
appeared in more than 50% of the responses. 
Telling stakeholders what actions to take in the crisis was a common theme, 
appearing in 58% apologies and 46% suggestion lists. Telling stakeholders how to 
protect themselves is likely more important in some crises than others. In some 
situations there is nothing stakeholders can do to protect themselves. Also, if an apology 
comes after the damage from a crisis has been done, organizations may have nothing 
useful to tell stakeholders in this regard. However, if a crisis is ongoing and there are 
ways stakeholders can protect themselves, many stakeholders expect apologetic 
organizations to provide this information.    
More than one-third (35%) of the apologies and two-thirds (66%) of the 
suggestion lists included compensation. Although public relations scholars distinguish 
between compensation and apologies (Benoit, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2008), the 
findings here suggest that an organization’s stakeholders do not necessarily make this 
distinction. Many of the study participants indicated that compensation acts as an 
apology. Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) may be right to argue that the perceived 
sincerity of an apology is related to the perceived costliness of an apology. 
Compensation seems to go beyond corrective action (which fixes problems by 
preventing or repairing damage) by helping to rebuild the relationship. The implications 
of this finding are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Summary of Qualitative Findings 
 Stakeholder-generated apologies and suggestion lists were analyzed with a 
modified form of Glaser’s (1965) constant comparative method. Two major themes 
emerged from the qualitative data. First, stakeholders expect organizational apologies to 
fix problems created by a crisis. Second, stakeholders expect organizational apologies 
to rebuild relationships with stakeholders after a crisis. Strategies for fixing problems 
and rebuilding relationships can be primarily based in the words an organization says or 
in the behaviors an organization performs. 
The data suggest that most stakeholders do recognize the value of one or more 
of Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology components. However, most stakeholders 
apparently do not consider all four components to be necessary for an effective 
organizational apology. Based on how often each component was mentioned, 
acknowledgement of responsibility seems to be the least critical element. Many 
stakeholders also believe effective apologies should include additional components like 
telling victims how to protect themselves (at least in data breach crises) and providing 
compensation. 
In summary, the findings from Study 2 and Study 3 indicate that organizational 
apologies, though similar to interpersonal apologies, do not always contain the same 
components. Scher and Darley’s (1997) four components do not exhaust the categories 
of organizational apology components. Perhaps because relationships between 
organizations and stakeholders are more distant than interpersonal relationships, 
stakeholders (at least in the hypothetical data breach crisis) appeared to place somewhat 
less emphasis on overt acknowledgements of responsibility and more emphasis on 
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behaviors that showed an organization taking responsibility. Such behaviors could be an 
important barometer by which stakeholders measure the sincerity of an organization’s 
apology. The next chapter discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the 
present findings.   
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 The previous two chapters reported results from an online experiment and two 
qualitative studies, all of which examined the way stakeholders perceive organizational 
apologies. Study 1 used an online experiment to deductively test the importance of four 
apology components identified in the existing literature. Studies 2 and 3 used qualitative 
data generated by stakeholders to inductively identify apology components that 
stakeholders believe should be part of organizational apologies. 
 The original goal of this dissertation was to understand what constitutes an 
effective organizational apology from the perspective of an organization’s stakeholders. 
Apologies are widely studied in the crisis communication literature, but are often 
defined and operationalized inconsistently (Coombs et al., 2010; Fediuk, Pace, & 
Botero, 2010; Pace et al., 2010). Most of the empirical research on what constitutes an 
apology has focused on interpersonal apologies (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Scher 
& Darley, 1997), not organizational apologies. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
there are fundamental differences between communication coming from an individual 
and communication coming from an organization (Bisel & Messersmith, 2012; 
Hallahan, 2000). For this reason, scholars cannot afford to simply assume that 
organizational apologies and interpersonal apologies contain the same components. The 
three studies conducted for this dissertation sought to test which components from 
interpersonal apologies are important in organizational apologies, and what additional 
components stakeholders consider important. 
 Beyond simply identifying what organizational stakeholders consider to be an 
organizational apology, this dissertation examined what makes an organizational 
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apology effective. Organizations and their stakeholders have relationships with one 
another that influence the way stakeholders perceive crises and crisis communication 
(K. A. Brown & White, 2011; Caldiero, 2006; Coombs, 2000). Therefore, this 
dissertation examined the role of organization-stakeholder relationships in shaping 
stakeholders’ reactions to organizational apologies. 
 The results of this research are helpful in three areas. First, these results help to 
clarify what constitutes an effective organizational apology in the minds of 
stakeholders. Second, these results shed light on how apologies influence stakeholders’ 
overall reactions to an organizational crisis. Third, these results highlight the 
importance of organization-stakeholder relationships before and after a crisis. Each of 
these areas will be discussed in turn. 
What Constitutes an Effective Organizational Apology? 
 This section draws upon the results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 to determine what 
constitutes an effective organizational apology from the perspective of an organization’s 
stakeholders. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, effectiveness was operationalized in terms 
of persuading stakeholders to accept the organization’s apology and continue their 
business relationship with the organization. Study 1 found that all four of Scher and 
Darley’s (1997) apology components influenced stakeholder perceptions that an 
organization had apologized. However, the four components were not equally 
influential, nor did all four components contribute equally to the effectiveness of the 
organizational apology. Studies 2 and 3 identified several apology components not 
included in Scher and Darley’s theory. A typology was developed that classifies 
apology components according to whether the component primarily (1) fixes the 
173 
problem or (2) rebuilds the relationship and whether the component is primarily based 
in (a) words or (b) behaviors (see Figure 17). Thus, the four categories of apology 
components are (1a) words that fix problems, (1b) behaviors that fix problems, (2a) 
words that rebuild relationship, and (2b) behaviors that rebuild relationships. 
This section begins by discussing the findings related to Scher and Darley’s 
(1997) four apology components. Next, the additional components found in the 
qualitative data are discussed. Then, these various components are used to suggest a 
new way of understanding organizational apologies. Finally, comments are offered 
about stakeholders’ sometimes unrealistic perspective on organizational apologies. The 
first of Scher and Darley’s apology components to be considered is the expression of 
remorse. 
Expressions of Remorse 
 Expressions of remorse are considered a vital part of any apology (Benoit, 
1995a; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Coombs, 2007a; Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 2004; N. 
Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). In Study 1, stakeholders reported higher perceived 
apology (PA) scores when the organization’s apology included an expression of 
remorse. The size of the effect was η2 = .12. Although this effect was not large, it was 
larger than the effect a promise of forbearance or an offer of reparations had on PA.  
 Most of the apologies written by stakeholders for Study 2 contained expressions 
of remorse (69%). The qualitative data suggest that stakeholders want indications that 
an organization is genuinely remorseful in crisis situations. The apologies in Study 2 
often used phrases like “truly sorry,” “sincerely apologize,” or “deeply regret” to 
convey genuine remorse. In interpersonal communication, nonverbal elements such as 
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facial expression, body language, and tone of voice can be used to demonstrate sincerity 
(Afifi, 2007). Perhaps because organizations do not have faces or bodies like 
individuals have, organizations need to use especially forceful language to convince 
stakeholders of their sincerity.  
According to many theorists, expressions of remorse show that offenders regret 
what happened (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Scher & Darley, 1997; Tavuchis, 1991). 
Data from Study 3 suggest that a related function of genuine remorse is showing care 
for victims. As one Study 3 participant wrote, “The tone of the apology should be 
sincere. It should make the customers believe that the company actually cares about 
them.” The implication of this suggestion is that the writer wants to be valued as a 
person, not just as a source of revenue for the organization. 
An organization that does not regret what happened apparently does not care 
about its stakeholders as people. The notorious case of the Ford Pinto has often been 
used to illustrate the problem of organizations that would rather save money than 
protect stakeholders (Schwartz, 1990-1991). By contrast, an organization that feels a 
sense of concern for the wellbeing of its stakeholders will be genuinely sorry when any 
harm comes to those stakeholders. Expressions of remorse may not actually fix the 
problems caused by a crisis, they can help to rebuild relationships between an 
organizations and stakeholders by reassuring stakeholders that the organization cares 
about them. Thus, based on the categories developed for Studies 2 and 3 (see Figure 
17), expressions of remorse can be categorized as words that rebuild relationships. The 
next apology component provides an example of words that fix problems. That 
component is the acknowledgement of responsibility. 
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Acknowledgements of Responsibility 
 Like expressions of remorse, acknowledgements of responsibility are widely 
recognized in the literature as a necessary component of apologies (Benoit, 1995a; 
Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Coombs, 2007a; Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 2004; N. Smith, 
2008; Tavuchis, 1991). Study 1 found that acknowledgements of responsibility made 
stakeholders significantly more likely to perceive that the organization had apologized. 
The effect size for responsibility was the same as the effect size for remorse (η2 = .12).  
 Determining what counts as an acknowledgment of responsibility can be 
difficult. Most scholars seem to assume that responsibility can only be acknowledged 
through words (e.g., Benoit, 1995a; Coombs, 2007a; Tavuchis, 1991). However, at least 
in an organizational context, responsibility can be acknowledged through behaviors as 
well as through words. When Merrill Lynch was accused of defrauding investors in 
2001, the company never admitted fault, but did agree to pay a $100 million fine 
(Hearit, 2006). The attorney general of New York was quoted in The New York Times 
as saying, “You don’t pay a $100 million fine if you didn’t do anything wrong” 
(McGeehan, 2002, p. A1). When organizations take corrective action or provide 
compensation, the public often perceives that the organization is taking responsibility. 
 Hearit (2006) explained, “due to liability concerns, in the current form of 
contemporary apologetic speech, the acknowledgment of the wrongdoing comes not in 
the apology but instead in the compensation” (p. 210). The results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 
support the idea that stakeholders may interpret a number of apology components, 
including behaviors, as acknowledgements of responsibility. In fact, this finding helps 
to explain the unsuccessful manipulation check in Study 1.  
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As reported in Chapter 4, one of the manipulation checks used in Study 1 stated, 
“The organization took responsibility for what happened.” All four of the apology 
conditions were positively related to participants’ perception that the organization had 
taken responsibility. The acknowledgment of responsibility condition accounted for 7% 
of the variance in this manipulation check, as did the offer of reparations condition. The 
expression of remorse condition and the promise of forbearance condition each 
accounted for 3% of the variance in the manipulation check. From the stakeholder 
perspective, an organization that is willing to pay for damages has acknowledged 
responsibility just as much as an organization that uses words to claim responsibility, 
and remorse or forbearance also indicate, to a lesser extent, that the organization has 
taken responsibility. 
As mentioned already, there is an important legal distinction between an 
organization claiming responsibility with words and an organization offering 
reparations or compensation to victims. When organizations directly admit guilt they 
usually incur liability (Hearit, 2006; Tyler, 1997). However, organizations can give aid 
to crisis victims without actually accepting responsibility under the law. Choi and Lin 
(2009b) found that people with legal training could distinguish between apologies that 
took responsibility and those that did not, but college students made no such distinction. 
Stakeholders may interpret certain organizational behaviors as acknowledgements of 
responsibility even though the organization not legally accepted responsibility.  
The fact that many stakeholders do not make clear distinctions between 
acknowledgments of responsibility and other apology components may help to explain 
why only 18% of the apologies written for Study 2 and only 30% of the suggestion lists 
177 
created for Study 3 included acknowledgements of responsibility. Participants in both 
studies were more likely to write about corrective action or compensation than to write 
about taking responsibility. When participants did write about taking responsibility, 
they tended to contrast it with “making excuses,” “blaming others,” or, “dancing 
around.” Thus, stakeholders seem to equate taking responsibility with facing up to and 
fixing problems. An acceptance of responsibility uses words to begin the process of 
fixing problems, but corrective action goes farther by engaging in behaviors that fix 
problems. Thus, corrective action may take the place of an acknowledgment of 
responsibility. 
Another reason so few participants in Studies 2 and 3 wrote about taking 
responsibility could be the type of crisis scenario used for both studies. Because these 
studies used a data breach scenario, many study participants may have blamed the 
hacker more than they blamed the organization. If participants did not think the 
organization was responsible they would not have had any reason to include 
acknowledgments of responsibility in their apologies or suggestion lists. More will be 
said about this issue in the limitations section of Chapter 7.  
With acknowledgments of responsibility, organizational apologies are using 
words to begin fixing problems. However, stakeholders also expect organizations to 
behave in ways that fix problems. A particularly important behavior is preventing the 
recurrence of a problem. This behavior manifests itself in organizational apologies as a 
promise of forbearance. 
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Promises of Forbearance 
 Most, but not all, scholars consider a promise of forbearance to be a necessary 
part of an apology. Benoit (1995a) and Lazare (2004) did not include this component, 
but Davis (2002), Hearit (2006), Scher and Darley, (1997), and N. Smith (2008) all 
identified forbearance as a key component of an apology. Tavuchis (1991) also 
suggested that a promise of forbearance, either stated or implied, is often part of an 
apology. 
 Study 1 and Studies 2 and 3 offer somewhat conflicting results about how 
important promises of forbearance are to stakeholders. On the one hand, the promise of 
forbearance condition in the online experiment had a very small effect on participants’ 
perception that the organization had apologized (η2 = .03). On the other hand, the most 
common apology component across Studies 2 and 3 was the promise of forbearance, or 
the prevention of recurrences. Most of the apologies (65%) and suggestion lists (86%) 
written by the participants included at least one reference to this concept.  
 Individuals may be able to offer credible promises of forbearance using words 
alone (Scher & Darley, 1997; Tavuchis, 1991). However, the evidence from Studies 2 
and 3 indicates that most stakeholders want organizational apologies to describe 
specific actions an organization has taken or will take to prevent the recurrence of a 
problem. Thus, when organizations promise forbearance or prevent the recurrence of a 
crisis, these organizations are necessarily engaging in behaviors that fix problems.  
Based on the results of Study 1, these behaviors, in and of themselves, may not 
constitute apologies in the minds of stakeholders. However, the participants in Studies 2 
and 3 clearly believed that an organization ought to include forbearance or prevention 
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along with an apology. Participants in Studies 2 and 3 were specifically instructed to 
think about the kind of apologies they would be willing to accept. Although 
stakeholders might perceive that an organization has apologized without forbearance or 
prevention, stakeholders might be reluctant to accept the organization’s apology if that 
apology was not accompanied by forbearance or prevention. Stakeholders appear to 
differentiate between organizational apologies and effective organizational apologies. 
Another component that appears to be very important in organizational apologies is the 
offer of reparations.  
Offers of Reparations 
 Image repair theory (Benoit, 1995a) holds that corrective action, such as making 
reparations, is not part of an apology. However, many scholars do consider reparations 
to be part of a complete apology (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 
2004; Scher & Darley, 1997, N. Smith, 2008). According to the results of Study 1, an 
offer of reparations (η2 = .06) did not affect perceptions of an apology as much as 
remorse or responsibility, but reparations did have a larger effect than forbearance. 
More importantly, offers of reparations had greater influence than remorse, 
responsibility, or forbearance on all of the other dependent variables in Study 1. These 
other dependent variables will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 Much like promises of forbearance, offers of reparations seem to have less effect 
on whether stakeholders perceive that an organization has apologized, and more effect 
on whether stakeholders think an apology is worth accepting. The qualitative data 
provided fairly strong support for the importance of reparations, with 43% of the 
apologies and 55% of the suggestion lists including this component. One apology in 
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Study 2 stated, “Rest assured that all customers affected will be compensated and their 
data restored. We will make this right for our customers.” Another said, “We will do 
whatever we can to limit the danger to you and will compensate you for whatever 
negative effects occur.” Other apologies included more specific reparations such as 
identity theft insurance and free credit monitoring. 
 The manipulation checks in Study 1 revealed that offers of reparations were 
almost as important as direct acknowledgments of responsibility for making 
stakeholders believe that the organization took responsibility for the crisis. As the 
Merrill Lynch case suggests, taking responsibility is not necessarily the same as 
claiming responsibility (Hearit, 2006). Claiming responsibility involves accepting 
blame, but taking responsibility could be an action designed to repair the damage 
caused by a crisis. In a data breach crisis, for example, an organization that offers free 
credit monitoring to its customers is taking responsibility to protect its stakeholders, 
even if the organization never claims to be at fault. 
In addition to creating the perception that an organization has taken 
responsibility for a situation, the offer of reparations is certainly a behavior that helps to 
fix problems (Benoit, 1995a). On its own, fixing a problem does not necessarily rebuild 
a relationship. However, fixing a problem may help to lay a foundation for relationship 
repair. Relationships between organizations and stakeholders, or organizations and 
publics (OPRs), are evaluated in terms of trust, control mutuality, commitment, and 
satisfaction (J. E. Grunig & Huang, 2000; Hon & Grunig, 1999). Organizations that 
provide reparations demonstrate that they can be trusted to treat stakeholders fairly, and 
that they are committed to maintaining the OPR.  
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As an illustration of this point, one of the apologies written for Study 2 stated, 
“A good company is one that stands behind its customers and that is our pledge to you, 
that we will absorb any losses caused.” Promising to absorb customers’ losses is 
obviously an offer of reparations. In this case, the author of the apology apparently 
considered reparations to be a way for the company to show its trustworthiness and its 
commitment to its stakeholders. 
The results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that stakeholders do consider Scher 
and Darley’s (1997) four apology components to be part of, or at least closely related to, 
effective organizational apologies. However, all three studies suggest that stakeholders 
do not require all four components to be present in an apology. Trend analysis of the 
Study 1 data found that apologies only needed to contain any two components to create 
the perception that the organization had apologized (see Figure 9). Although adding a 
third component increased this perception significantly, adding a fourth component did 
not. Furthermore, only 6% of the apologies written for Study 2 and 1% of the 
suggestion lists written for Study 3 contained all four of these apology components. At 
least in the hypothetical crisis scenario used here, stakeholders believed an 
organizational apology could be effective even if the apology was missing one or more 
of these components. Overall, the most important component was the offer of 
reparations and the least important component was the acknowledgment of 
responsibility. 
Along with Scher and Darley’s (1997) four components, other components of 
effective organizational apologies were identified in the qualitative data from Studies 2 
and 3. The first of these components was an explanation of the crisis.  
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Explanations 
 The concept of explanations is a source of disagreement between some scholars. 
Lazare (2004) believed that explanations help victims of an offense work through issues 
and achieve healing. Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) identified explanations as part of 
the apology speech act, but Scher and Darley (1997) rejected this position. According to 
Scher and Darley, explanations affect the way victims perceive the situation, while 
apologies affect the way victims perceive the offender. Thus, Scher and Darley did not 
test the effects of explanations along with their other four apology components. 
 Scher and Darley’s (1997) argument has a certain conceptual appeal, but the 
qualitative data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that explanations do more than affect 
victims’ perceptions of the situation. As discussed in Chapter 5, explanations can 
reinforce acknowledgements of responsibility by describing where an organization 
failed. Explanations can also clarify the extent of the problem by specifying how 
stakeholders are affected by a crisis. Finally, explanations give credibility to promises 
of forbearance. Stakeholders appear more likely to believe an organization can or will 
prevent recurrences of a problem when the organization can explain how the problem 
happened in the first place. 
 Nearly half (42%) of the suggestion lists written for Study 3 recommended that 
organizations include explanations in apologies. Only 12% of the apologies in Study 2 
contained explanations, but this difference may be related to the method of each study. 
Both studies were based on hypothetical scenarios, so participants had to imagine 
certain details about what had happened. It was probably much easier for Study 3 
participants to write generic suggestions like, “Tell me how (in words I can understand) 
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the hackers accessed my information,” than for Study 2 participants to invent and 
describe such details in their written apologies. 
 These findings do not prove that explanations are a necessary part of apologies. 
However, they suggest that Scher and Darley (1997) may have been hasty to exclude 
explanations from their research. Explanations could be especially important in 
organizational apologies, because the bureaucracy and the many people involved in an 
organizational crisis often make it difficult to determine exactly what happened. An 
organization that does not provide an explanation may be seen the same way as an 
individual who tries to apologize without saying what she or he is sorry for.  
 Explanations are words that can primarily help to fix problems. Being able to 
articulate a problem is the first step to repairing that problem and preventing its 
recurrence. However, explanations are also consistent with OPR theory. One of J. E. 
Grunig and Huang’s (2000) relationship maintenance strategies is disclosure (i.e., 
openness). Given that trust is an important outcome of OPRs, honest explanations of a 
crisis may help to rebuild relationships as well as fix problems. Another way 
organizational apologies can use words to fix problems is by telling stakeholders how to 
protect themselves. 
Telling Stakeholders What Actions to Take 
 None of the literature on apologies treats instructions for victims as part of an 
apology. However, public relations scholars have recognized that telling stakeholders 
what actions to take in a crisis is a vital part of crisis communication (Coombs, 2006a, 
2007a). Coombs (2006a) emphasized that protecting stakeholders from harm should be 
the first priority of any organization in a crisis situation. What is interesting about the 
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findings from Study 2 and Study 3 is that stakeholders do not always distinguish 
between organizational apologies and other types of crisis communication. 
 Many of the apologies in Study 2 (58%) and the suggestion lists in Study 3 
(46%) included instructions to help stakeholders protect themselves. Although telling 
stakeholders what actions to take might be construed as shifting the burden of managing 
the crisis off of the organization and onto the stakeholders, the participants in Studies 2 
and 3 seemed to view it as showing concern for the well-being of stakeholders. When 
an organization cannot fix a crisis on its own, the organization should partner with its 
external stakeholders to resolve the situation, or at least minimize the damage. Because 
an organization generally has more information about a crisis than stakeholders have, 
the organization can share this information with its stakeholders to start fixing the 
problem. Stakeholders may perceive the organization’s apology as incomplete if the 
organization does not help stakeholders protect themselves from further risk or harm. 
 Telling stakeholders how to protect themselves is not always possible. This 
dissertation used a hypothetical data breach scenario for all three studies. Such a 
scenario lends itself to this kind of response from the organization. However, in other 
types of crises (e.g., fraud), the damage might already be done by the time stakeholders 
learned about the situation. In these situations, an organization could not tell 
stakeholders what actions to take to protect themselves, but it could still take corrective 
action, itself.  
Corrective Action 
 Two types of corrective action have already been discussed. Stakeholders expect 
organizations to make reparations and to ensure that problems do not recur. These two 
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types of corrective action were identified in Benoit’s (1995a) image repair theory. 
However, the qualitative data from Studies 2 and 3 point to a third type of corrective 
action that may be appropriate in some crisis situations. This type of correction action 
can be labeled mitigating harm.  
 The qualitative data produced a number of suggestions and apology components 
that could not be categorized as prevention or forbearance because they did nothing to 
ensure that the problem would not happen again. These components could not be 
categorized as reparations, either, because they did not restore anything victims had 
lost. Instead, these components were meant to limit the negative effects of the crisis on 
the stakeholders. For example, one apology in Study 2 stated, “For the time being, we 
have removed all customer information from our database so that it can no longer be 
accessed.” Mitigating harm was present in 26% of the apologies and 27% of the 
suggestion lists. 
 As noted in Chapter 2, many case studies have concluded that apologizing and 
taking corrective action are the best ways to repair one’s public image (Benoit, 1997a; 
Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brazeal, 2008; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Len-Rios & Benoit, 
2004). Image repair theory holds that these strategies work well together, but are 
distinct from one another. The findings from this dissertation suggest that stakeholders 
do not necessarily make this distinction. Although Study 1 found that remorse and 
responsibility had greater effects on perceptions of an apology, the corrective action of 
reparations was more important in influencing outcomes such as account acceptance, 
organizational reputation, anger, empathy, and behavioral intentions. Furthermore, 
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participants in Studies 2 and 3 mentioned corrective action more consistently than they 
mentioned remorse or responsibility.  
 Corrective actions, including efforts to mitigate harm, are examples of fixing 
problems primarily through behaviors rather than words. However, taking corrective 
action also helps to strengthen the OPR, as defined by J. E. Grunig and Huang (2000) 
and Hon and Grunig (1999). Study 1 found that both promises of forbearance and offers 
of reparations improved the post-crisis OPR (see Table, 13). Corrective action may 
demonstrate that an organization is trustworthy and committed to its stakeholders. It 
may also increase stakeholder satisfaction with the OPR. Thus, although corrective 
action is primarily a behavior that fixes problems, it may also act as a behavior rebuilds 
relationships.  
Providing compensation is another type of behavior that organizations can 
perform as part of an apology. Providing compensation is a behavior that focuses 
primarily on rebuilding relationships.  
Providing Compensation 
 The concept of compensation is discussed here because it reinforces the point 
that stakeholders do not always distinguish between apologies (as defined by scholars) 
and the behaviors that accompany those apologies. Benoit (1995a) described 
compensation as a kind of bribe paid to victims to “help offset the negative feeling 
arising from the wrongful act” (p. 78). Benoit made clear that compensation is not 
corrective action because it does not correct harm. Compensation is not the same as 
apologizing either, because it does not involve accepting responsibility. Benoit’s 
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theoretical categories make sense, but stakeholders do not necessarily make the same 
distinctions. 
 For example, Chapter 5 reported that many participants in Study 2 and Study 3 
treated compensation (gift cards, coupons, etc.) as if it was an apology, itself. One 
apology stated, “As an apology, we would like to extend a coupon code for you to use 
on your next purchase.” Another apology read, “As an apology for this situation, we 
would like to offer you a token of appreciation in the form of a gift card.” 
Compensation was mentioned by 35% of the Study 2 participants and 66% of Study 3 
participants.  
Often, compensation was presented as a sign of the organization’s sincerity. 
This finding is consistent with Ohtsubo and Watanabe’s (2009) finding that victims 
perceive costly apologies to be more sincere than no-cost apologies. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Ohtsubo and Watanabe’s research was based on costly signaling theory, 
which predicts signals will be more believable when they involve some expense for the 
sender (Johnstone, 1997; E. A. Smith & Bliege Bird, 2005). Although Ohtsubo and 
Watanabe studied apologies between individuals, it is not surprising that a similar 
finding would emerge for organizational apologies. As mentioned previously, 
organizations do not have bodies or faces, so they cannot use the same nonverbal cues 
individual might use to convey sincerity. Just as stronger language may help 
organizations convey feelings of genuine remorse, so too compensation may act as a 
signal that organizations truly desire to rebuild relationships with stakeholders. This 
notion is consistent with OPR theory. 
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Broom et al. (1997) argued that the need for resources is one reason 
organizations and stakeholders form OPRs, and that exchanging resources is part of the 
OPR. This model helps how providing compensation can rebuild relationships. The 
more an organization is willing to share its resources with its stakeholders, the more 
commitment the organization has to that relationship.  
Although many stakeholders seem to conflate compensation with apologies, 
they do not generally conflate compensation and corrective action. For instance, many 
of the apologies and suggestion lists written for Studies 2 and 3 contained both 
corrective action and compensation. As Benoit (1995a) explained, compensation 
primarily influences victims’ affective reaction to an offender, while corrective action 
seeks to repair or prevent harms. Corrective action may help to move an organization-
stakeholder relationship from negative to neutral, but compensation appears to move the 
relationship from neutral to positive. 
Compensation is a behavior organizations can use to rebuild stakeholder 
relationships. Organizations can also rebuild stakeholder relationships by behaving in 
ways that foster personal communication. 
Fostering Personal Communication 
Studies 2 and 3 found that many stakeholders want organizational apologies to 
include invitations for stakeholders to contact the organization. Some stakeholders also 
care how the apology addresses them and who signs the apology. Facilitating two-way 
communication with stakeholders (e.g., through hotlines or special email addresses), 
addressing stakeholders respectfully, and having apologies signed by a real person 
instead of the whole organization are all ways of making communication more personal. 
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When organizations foster personal communication with stakeholders they demonstrate 
a level of concern that goes beyond the general concern of an organization for its 
stakeholders. Personal communication shows that individual members of the 
organization care about stakeholders as individuals.  
These findings are consistent with OPR theory. J. E. Grunig and Huang (2000) 
identified symmetrical, two-way communication as a key OPR maintenance strategy. 
Symmetrical communication requires organizations and stakeholders to be open with 
one another, to participant in mutual networks, to share tasks, to look for win-win 
solutions in any negotiation, to collaborate with one another when possible. Kent and 
Taylor’s (2002) dialogic public relations theory encourages organizations to build 
relationships with stakeholders through mutuality, propinquity, empathy, risk, and 
commitment. All of these strategies and principles involve fostering personal 
communication with stakeholders.  
These findings are also consistent with the existing crisis communication 
literature. For example, a number of writers urge organizations to be open in crisis 
communication (Albrecht, 1996; Lukaszewski, 1997; Seeger, 2006). This openness is 
usually applied to media relations, but could be applied to stakeholder relationships, as 
well. By encouraging two-way instead of just one-way communication with 
stakeholders, organizations show that they have nothing to hide and that they value the 
OPR.  
Turk et al. (2012) reported that crisis communication was more effective when it 
came from the CEO. Several stakeholders in Study 2 and Study 3 indicated that 
apologies should come from organizational leaders, or at least from specific individuals 
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who would be responsible for following up with stakeholders. Making crisis 
communication more personal may help to humanize the organization and reassure 
stakeholders that real people within the organization are taking the crisis seriously. 
Using an apology to foster personal communication requires an organization to 
behave in certain ways. These behaviors are intended to rebuild relationships with 
stakeholders. At the same time, there are several ways organizations can rebuild 
relationships with words. This chapter has already considered expressions of remorse, 
one of the primary ways apologies rebuild relationships through words. The concept of 
identifying with stakeholders is addressed next.  
Identifying with Stakeholders 
 The observation that apologies use words to rebuild relationships is neither 
controversial nor original. Tavuchis (1991) noted that one of the remarkable things 
about apologies is how much they can do to rebuild relationships using only words. 
Many other scholars have also written about the power of words in the context of 
apologies (Burke, 1961; Goffman, 1971; Hearit, 2006; N. Smith, 2008). The preceding 
paragraphs have argued that stakeholders do not consider organizational apologies to be 
complete without certain behaviors that demonstrate the organization’s sincerity and 
commitment to its stakeholders. However, this line of argumentation should not be 
taken to mean that words do not matter. One way organizational apologies can rebuild 
relationships using words is by identifying with stakeholders. 
Identification exists between two parties when “their interests are joined” 
(Burke, 1969, p. 20). Organizations can identify with stakeholders by talking about how 
important their stakeholders are, by pointing out the values they share with their 
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stakeholders, and by empathizing with stakeholders’ suffering. All three of these themes 
were found in the qualitative data from Studies 2 and 3. 
 Hearit (2006) suggested that apologies should involve efforts to identify with 
injured stakeholders. Based the findings from Studies 2 and 3, identification seems to 
reinforce the sincerity of an apology and to reassure victims that corrective action will 
be taken. Identification helps stakeholders trust an organization because identification 
tells stakeholders that the organization is on their side. The next way for organizations 
to rebuild relationships with words is by requesting another chance. 
Requesting Another Chance 
 Asking for forgiveness is humiliating and painful. Perhaps for this reason, Burke 
(1961) used the term mortification to describe the process of symbolically dying for 
one’s transgressions through apologizing. According to Benoit (1995a) and Hearit 
(2006), apologies ought to include asking for forgiveness. At the interpersonal level, 
forgiveness means choosing not to avoid an offender or seek revenge (McCullough et 
al., 1998). The organizational equivalent to forgiveness seems to be continuing to do 
business with the organization (i.e., not avoiding) and refraining from attempts to harm 
the organization (i.e., not seeking revenge).  
 Many of the apologies written for Study 2 (37%) included appeals to 
stakeholders to accept the apology or to continue doing business with the organization. 
Statements like, “We deeply apologize and hope that you will give us a second chance 
in the near future,” or “We hope you will forgive us and continue to do business with 
our company,” are examples of asking for another chance.  
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 Some of the statements written by participants in Study 2 do not sound 
particularly realistic. For example, how many real organizations would be willing to 
write, “We are truly sorry that this has happened, and hope that it will not persuade you 
to do business elsewhere”? Planting the idea that stakeholders could do business 
elsewhere does not seem particularly strategic. However, the point of this research was 
to understand what would constitute an effective organizational apology from the 
perspective of the stakeholders. Evidently, some stakeholders want organizations to 
show humility by acknowledging that stakeholders do not have to do business with the 
organization and asking stakeholders for their support.  
 The various apology components discussed above were all identified in the 
literature or in the qualitative data. These components can be categorized into words 
that fix problems, behaviors that fix problems words that rebuild relationships, and 
behaviors that rebuild relationships (see Figure 17). With these categories in mind, it 
becomes possible to summarize what constitutes an effective organizational apology 
from the perspective of stakeholders.  
Summarizing what Constitutes an Organizational Apology 
 According to Tavuchis (1991), apologies are speech acts meant to restore 
relationships by demonstrating an offender’s regret over violating some social rule or 
norm.  The results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that effective organizational apologies 
need to go beyond the speech act of an apology to a set of actions that involves words 
and behaviors. From the perspective of stakeholders, an effective organizational 
apology is a combination of words and behaviors designed to fix the problem and 
rebuild the relationship.  
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The results of Study 1 suggest that words alone may be enough to constitute an 
apology, but words alone do not constitute an effective apology. If an organization 
expresses remorse and acknowledges responsibility for a crisis, stakeholders may 
recognize that the organization is attempting to apologize. However, if these words are 
not accompanied by behaviors designed to fix the problem and rebuild the relationship, 
stakeholders may not accept the organization’s apology. 
 Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology components, which were originally 
identified in interpersonal apologies, are certainly applicable to organizational 
apologies. However, these four components do not represent everything stakeholders 
consider to be important—or even what stakeholders consider most important in 
organizational apologies. For example, Scher and Darley did not address compensation, 
which appears to be a key component of an organizational apology, at least in a data 
breach crisis.  
The present findings suggest that scholars should be careful not to conceptualize 
apologies in ways that are overly reductionist or overly complicated. Scholars like 
Benoit (1995a) and Coombs (2007a; Coombs & Holladay, 2008) have narrowly defined 
apologies, making distinctions stakeholders do not necessarily make between apologies 
and compensation or corrective action. On the other hand, scholars like Hearit (2006) 
and N. Smith (2008) have provided lengthy and detailed typologies of apology 
components that go beyond what stakeholders expect or demand.  
Although it is normal and often helpful for scholars to have more precise and 
complex understandings of concepts than lay people have, scholars ought to remember 
that many concepts, including apologies, are social constructs. As such, apologies may 
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be socially constructed in ways that do not always match academic theories. For 
scholarly research to be most relevant, it should take into account the way lay people 
use terms and concepts like apologies, while critiquing these uses when necessary. The 
next subsection offers this type of critique. 
 Are Stakeholders’ Expectations Realistic? 
 The qualitative data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that some stakeholders have 
unrealistic expectations regarding organizational apologies. Some of these unrealistic 
expectations are no doubt related to the methodology of the two studies. However, some 
of these expectations indicate that stakeholders struggle to see crises from the 
organization’s perspective.  
 Unrealistic stakeholder expectations were evident when participants in Study 2 
and Study 3 wrote about the kind of reparations and compensation organizations should 
offer in a data breach crisis. One of the hypothetical apologies read, “We would also 
like to offer you a 2 day stay in a 3 star hotel for you and your family.” Another stated, 
“We will also offer you as compensation a $1000.00 gift card.”  In the case of Amazon, 
a company with 182 million active customers (Thomas, 2013), such compensation 
would cost the organization $182 billion. Even if Amazon only provided $50 gift cards 
to its approximately 10 million Amazon Prime members, it would spend half a billion 
dollars. Such numbers are unrealistic for a crisis that is, at best, only partially the 
organization’s fault.  
 Perhaps such unrealistic apologies and suggestions stem from the way Studies 2 
and 3 were designed. Participants were asked to write apologies (or suggestions for 
apologies) that they would accept from the organization. Participants were not asked to 
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write the minimum acceptable apology, so some participants may have treated their 
writing tasks as opportunities to fantasize about an ideal organizational apology. In a 
real data breach crisis, stakeholders might be just as willing to accept the organization’s 
apology when offered a $5 gift certificate as they would be when offered  a $50 gift 
certificate. Future research is needed to explore the effects of different amounts of 
compensation or different types of reparations on apology acceptance.  
Even if some of the unrealistic expectations expressed by participants in Studies 
2 and 3 were produced by the methodology, the data still suggest that crafting realistic 
and appropriate organizational apologies is difficult for many people. Many participants 
wrote that the organization ought to reimburse customers for fraudulent charges on their 
credit cards, despite that fact that most credit card companies do not hold customers 
liable for such charges. As discussed above, a number of participants also imagined 
organizations paying exorbitant amounts of compensation, suggesting that these 
participants did not have any idea how costly their suggestions would be, or what the 
organizations could actually afford. 
Studies 2 and 3 were not intended to show organizations precisely how to word 
an apology, or how much money to offer customers after a data breach crisis. Rather, 
the purpose of these studies was to identify components stakeholders expect to find in 
organizational apologies. Thus, components such as compensation and reparations 
appear to be important, but in keeping with situational crisis communication theory 
(Coombs, 2007b), the way those components are incorporated into the apology would 
probably depend upon the situation. 
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Of course, apologies are not an end, in and of themselves. Whether apologies 
come from individuals or organizations, they are intended to restore relationships 
(Goffman, 1971; Tavuchis, 1991). In the context of crisis communication, organizations 
use apologies to influence the way stakeholders perceive and act toward the 
organization. The next section discussed how apologies affect stakeholders’ reactions to 
an organizational crisis. 
How Apologies Influence Stakeholders’ Reactions to Crises 
 An organizational crisis may produce a variety of stakeholder reactions, 
especially if those stakeholders are victims of the crisis. Crises often damage an 
organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2007b; Pace et al., 2010) or make stakeholders 
angry at the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Lee & Chung, 2012). These 
reactions may affect stakeholders’ behavioral intentions toward the organization 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2007, 2009). 
 As reported in Chapter 4, Study 1 measured seven types of reactions victims 
might have to a hypothetical data breach crisis, and tested the effects of Scher and 
Darley’s (1997) four apology components on each of these variables. The most 
interesting results were related to the unique effects of reparations, the unexpected 
effects of empathy, and the lack of effects for attributions of responsibility. Each of 
these results will be explored in turn. 
The Unique Effects of Reparations  
 Of the four apology components tested in Study 1, the offer of reparations was 
the strongest predictor of the dependent variables. All four apology components were 
significant predictors of victims’ willingness to accept the organization’s account of the 
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crisis, victims’ perceptions of the organization’s reputation, and victims’ perceptions of 
their relationship with the organization. However, in every instance, the offer of 
reparations had the largest effect size. 
 The offer of reparations was the only one of the four apology components that 
was significantly related to victims’ feelings of anger or empathy. Offers of reparations 
produced slightly lower levels of anger and slightly higher levels of empathy among 
victims. 
 Both the promise of forbearance and the offer of reparations were significant 
predictors of victims’ behavioral intentions (i.e., making purchases from the 
organization in the future and not engaging in negative word of mouth regarding the 
organization). Once again, however, the offer of reparations had a larger effect size.  
 According to these findings, the apology components that create the strongest 
perception of an apology (remorse and responsibility) are not the apology components 
that have the most influence on account acceptance, organizational reputation, OPR, 
anger, empathy, or behavioral intentions. If an organization wants to influence these 
variables it should focus more on making reparations than on how it phrases its public 
apology. 
 These findings are consistent with Coombs and Holladay’s (2008) study that 
found compensation and apologies were equally effective at repairing an organization’s 
reputation after a crisis. Also, Benoit and Brinson (1994) argued that apologies are more 
effective when combined with corrective action. The key difference between these 
earlier studies and the present research is that the earlier studies did not treat 
compensation or corrective action as part of the apology. This dissertation has found 
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evidence that many stakeholders do regard such actions as part of organizational 
apologies.   
 Another interesting finding from this research was that empathy does not appear 
to function in organization-stakeholder relationships the way it functions in 
interpersonal relationships. 
The Unexpected Effects of Empathy 
 Based on the existing literature, Study 1 tested the possibility that anger and 
empathy would act as mediating variables between the other dependent variables in the 
study and behavioral intention. Path analysis revealed that anger mediated the 
relationship account acceptance and behavioral intentions, as well as the relationship 
between attributions of responsibility and behavioral intentions (see Figure 15). Anger 
was also a significant negative predictor of behavioral intentions (β = -.18, p < .001). 
This finding was consistent with past research (Coombs & Holladay, 2007). However, 
the findings for empathy were quite unexpected. 
 Although empathy had not been tested before in the context of organizational 
apologies, McCullough et al. (1998) had demonstrated that empathy mediated the 
relationship between apologies and forgiveness in interpersonal relationships. When an 
offender apologizes, victims are better able to take the offender’s perspective and share 
the offender’s feelings, thus making it easier for the victim to forgive. However, the 
findings from Study 1 indicated that empathy may have the opposite effect in the 
context of organizational apologies. 
As seen in Figure 16, empathy did act as a partial mediator between perceptions 
of the apology and behavioral intentions. Perceptions that the organization had 
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apologized made victims feel greater empathy (β = .14, p = .002), but greater feelings of 
empathy were negatively associated with behavioral intentions (β = -.08, p < .001). In 
other words, the more victims perceived that the organization had apologized the more 
empathetic they felt toward the organization. However, the empathy they felt, the less 
likely they were to business with the organization in the future and the more likely they 
were to say negative things about the organization to other people.  
Empathy also partially mediated the relationships between account acceptance 
and behavioral intentions, OPR and behavioral intentions, and attributions of 
responsibility and behavioral intentions. Because empathy acted as a negative predictor 
of behavioral intention, it reduced the total effect sizes of account acceptance, OPR, and 
attributions of responsibility on behavioral intentions. As seen in Figure 14, higher 
account acceptance and OPR scores were related to more positive behavioral intentions, 
while attributing more responsibility to the organization was related to less positive 
behavioral intentions. However, account acceptance and OPR quality also produced 
higher empathy scores (see Figure 16), which were associated with more negative 
behavioral intentions. The increase in empathy partially counteracted the positive 
effects of account acceptance and OPR. At the same time, stronger attributions of 
responsibility, which had a negative effect on behavioral intentions, also had the 
positive effect of reducing empathy.  
What accounts for this unexpected finding? Perhaps empathy operates 
differently in an organizational context than it does in an interpersonal context. The 
empathy scale used in Study 1 was adopted from Coke et al. (1978) and McCullough et 
al. (1998). This scale measured how softhearted, moved, and empathetic stakeholders 
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felt toward the organization. Maybe in an organizational context these emotions are 
associated with a loss of confidence in the organization, or pity for an organization that 
is perceived to be struggling, rather than an understanding of the organization’s 
perspective. Pitying another person may produce leniency, but pitying an organization 
may produce avoidance. Stakeholders probably do not want to do business with an 
organization that does not inspire confidence, or with a business that may not survive 
for long.  
Although the findings related to empathy are interesting, making too much of 
these findings would be a mistake. Overall, the effect sizes related to empathy were 
quite small. The clearest conclusion seems to be that stakeholders do not experience 
much empathy for organizations—at least not online retailers. Another surprising 
finding from this research was related to the lack of any significant relationship between 
apologies and attributions of responsibility.  
The Lack of Effects on Attributions of Responsibility 
Coombs’ situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 1995; 2007b) is 
based on attribution theory. Different types of crises are expected to produce different 
attributions of responsibility, thus requiring organizations to use different crisis 
responses. These different crisis responses, in turn, are indented to reduce the amount of 
responsibility attributed to the organization. A curious feature of apologies is that 
although they typically involve acknowledging responsibility, they actually reduce 
attributions of responsibility in interpersonal contexts (Weiner, 2006). This dissertation 
sought to measure the affects of apologies on attributions of responsibility in an 
organizational context. 
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Naturally, organizations do not want their crisis responses to increase 
attributions of responsibility. In some crises, such as major scandals, responsibility is 
unambiguous and there is little an organization can do to change attributions of 
responsibility. However, if the question of responsibility is open to interpretation, 
organizations might be hesitant to apologize.  
Study 1 tested the effects of Scher and Darley’s (1997) four apology 
components on attributions of responsibility in a particularly ambiguous crisis situation. 
The hypothetical data breach crisis represented a situation in which the organization 
was a victim, but where the organization also had a responsibility to protect its 
stakeholders’ personal information. Theoretically, if there was ever a scenario in which 
an apology could affect attributions of responsibility, this scenario should have been the 
one. However, the four-way ANOVA was non-significant, indicating that the apology 
components did not influence attributions of responsibility. 
One might wonder if this finding was the result of a hypothetical scenario that 
simply produced very low attributions of responsibility across all conditions. However, 
the mean attribution scores for each cell in Study 1 were near the mid-point of the 7-
point scale, ranging from 3.98 to 4.66. Attribution of responsibility was also normally 
distributed, overall. Thus, attribution of responsibility did vary, but this variance was 
not caused by the apology conditions. If there had been a relationship between 
apologies and attribution, that relationship should have been identifiable. 
Given the small effects of the apology components on other variables, it is easy 
to see how the effects on attribution of responsibility did not reach the level of statistical 
significance. This finding is at least partially good news for organizations thinking 
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about apologizing. Apparently apologies do not increase attributions of responsibility—
not even in situations where responsibility is ambiguous. On the other hand, 
organizational apologies may not always reduce attributions of responsibility the way 
they do in interpersonal apologies (Weiner, 2006; Weiner et al., 1991). 
Based on the results of Study 1, a more important variable to consider is the 
relationship between the organization and its stakeholders. The next section discusses 
how the OPR affects stakeholders’ reactions to organizational crises.  
The Importance of Organization-Stakeholder Relationships 
Relationships between organizations and stakeholders (usually called 
organization–public relationships in the public relations literature) are known to affect 
the way stakeholders respond to organizational crises. K. A. Brown and White (2011) 
found that students’ relationship with their university was more important in how 
students responded to a hypothetical crisis than the type of crisis response the university 
used. Caldiero (2006) reported that when stakeholders had positive relationship 
histories with an organization they were more willing to accept defensive crisis 
responses like denial or excuses.  
Study 1 tested the effects of pre-crisis OPR quality on eight dependent variables: 
perceived apology, account acceptance, organizational reputation, post-crisis OPR 
quality, anger, empathy, attributions of responsibility, and behavioral intentions. Higher 
pre-crisis OPR scores were associated with higher scores for perceived apology, 
account acceptance, organizational reputation, post-crisis OPR quality, empathy, and 
behavioral intention. A more positive pre-crisis OPR was also associated with lower 
levels of anger and lower attributions or responsibility after a crisis. When behavioral 
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intention was regressed on perceived apology, account acceptance, organizational 
reputation, attribution of responsibility, anger, empathy, and post-crisis OPR, the post-
crisis OPR was the strongest predictor, by far (β = .75, p < .001). The association 
between the OPR and behavioral intention was four times stronger than the association 
between anger and behavioral intention, eight times stronger than the relationship 
between empathy and behavioral intentions, and 10 times stronger than the association 
between reputation and behavioral intentions. None of the other variables were even 
statistically significant predictors of behavioral intention. Thus, assuming the goal of 
crisis communication is to make stakeholders more likely to continue doing business 
with an organization (and less likely to say negative things about the organization), the 
most important variable in Study 1 was the OPR after the crisis, and the most important 
predictor of OPR after the crisis was the OPR before the crisis.  
Other scholars have previously noted the importance of pre-crisis relationships 
in crisis communication (Coombs, 2000; Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Caldiero (2006) 
found that strong relationships with stakeholders before a crisis allowed organizations 
to use denial or excuse strategies when responding to crises. Coombs and Holladay 
(2006) reported that when organizations have very positive reputations before a crisis, 
their reputations after a crisis do not suffer as much. K. A. Brown and White (2011) 
wrote that “maintaining positive relationships with stakeholders is more important than 
any individual crisis response strategy” (p. 88).  
This study reinforces K. A. Brown and White’s (2011) point. The OPR had 
larger effects than any of the apology components on all of the dependent variables 
except perceived apology (PA). Post-crisis OPR scores explained most of the variance 
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in behavioral intentions (see Table 29). Evidently, at least in the context of a data 
breach crisis, the way an organization has dealt with its stakeholders before the crisis 
matters more than what an organization says after the crisis.  
This chapter has discussed the key research findings of this dissertation. Overall, 
the findings suggest that stakeholder’s consider an effective organizational apology to 
be a combination of words and behaviors designed to fix the problem and rebuild the 
relationship. However, the quality of the OPR before and after a crisis is a much 
stronger predictor of how stakeholders will behave toward the organization than how 
the organization apologizes. The next chapter will consider the implications of these 
findings for public relations theory, practice, and method, as well as the limitations of 
this research and directions for future study.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Two of the most prominent areas of public relations research are crisis 
communication (An & Cheng, 2010; Coombs, 2010b) and relationship management (J. 
E. Grunig & Huang, 2000; Ledingham, 2006). This dissertation has examined the 
concept of the organizational apology within the context of these two areas. 
Specifically, this dissertation has tried to determine what constitutes an effective 
organizational apology from the perspective of organizational stakeholders. 
Furthermore, this dissertation has considered how the relationships between an 
organization and its stakeholders or publics (OPR) can affect stakeholders’ reactions to 
organizational crises and apologies. This final chapter considers the implications of this 
dissertation for the field of public relations. First, the key findings from the dissertation 
will be reviewed briefly. Next, the implications of those findings for public relations 
theory, practice, and method will be discussed. Finally, the limitations of the 
dissertation will be noted and directions for future research will be offered.  
Review of Key Findings 
 Three separate studies were conducted for this dissertation. Study 1 was an 
online experiment that used a 2x2x2x2 between-subject factorial design. The purpose of 
this study was to test the effects of four apology components (expressions of remorse, 
acknowledgements of responsibility, promises of forbearance, and offers of 
reparations), as well as OPR quality, on stakeholders’ reactions to a crisis. Participants 
were asked to identify an online retailer with whom they had done business in the past, 
and then to imagine that the online retailer had been hacked and their customer 
information had been stolen. Participants were presented with one of 16 different 
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apology messages, and they completed a questionnaire to measure their perception of 
the apology, account acceptance, organizational reputation, relationship quality (OPR), 
anger, empathy, attribution of responsibility, and behavioral intentions. 
 Studies 2 and 3 took a more inductive, qualitative approach. These studies were 
designed to find out what stakeholders considered to be the important components of an 
organizational apology without prompting from the researcher. Participants in both 
studies were asked to imagine the same data breach crisis used in Study 1. Study 2 
asked participants to write the kind of apology they would accept from the organization 
in the scenario. Study 3 asked participants to write a list of suggestion the organization 
could use to make an effective (i.e., acceptable) apology.   
 The results of Study 1 revealed that all four of the apology components 
contributed to stakeholders’ perception that the organization had apologized. These four 
components also produced higher scores for account acceptance, organizational 
reputation, and post-crisis OPR. The offer of reparations component produced lower 
levels of anger and higher levels of empathy. Both the promise of forbearance 
component and the offer of reparations component improved stakeholder’s behavioral 
intentions toward the organization. However, almost all of the effect sizes were quite 
small.  
Two findings were particularly surprising. Study 1 found that none of the 
apology components significantly affected attributions of responsibility. This finding 
ran contrary to previous research on interpersonal apologies, which suggest apologies 
can reduce attributions of responsibility (Weiner, 2006; Weiner et al., 1991).  
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Study 1 also found that feelings of empathy had a small negative effect on 
behavioral intentions. The more stakeholders empathized with an organization, the more 
negative their behavioral intentions were. This finding was unexpected because 
McCullough et al. (1998) demonstrated that one of the ways interpersonal apologies 
produce forgiveness in by increasing victims’ empathy for their offenders.  
Study 1 revealed that the best predictor of account acceptance, organizational 
reputation, attribution of responsibility, post-crisis OPR, anger, or empathy, was the 
quality of the OPR before the crisis. The best predictor of behavioral intentions was the 
quality of the OPR after the crisis. The qualitative data from Studies 2 and 3 were used 
to triangulate Study 1’s findings. 
 Nine apology components emerged from the qualitative data. A typology was 
developed to classify these components based on whether they were intended primarily 
to (1) fix problems or (2) rebuild relationship, and whether they were primarily based 
on (a) words or (b) behaviors. Figure 17 illustrates this typology. 
The category of words that fix problems (1a) included acknowledging 
responsibility, offering explanations, and telling stakeholders what actions they could 
take to protect themselves in the crisis. The category of behaviors that fix problems (1b) 
was comprised of three types of corrective action: mitigating harm, offering reparations, 
and preventing future recurrences. The category of words that rebuild relationships (2a) 
contained expressions of genuine remorse, identification with stakeholders, and 
requesting another chance. The category of behaviors that rebuild relationships (2b) 
included providing compensation and fostering personal communication.  
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 In keeping with Scher and Darley’s (1997) research on interpersonal apologies, 
the three studies conducted for this dissertation demonstrated that stakeholders do 
recognize expressions of remorse, acknowledgements of responsibility, promises of 
forbearance, and offers of reparation as possible components of effective organizational 
apologies. However, stakeholders do not require all four components to be present for 
an apology to be effective, nor do they limit apology components to these four. In 
particular, behaviors such as taking corrective action and providing compensation 
appear to be important parts of effective organizational apologies. 
This dissertation concluded that an effective organizational apology, from the 
stakeholder perspective, is comprised of a combination of words and behaviors that fix 
problems and repair relationships. There are a number of apology components that can 
be combined to create effective apologies, and in many cases, behaviors like providing 
compensation can take the place of direct acknowledgments of responsibility. Although 
words are a necessary part of organizational apologies, words without actions do not 
seem to produce effective organizational apologies.  
Perhaps the most important finding from this dissertation relates to the 
importance of the OPR. No matter how organizations word their apologies, the 
relationship and reputation they have established with their stakeholders before the 
crisis has the largest effect on stakeholder reactions to the crisis. The implications of 
these findings are discussed next. 
Implications 
Understanding what constitutes an effective organizational apology in the minds 
of stakeholders has important implications for the field of public relations. Scholars 
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have defined and operationalized apologies in many ways, creating a degree of 
confusion in the literature (Coombs, et al., 2010; Fediuk, Pace, & Botero, 2010). 
Scholars have also tended to define apologies deductively based on existing theory, 
rather than letting stakeholders’ perceptions of apologies guide their definitions. By 
taking a stakeholder perspective on organizational apologies, this dissertation advances 
public relations theory. 
This dissertation also extends the application of OPR theory to crisis 
communication. A number of public relations researchers have written about the 
importance of the OPR in crisis communication (K. A. Brown & White, 2011; Coombs, 
2000; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Caldiero, 2006; Huang, 2008). However, these 
scholars did not specifically address the OPR in the context of organizational apologies. 
This dissertation helps to demonstrate the relative importance of the OPR, as compared 
to organizational apologies.  
In addition to theoretical implications, this dissertation has practical implications 
for organizations in crisis situation. For example, organizations may be afraid to 
apologize due to liability concerns (Hearit, 2006; Tyler, 1997), or because they fear that 
apologizing will make them look more responsible than they really are. However, the 
present findings suggest these concerns need not prevent organizations from using 
apologies in their crisis response. These findings also suggest that organizations should 
focus their resources on establishing and maintaining good OPRs if they want their 
crisis communication to be most effective.  
From a methodological standpoint, this research points out the difficulties that 
arise when researchers and participants in a study define key concepts differently. The 
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present findings suggest a new way to operationalize organizational apologies in future 
studies. Also, this dissertation begins to test Coombs’ (2012) suggestion that victims 
may have different reactions to organizational apologies than non-victims.  
Each of these areas—theoretical, practical, and methodological implications—
will be addressed in turn. 
Theoretical Implications 
 This dissertation advances public relations theory by helping to clarify the way 
scholars define and operationalize organizational apologies, by highlighting differences 
between organizational apologies and interpersonal apologies, by suggesting an 
expanded understanding of corrective action, and by reaffirming the importance of the 
OPR. The issue of definition and operationalization is considered first. 
Good theories depend on clearly defining and operationalizing key concepts. 
The concept of the apology has been defined and operationalized differently within 
image repair theory (Benoit, 1995a), situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 
1995, 2007a, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2008), and speech act theory (Blum-Kulka & 
Olshtain, 1984; Scher & Darley, 1997). Other scholars have offered their own unique 
definitions and operationalizations (Hearit, 2006; Lazare, 2004; N. Smith, 2008; 
Tavuchis, 1991). All of these scholars have regarded apologies as either an image repair 
strategy (Benoit, 1997b; Coombs, 2007a; Hearit, 1994) or a relationship repair strategy 
(McCullough et al., 1997; Scher & Darley, 1997; Tavuchis, 1991), but they have 
differed on what components an apology ought to contain. 
Naturally, the definitions and operationalizations researchers use affect the 
results they find. For example, Coombs and Holladay (2008) reported that apologies 
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were no more effective than sympathy or compensation at influencing stakeholders’ 
reactions to an organizational crisis. However, the apology in their study was 
operationalized with only an acknowledgement of responsibility and a request for 
forgiveness. Participants in the study may have considered the sympathy condition 
(which included an expression of remorse and an attempt to identify with stakeholders) 
or the compensation condition (which contained both compensation and an offer of 
reparations) to be just as apologetic as the apology condition.  
A number of scholars have described apologies as speech acts (Blum-Kulka & 
Olshtain, 1984; Scher & Darley, 1997; Searle, 1969; Tavuchis, 1991). This dissertation 
found that while stakeholders may recognize words alone as an organizational apology, 
they are not likely to find such an apology effective. From the stakeholder perspective, 
effective organizational apologies use a combination of words and behaviors to fix 
problems and repair relationships. Certain behaviors, such as taking corrective action or 
providing compensation, may represent apologies in the minds of stakeholders. Crisis 
communication scholars ought to be cautious not to assume stakeholders define 
concepts the way they do.  
Crisis scholars should not be surprised to learn that stakeholders expect 
behaviors to be part of organizational apologies. Benoit and Pang (2008) observed that 
an organization’s public image is shaped by its “words and deeds” (p. 245). Coombs 
(2000) wrote, “Crisis mangers must respond—say or do something—in a crisis” (p. 83). 
Clearly, scholars already understand that both words and behaviors are part of effective 
crisis responses. The difference between scholars and stakeholders is that scholars parse 
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crisis responses in such a way that apologies do not include behaviors, while 
stakeholders do not parse crisis responses this way. 
Hearit (2006) argued that liability issues have changed the essence of 
organizational apologies. He wrote that “compensation has become the new apology” 
(p. 209). To illustrate this point, Hearit noted that even when companies face 
overwhelming evidence of their own wrongdoing, they prefer to deny culpability, offer 
a statement of sympathy, and “pay large sums of money to settle an issue” (p. 209). 
Thus, “the essence of the apology comes not in the actual words…but instead in the 
amount of money that is paid to victims” (p. 209).  
The findings of this dissertation support and extend Hearit’s (2006) analysis. 
Not only do many organizations use compensation or corrective action in lieu of a 
verbal (or written) apology, but many stakeholders also seem to treat compensation or 
corrective action as the most important part of an organizational apology. Because 
apologies are social constructs, the way apologies are symbolized is open to change. If 
such a change is occurring or has occurred, scholars can either reject the change and 
argue that the “new” apologies are inauthentic, or they can update their own definitions 
and operationalizations of the concept. 
Another possible way to address the apparent discrepancies between scholarly 
definitions and stakeholder definitions of apologies may be to distinguish between 
technical apologies and practical apologies, at least in organizational contexts. Coombs 
(2007a) distinguished between apologies and partial apologies, with the difference 
being that partial apologies do not contain acknowledgements of responsibility. 
However, calling an apology partial creates the impression that the apology is 
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unsatisfactory to victims. The present research suggests that even when organizational 
apologies do not contain overt acknowledgments of responsibility, stakeholders may 
still be willing to accept those apologies.   
A technical apology could be the kind of statement that accepts full 
responsibility for wrongdoing—the kind of apology that creates liability problems for 
an organization (Tyler, 1997). For example, an organization in a data breach crisis could 
say, “We were responsible for the security of our customers’ information and we 
apologize for our failure to protect your data.” Such a statement would meet the 
technical definition of an apology, as given by scholars (Benoit, 1995a; Coombs, 
2007a), but it might or might not satisfy stakeholders.  
By contrast, a practical apology would be the kind of apology that does not 
directly accept blame for a crisis, but does satisfy stakeholders. Returning to the data 
breach example, an organization might say, “We are very concerned about what has 
happened and we are going to offer all of our affected customers free identity theft 
protection, along with a coupon for 20% off their next purchase.” This message does 
not meet the technical definition of an apology, and would be classified as a partial 
apology by Coombs (2007a). However, many stakeholders might find this message 
more satisfying, and might even regard it as an apology. If so, the organization could be 
said to have practically apologized.  
Technical apologies can be (and have been) defined by scholars a priori. 
Practical apologies, as envisioned here, would be defined a posteriori in terms of 
stakeholder reactions. Thus, scholars would have to analyze a crisis situation to see if 
stakeholders accepted or rejected an apology before they could label a crisis response as 
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a practical apology. Instead of imposing their own categories onto the situation, this 
approach would encourage scholars to acknowledge that apologies are social 
constructions that may take on different forms in different contexts.  
Another theoretical implication of this dissertation is that organizational 
apologies do not function exactly like interpersonal apologies. McCullough et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that interpersonal apologies work, at least in part, by enabling victims to 
empathize with offenders. Interpersonal apologies lead to empathy, which leads to 
forgiveness. However, the present research did find support for this dynamic in the 
context of organizational apologies. One explanation may be that people do not feel the 
same empathy for an organization that they feel for one another (Bisel & Messersmith, 
2012).   
As reported in Chapter 4, apologies had very small effects on empathy, and 
empathy had very small effects on behavioral intentions (the organizational equivalent 
of forgiveness). Perhaps stakeholders do struggle to empathize with organizations. 
According to relationship management theory, OPRs can be measured in terms of trust, 
control mutuality, commitment, and satisfaction (J. E. Grunig & Huang, 2000; Hon & 
Grunig, 1999). Empathy is not considered an outcome of OPRs.  
Dialogic public relations theory does consider empathy an important principle 
(Kent & Taylor, 2002), but defines empathy as “walking in the shoes” of one’s 
stakeholders (p. 27). This definition captures only part of Coke et al.’s (1978) definition 
of interpersonal empathy. Coke and his colleagues argued that empathy involves taking 
another person’s perspective and sharing another person’s emotions. Dialogic public 
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relations theory does not include the idea of stakeholders or publics feeling what the 
organization feels. 
If empathy is merely a matter of perspective taking, the hypothetical data breach 
scenario used in this dissertation should have allowed stakeholders to take the 
organization’s perspective. Data breaches are becoming more and more common. The 
question, “How could this happen?” should have been easy enough for stakeholders to 
answer. On the other hand, if empathy also requires the sharing of emotions, it may 
have been difficult for stakeholders to imagine and share what members of the 
organization were feeling. Perhaps future research ought to explore if and how empathy 
between organizations and stakeholders can be defined and operationalized.  
Surprisingly, what little empathy stakeholders did feel toward the organization 
made them less likely to do business with the organization and more likely to spread 
negative word-of-mouth about the organization. Perhaps stakeholders interpret the 
concept of empathy for an organization differently from the concept of empathy for 
another person. Instead of perspective-taking and sharing emotions, empathy for an 
organization may be more akin to pity, which may relate to a loss of confidence in the 
organization. Just because stakeholders feel bad for an organization in crisis does not 
mean those stakeholders want to continue doing business with the organization. Further 
research is needed to better understand this dynamic. 
Instead of empathy, anger seems to be the more important emotion when trying 
to understand victims’ reactions to an organizational crisis. Anger fully mediated the 
relationship between account acceptance and behavioral intention, as well the 
relationship between attributions of responsibility and behavioral intention. As seen in 
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Figure 15, greater attributions of responsibility led to more anger, and more anger led to 
more negative behavioral intentions. Account acceptance, on the other hand, reduced 
anger. These findings are consistent with other crisis communication research (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2007; Pace et al., 2010), and suggest that organizations need to be more 
concerned with minimizing stakeholder anger than with maximizing stakeholder 
empathy. 
One issue organizations apparently do not need to be concerned about is having 
stakeholders attribute more responsibility to them as the result of an apology. The 
apology components tested in Study 1 did not have a statistically significant effect on 
how much responsibility stakeholders attributed to the organization. This finding is 
important because the data breach scenario used in this dissertation contained elements 
of a victim crisis (i.e., the organization is a victim) and a preventable crisis (i.e., the 
organization should have prevented the crisis from occurring (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002). This scenario involved more ambiguous responsibility than, say, a product recall 
crisis or an industrial accident crisis because there were hackers who had illegally 
accessed the organization’s database. If there was any danger of an apology increasing 
attributions of responsibility, this scenario should have produced that effect.  
From the perspective of positive organizational scholarship (K. S. Cameron et 
al., 2003) this finding should come as good news. Organizations seeking to exhibit the 
virtues of honesty and integrity need not fear that they will be unfairly blamed for crisis 
situations when they apologize. 
Studies of interpersonal apologies have found that apologies may actually 
decrease attributions of responsibility (Weiner, 2006). This dissertation did not find the 
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same effect for organizational apologies. Situational crisis communication theory posits 
that attributions of responsibility are primarily affected by the type of crisis (Coombs, 
2007a, 2007b), and research supports this link (Coombs & Holladay, 2007). Further 
research involving different crisis situations would be required to validate the present 
findings that apologies and attributions of responsibility are unrelated. For now, 
however, it appears other factors beside the apology determine whom stakeholders 
blame for crises. 
 Why do organizational apologies differ from interpersonal apologies? Further 
research into this question is needed, but a few possible explanations can be offered. 
First, because organizations are not individuals, they do not communicate the way 
individuals do (Hallahan, 2000). Unlike individuals, organizations do not engage in 
nonverbal communication, and their communication tends to lack emotion. These 
differences may make it hard for stakeholders to judge the sincerity of an organization’s 
words.   
A second possible explanation is that because organizations are comprised of 
many people, the person offering the apology may not actually be responsible for the 
crisis. Stakeholders may sense that an apology comes from the public relations 
department, not from the people who caused the harm. If so, stakeholders may be 
reluctant to accept mere words as an adequate token of the organization’s regret and 
commitment to its stakeholders. 
A third reason for the differences between organizational and individual 
apologies may be the differences between organization–stakeholder relationships and 
interpersonal relationships. The OPR tends to be more instrumental than an 
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interpersonal relationship. People usually form a relationship with an organization as a 
means to an end. However, an interpersonal relationship may be an end in and of itself. 
Thus, people may be more motivated to seek reconciliation with another individual than 
with an organization—especially if there are multiple organizations that could help 
people achieve the same goal. For example, it is relatively easy for customers who are 
unhappy with Walmart to take their business to Target, but it is not so easy for two 
friends who are fighting to forget each other and make new friends.  
In addition to the important differences between organizational and individual 
apologies, this dissertation highlights an interesting finding about corrective action. This 
finding emerged from the qualitative data collected for Studies 2 and 3. Although 
Benoit (1995a, 1997b) defined corrective action as either preventing the recurrence of 
an offense or repairing the damage caused by an offense, the qualitative data analysis 
suggested that mitigating harm is another type of corrective action that matters to 
stakeholders. Mitigating harm involves trying to minimize the damage victims are 
suffering while the crisis is ongoing. This concept has already been recognized by crisis 
scholars (Coombs, 2006; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992), but has not been treated as an 
image repair strategy.  
The current research suggests that some stakeholders consider mitigating harm 
to be part of an effective apology. In the case of the data breach scenario, stakeholders 
imagined that organizations would take actions such as helping authorities catch the 
hacker, or asking customers to change their passwords. Mitigating harm may not be 
possible in all crises, but in situations where the crisis is ongoing, stakeholders look for 
this type of corrective action along with prevention and reparations.  
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A final theoretical implication of this dissertation is that researchers are right to 
emphasize the role of organization–stakeholder relationships in crisis communication. A 
number of scholars have already made this observation (K. A. Brown & White, 2011; 
Caldiero, 2006; Coombs, 2000; Coombs & Holladay, 2001), and the present findings 
strongly support it. Explaining why stakeholders forgive or do not forgive an 
organization has more to do with the relationship and reputation the organization has 
established with its stakeholders before the crisis occurs. Furthermore, if the OPR is 
important even in the context of retailer–customer relationship tested here (a relatively 
distant relationship), then the OPR is likely to be even more important in other contexts, 
such as relationships between organizations and members or organizations and donors.  
Along with these theoretical implications, this dissertation has important 
implications for public relations professionals. 
Practical Implications  
This dissertation has several implications for the practice of public relations. 
Although no magic combination words can make stakeholders forgive an organization 
in a crisis, there are a variety of crisis responses that stakeholders seem willing to accept 
as organizational apologies. In terms of repairing an organization’s image and 
rebuilding relationships with stakeholders, it is more important for an organization to 
offer a response that stakeholders will accept as an apology than to offer a response that 
scholars would define as an apology.  
In a crisis situation, an organization often gets conflicting advice from its public 
relations department and its legal department (Coombs, 2007a). Public relations 
professionals tend to argue for openness and taking steps to repair the organization’s 
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reputation, while attorneys generally advocate for limiting disclosure and trying to 
minimize liability. The present findings suggest that public relations professionals do 
not need to insist upon a full acknowledgement of responsibility in every case. Other 
strategies, such as expressing remorse, taking corrective action, and offering 
compensation can have the same positive effect on the organization’s relationship with 
its stakeholders, without opening the organization to lawsuits.  
Two caveats are in order here, however. First, organizations that have caused 
harm to stakeholders have an ethical duty to admit their mistakes, even if doing so will 
be costly. Second, this dissertation studied only one type of crisis, and the results may 
not be generalizable to other situations. As Coombs and Holladay (2008) noted, full 
apologies may become more important when crises are more severe and when more 
responsibility is attributed to the organization. 
Perhaps the most important practical implication of this dissertation is that 
effective crisis responses begin long before a crisis occurs. Previous research has 
reported that positive organizational reputations (Coombs & Holladay, 2006) and 
positive OPRs (K. A. Brown & White, 2011; Huang, 2008) lead to more positive 
stakeholder reactions following a crisis. The findings reported in this dissertation 
indicate that pre-crisis OPR quality is a better predictor of account acceptance, 
organizational reputation, attributions of responsibility, anger, empathy, and post-crisis 
OPR quality than the content of an organization’s apology. Furthermore, the post-crisis 
OPR quality is the best predictor of stakeholders’ behavioral intentions after a crisis. 
Organizations cannot simply rely on their public relations staff to save them 
from crises with cleverly-worded statements. Organizations need to build and maintain 
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quality relationships by acting with honestly, competence, justice, and a genuine 
commitment to their stakeholders. Practically speaking, this approach gives 
organizations a better chance of surviving a crisis than trying to formulate the perfect 
response after a crisis has occurred.  
In addition to theoretical and practical implications, this dissertation has 
implications for the methods scholars use to study organizational apologies. 
Methodological Implications 
 The methodological implications of this dissertation involve the measurement of 
the OPR, the manipulation of one of the experimental conditions, the use of victims 
instead of non-victims in crisis communication research, and the way scholars 
operationalize organizational apologies. 
 As described in Chapter 3, this dissertation used Hon and Grunig’s (1999) OPR 
scale to measure relationships between organizations and stakeholders. This scale has 
been used widely in public relations research, and its reliability and validity have been 
tested (Ki & Hon, 2007a). The OPR scale is intended to have six dimensions—four 
dimensions of relationship quality (trust, control mutuality, commitment, and 
satisfaction) and two dimensions of relationship type (communal or exchange). 
However, confirmatory factor analysis conducted for Study 1 found only three 
dimensions. Relationship quality was found to be a one-dimensional construct rather 
than a four-dimensional construct. The other two factors (communal relationship and 
exchange relationship) were confirmed. 
 Perhaps the difference between the present study and previous studies is related 
to the types of organizations and stakeholders in each study. For example, Ki and Hon’s 
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(2007a) validation of the OPR scale was conducted with a farm bureau and its 
members. By contrast, the present study involved retailers and customers. Customers 
may not have enough involvement with retailers to distinguish between the concepts of 
trust, control mutuality, commitment, and satisfaction. 
 The important point here is that even when a scale has been previously tested 
and widely used, researchers still need to check the reliability and validity of that scale 
when they use it. Different populations and different situations may yield different 
results. In this case, the fact that the OPR quality scale was one-dimensional did not 
cause serious problems for the analysis. However, if the study’s hypotheses had 
involved specific dimensions of OPR quality, confirming the validity of each dimension 
would have been especially important.  
 Another methodological implication of this dissertation is the need to check 
manipulations carefully. In factorial ANOVAs, the researcher cannot simply look for a 
main effect of a factor on a manipulation check. The effects of other factors must be 
examined, as well, in order to rule out confounds (Perdue & Summers, 1986). In the 
case of Study 1, the manipulation check for the acknowledgement of responsibility was 
unsuccessful because both the responsibility and the reparation condition affected it.  
 In some cases, a failed manipulation check is theoretically interesting. This 
dissertation involved three separate studies, all of which indicated that behaviors can 
substitute for words in an organizational apology. Therefore, the fact that participants in 
Study 1 perceived an offer of reparations as taking responsibility sheds light on the 
importance of combining words and behaviors in organizational apologies.    
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 One unique aspect of this dissertation’s methodology was the attempt to study 
crisis victims. Coombs (2012) and Kent (2010) argued that too much crisis 
communication research involves only non-victims. Coombs (2012) also suggested that 
crisis victims might be more concerned than non-victims with the kind of apologies 
organizations offer.  
 Study 1 tried to help participants imagine themselves as crisis victims. 
Participants were asked to identify an organization with which they had an existing 
business relationship, and then the experimental manipulation was customized to 
include the name of that organization. However, the effect sizes for all apology 
components were quite small. Perhaps participants in Study 1 were not able to truly see 
themselves as victims of the hypothetical crisis, or perhaps the crisis was not severe 
enough to evoke strong reactions from the participants. Another possibility is that 
victims’ reactions to apologies do not vary much from non-victims’ reactions. Further 
testing is needed to understand this issue.  
One final methodological implication deserves discussion. This dissertation has 
argued that effective organizational apologies, from the stakeholder perspective, use a 
combination of words and behaviors to fix problems and rebuild relationships. Future 
research on organizational apologies should consider operationalizing apologies to 
include these elements. Organizational apologies do not necessarily require elements 
from all four of the categories in Figure 17 (words that fix problems, behaviors that fix 
problems, words that rebuild relationships, and behaviors that rebuild relationships). 
However, organizational apologies should be operationalized to include words and 
behaviors, as well as elements aimed at fixing problems and elements aimed at 
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rebuilding relationships. When studies report that apologies are no more effective than 
other crises responses (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 2008), such findings may be caused 
by the fact that participants perceived those other responses to be apologies.   
The next section discusses limitations of this dissertation and directions for 
future research. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 This dissertation used three studies to examine what constitutes an effective 
organizational apology from the perspective of an organization’s stakeholders. Study 1 
used an experiment to test the importance of four apology components on victims’ 
reactions to a crisis. Studies 2 and 3 asked participants to imagine themselves as victims 
of a crisis and to write an effective apology on behalf of the organization (Study 2) or a 
list of suggestions to make the organization’s apology effective (Study 3). Each of these 
studies involved certain limitations. This section discusses these limitations and offers 
several opportunities for additional research in this area. 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations associated with Study 1. As mentioned already, the 
manipulation check for the acknowledgment of responsibility conditions was 
unsuccessful to the extent that another factor in the analysis had a significant influence 
on this manipulation check. Participants did not completely distinguish between the 
acknowledgment of responsibility and the offer of reparations conditions. Therefore the 
findings related to the responsibility condition must be interpreted cautiously.  
The small effect sizes for the apology conditions in Study 1 also argue for a 
cautious interpretation of the findings. Just because certain factors are statistically 
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significant does not mean they are important. The small effect sizes may indicate that 
the hypothetical crisis was not severe enough, or the experimental design was not 
realistic enough to produce larger effects.  
Because Study 1 only studied one type of crisis and one type of stakeholder, the 
findings may not be generalizable to other groups or situations. Apologies might be 
more important in more severe crisis situations (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). 
Furthermore, non-victims might react differently than victims (Coombs, 2012).  
Because Studies 2 and 3 were exploratory studies that used convenience 
samples, the themes and categories identified in those studies may not generalize to 
other populations or other types of crises. The findings for both studies were based on 
analyzing and interpreting texts created by the participants, not by communicating with 
the participants directly. Thus, the researcher may not have understood all of the data in 
these studies the way the participants intended.  
Future Research 
Future research should examine apology components in different crisis 
situations. The data breach crisis employed in this dissertation was not as severe as 
many crises (e.g., industrial accidents, product negligence cases, etc.). More severe 
crises might produce different results.   
Different crisis situations could also affect the way stakeholders make 
attributions of responsibility. The present scenario produced moderate attributions of 
responsibility, but a crisis that involved misdeeds by members of the organization might 
yield significantly different results in the way responsibility was attributed and how 
apologies influenced that attribution.  
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Studying different crisis situations includes studying crises in different cultural 
contexts. Scholars have already noted differences between apologies in Western and 
Eastern cultures (Gries & Peng, 2002). The techniques used in this dissertation could be 
applied in intercultural communication research to determine what constitutes an 
effective organizational apology in the minds of international stakeholders.   
Future studies may want to modify the experimental manipulations used in this 
dissertation. The acknowledgement of responsibility manipulation in Study 1 was 
unsuccessful, suggesting that either the manipulation or the manipulation check ought to 
be revised. Also, Studies 2 and 3 found a number of apology components that could be 
included in future experiments. For instance, the effects of compensation on 
stakeholders’ perception that an organization had apologized would be worth testing. 
Explanations might also contribute to the perception that an organization has 
apologized.  
A key finding from all three studies was that organizational behaviors seem to 
affect stakeholder perceptions more than words do. In particular, some stakeholders 
perceive behaviors like providing compensation or taking corrective action as evidence 
that an organizational apology is sincere. A future experiment could test whether 
costlier forms of compensation are perceived as more sincere or more apologetic. 
Ultimately, the best way to test this dissertation’s main argument would be to 
operationalize apology components in terms of (1) fixing problems or (2) rebuilding 
relationships, and (a) word or (b) behaviors. The present findings suggest that when 
apologies contain all of these elements they will be perceived as more effective than 
apologies without all of these elements. Confirming this theory empirically would be 
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tremendously valuable to organizations trying to maintain or repair relationships with 
their stakeholders after a crisis.  
Conclusion 
 As Fink (1986) observed, organizational crises are inevitable. We live in an 
imperfect world filled with imperfect people. Regardless of how well-managed or well-
prepared organizations are, they will face crises eventually. When such crises arise, 
organizations need to be ready to respond appropriately. When organizations are 
responsible for contributing to these crises, organizational apologies are ethically and 
strategically appropriate.  
 The findings of this dissertation suggest that an organization’s stakeholders may 
not perceive an organizational apology the way they perceive interpersonal apologies. 
Furthermore, stakeholders may have different perceptions of an organizational apology 
than crisis communication scholars have. If the organization’s goal is to repair its public 
image and rebuild relationships with its stakeholders, the organization needs to make 
sure any apology it offers is acceptable to its stakeholders. When organizational 
apologies use a combination of words and behaviors to fix problems and rebuild 
relationships, these apologies will be more effective for organizations and more 
satisfying for stakeholders. 
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Table 1. Means and Reliabilities for Study 1 Scales 
 
 
Scale M SD α 
Pre-Test OPR (OPR1) 5.52 1.01 .96 
Pre-Test Communal Relationship (CR1) 5.52 1.21 .80 
Pre-Test Exchange Relationship (ER1) 3.60 1.65 .81 
Perceived Apology (PA) 4.80 1.67 .86 
Account Acceptance (AA) 5.10 1.46 .89 
Organizational Reputation (OR) 5.37 1.18 .84 
Anger (An) 3.14 1.74 .94 
Empathy (Em) 2.63 1.30 .76 
Attribution of Responsibility (AR) 4.24 1.26 .85 
Post-Test OPR (OPR2) 5.10 1.31 .97 
Post-Test Communal Relationship (CR2) 5.26 1.37 .83 
Post-Test Exchange Relationship (ER2) 3.74 1.67 .81 
Behavioral Intention (BI) 5.55 1.45 .94 
 
Note: N = 817; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3. Remorse Manipulation Check ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 969.39 15    64.63   26.17*** .33 
Remorse 519.07 1  519.07 210.18*** .21 
Responsibility 151.80 1  151.80   61.47*** .07 
Forbearance 46.04 1   46.04   18.64*** .02 
Reparations 53.28 1   53.28   21.57*** .03 
Remorse × Responsibility 132.07 1 132.07   53.48*** .06 
Remorse × Forbearance 5.15 1    5.15     2.08 .00 
Remorse × Reparations 4.88 1    4.88     1.97 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance 11.81 1  11.81     4.78* .01 
Responsibility × Reparations 6.09 1    6.09     2.47 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations 16.75 1 16.75     6.78** .01 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance 3.18 1   3.18     1.29 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations 5.03 1   5.03     2.04 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations 6.03 1   6.03     2.44 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations 3.07 1   3.07     1.24 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations 0.73 1   0.73     0.30 .00 
Within treatments 1978.14 801   2.47   
Total 24549.0 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 4. Responsibility Manipulation Check ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 573.80 15   38.25 13.37*** .20 
Remorse  81.56 1  81.56 28.50*** .03 
Responsibility 1578.83   1 1578.83 55.50*** .07 
Forbearance  66.96 1  66.96 23.40*** .03 
Reparations  180.79   1  180.79 63.17*** .07 
Remorse × Responsibility  22.05 1  22.05 7.70** .01 
Remorse × Forbearance   7.34 1   7.34 2.57 .00 
Remorse × Reparations   0.54 1   0.54 0.19 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance 26.40 1 26.40 9.23** .01 
Responsibility × Reparations   6.52 1   6.52 2.28 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations   5.55 1   5.55 1.94 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance  0.00 1  0.00 0.00 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations  0.37 1  0.37 0.13 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations  2.12 1  2.12 0.74 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations  1.00 1  1.00 0.35 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations 0.87 1 0.87 0.30 .00 
Within treatments 2292.43 801 2.86   
Total 23542.00 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 5. Forbearance Manipulation Check ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 1861.86 15  124.12   40.91*** .43 
Remorse   25.05 1   25.05     8.26** .01 
Responsibility   14.56 1   14.56     4.80* .01 
Forbearance 1703.24   1  1703.24 561.36*** .41 
Reparations   20.29 1   20.29     6.69* .01 
Remorse × Responsibility   33.35 1   33.35   10.99** .01 
Remorse × Forbearance 2.319E-005 1 2.319E-005     0.00 .00 
Remorse × Reparations   0.40 1   0.40     0.13 .00 
Responsibility × 
Forbearance   1.49 1   1.49     0.49 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations   0.05 1   0.05     0.02 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations 40.00 1 40.00   13.18 .02 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance   6.91 1   6.91     2.28 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations   0.73 1   0.73     0.24 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations   0.64 1   0.64     0.21 .00 
Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations   3.03 1   3.03     1.00 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations   0.02 1   0.02     0.01 .00 
Within treatments 2430.35 801   3.03   
Total 16146.00 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 6. Reparations Manipulation Check ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 2146.74 15 143.12   52.98*** .50 
Remorse    0.28 1    0.28      0.11 .00 
Responsibility    0.01 1    0.01      0.00 .00 
Forbearance  18.32 1   18.32      6.78** .01 
Reparations 2071.88 1 2071.88  767.00*** .49 
Remorse × Responsibility 12.35 1   12.35      4.57* .01 
Remorse × Forbearance 13.18 1   13.18      4.88* .01 
Remorse × Reparations  2.86 1    2.86      1.06 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance  4.49 1    4.49      1.66 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations  6.23 1    6.23      2.31 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations  2.48 1    2.48      0.92 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance  2.42 1    2.42      0.90 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations  0.01 1    0.01      0.00 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations  3.29 1    3.29      1.22 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations  7.82 1    7.82      2.90 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations 0.00 1    0.00      0.00 .00 
Within treatments 2163.73 801    2.70   
Total 18610.00 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 7. Perceived Apology ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 670.82 15   44.72     22.55*** .30 
Remorse 211.18 1 211.18    106.48*** .12 
Responsibility 214.40 1 214.40    108.11*** .12 
Forbearance   49.57 1   49.57     24.99*** .03 
Reparations   96.81 1   96.81     48.82*** .06 
Remorse × Responsibility   56.57 1   56.57     28.52*** .03 
Remorse × Forbearance    6.68 1    6.68 3.37 .00 
Remorse × Reparations    3.78 1    3.78 1.91 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance   14.54 1   14.54    7.33** .01 
Responsibility × Reparations    6.30 1    6.30 3.18 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations    4.94 1    4.94 2.49 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance    0.01 1    0.01 0.01 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations    1.57 1    1.57 0.79 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations    2.09 1    2.09 1.05 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations    1.29 1    1.29 0.65 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations    0.14 1    0.14 0.07 .00 
Within treatments 1588.56 801    1.98   
Total 21113.31 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 8. Perceived Apology Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
2.42 
(1.41) 
n = 52 
3.67 
(1.77) 
n = 54 
4.40 
(1.54) 
n = 47 
5.33 
(1.42) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
3.51 
(1.73) 
n = 43 
4.45 
(1.81) 
n = 57 
5.18 
(1.54) 
n = 55 
5.38 
(1.19) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.45 
(1.40) 
n = 56 
5.09 
(1.45) 
n = 50 
5.26 
(0.90) 
n = 44 
5.83 
(1.30) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
5.04 
(1.11) 
n = 50 
5.68 
(1.24) 
n = 51 
5.40 
(1.21) 
n = 46 
5.76 
(1.03) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Account Acceptance ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 335.96 15   22.40     12.74*** .19 
Remorse   51.64 1   51.64     29.36*** .04 
Responsibility   25.87 1   25.87     14.71*** .02 
Forbearance   42.48 1   42.48     24.15*** .03 
Reparations 185.94 1 185.94    105.73*** .12 
Remorse × Responsibility   12.04 1   12.04     6.85** .01 
Remorse × Forbearance    4.43 1    4.43 2.52 .00 
Remorse × Reparations    3.98 1    3.98 2.27 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance    0.42 1    0.42 0.24 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations    0.23 1    0.23 0.13 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations    3.44 1    3.44 1.96 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance    0.70 1    0.70 0.40 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations    1.88 1    1.88 1.07 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations    2.36 1    2.36 1.34 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations    0.20 1    0.20 0.11 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations    1.62 1    1.62 0.92 .00 
Within treatments    1408.75 801    1.76   
Total    22958.27 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 10. Account Acceptance Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
3.56  
(1.50) 
n = 52 
4.90 
(1.66) 
n = 54 
4.15  
(1.64) 
n = 47 
5.48  
(1.26) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.27 
(1.65) 
n = 43 
5.38  
(1.32) 
n = 57 
5.13  
(1.49) 
n = 55 
5.74  
(0.85) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.65  
(1.39) 
n = 56 
5.15  
(1.24) 
n = 50 
4.86 
(1.13) 
n = 44 
5.71  
(1.33) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
5.49  
(1.17) 
n = 50 
5.82  
(1.04) 
n = 51 
5.03  
(1.37) 
n = 46 
5.95  
(1.25) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 11. Organizational Reputation ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 101.16 15 6.74       5.24*** .09 
Remorse    9.25 1    9.25     7.18** .01 
Responsibility  18.18 1  18.18     14.11*** .02 
Forbearance  13.76 1  13.76   10.68** .01 
Reparations  38.55 1  38.55     29.92*** .04 
Remorse × Responsibility   3.29 1   3.29 2.55 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance   5.22 1   5.22   4.05* .01 
Remorse × Reparations   0.45 1   0.45 0.35 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance   0.02 1   0.02 0.02 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations   6.86 1   6.86   5.32* .01 
Forbearance × Reparations   0.81 1   0.81 0.63 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance   0.15 1   0.15 0.12 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations   2.14 1   2.14 1.66 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations   0.85 1   0.85 0.66 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations   0.08 1   0.08 0.06 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations   0.42 1   0.42 0.32 .00 
Within treatments 1031.94 801   1.29   
Total 24660.93 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 12. Organizational Reputation Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.40 
(1.22) 
n = 52 
5.27 
(1.16) 
n = 54 
5.07 
(1.44) 
n = 47 
5.42 
(1.13) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.91 
(1.36) 
n = 43 
5.57 
(1.02) 
n = 57 
5.66 
(1.06) 
n = 55 
5.71 
(1.-3) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
5.04 
(1.10) 
n = 56 
5.58 
(1.13) 
n = 50 
5.40 
(1.10) 
n = 44 
5.64 
(1.11) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
5.25 
(1.15) 
n = 50 
5.65 
(0.98) 
n = 51 
5.40 
(1.19) 
n = 46 
5.77 
(0.99) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Post-Crisis OPR ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 91.78 15   6.12      3.75*** .07 
Remorse   8.92 1   8.92  5.46* .01 
Responsibility   9.94 1   9.94  6.08* .01 
Forbearance 18.11 1 18.11  11.08** .01 
Reparations 34.20 1 34.20    20.93*** .03 
Remorse × Responsibility   1.54 1   1.54 0.94 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance   4.89 1   4.89 3.00 .00 
Remorse × Reparations   0.00 1   0.00 0.00 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance   2.88 1   2.88 1.76 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations   1.36 1   1.36 0.83 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations   0.81 1   0.81 0.49 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance   0.55 1   0.55 0.34 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations   3.24 1   3.24 1.98 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations   2.09 1   2.09 1.28 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations   0.05 1   0.05 0.03 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations   1.22 1   1.22 0.75 .00 
Within treatments    1308.481 801   1.63   
Total    22628.338 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 14. Post-Crisis OPR Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.10 
(1.52) 
n = 52 
4.94 
(1.27) 
n = 54 
4.85 
(1.68) 
n = 47 
5.15 
(1.22) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.95 
(1.68) 
n = 43 
5.34 
(1.14) 
n = 57 
5.23 
(1.23) 
n = 55 
5.33 
(1.02) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.91 
(1.35) 
n = 56 
5.14 
(1.23) 
n = 50 
4.97 
(1.24) 
n = 44 
5.48 
(1.25) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.99 
(1.32) 
n = 50 
5.48 
(1.00) 
n = 51 
5.10 
(1.23) 
n = 46 
5.50 
(0.95) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 15. Anger ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 124.37 15    8.29      2.85*** .05 
Remorse    0.19 1    0.19 0.07 .00 
Responsibility    0.36 1    0.36 0.12 .00 
Forbearance    8.73 1    8.73 3.00 .00 
Reparations  82.91 1  82.91     28.47*** .03 
Remorse × Responsibility   2.11 1   2.11 0.73 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance 18.58 1 18.58  6.38* .01 
Remorse × Reparations  0.26 1  0.26 0.09 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance  0.18 1  0.18 0.06 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations  0.44 1  0.44 0.15 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations  1.14 1  1.14 0.39 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance  0.04 1  0.04 0.01 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations  3.36 1  3.36 1.15 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations  0.29 1  0.29 0.10 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations  0.00 1  0.00 0.00 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations 4.38 1 4.38 1.50 .00 
Within treatments 2332.51 801  2.91   
Total 10503.50 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 16. Anger Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
3.98 
(1.99) 
n = 52 
2.94 
(1.83) 
n = 54 
3.59 
(1.79) 
n = 47 
3.19 
(1.92) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
3.20 
(1.99) 
n = 43 
2.67 
(1.45) 
n = 57 
3.12 
(1.70) 
n = 55 
2.66 
(1.39) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
3.28 
(1.67) 
n = 56 
2.80 
(1.62) 
n = 50 
3.61 
(1.90) 
n = 44 
2.67 
(1.57) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
3.45 
(1.55) 
n = 50 
2.74 
(0.47) 
n = 51 
3.57 
(1.72) 
n = 46 
2.99 
(1.72) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 17. Empathy ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 57.51 15   3.83     2.31** .04 
Remorse  4.37 1   4.37 2.63 .00 
Responsibility  2.50 1   2.50 1.50 .00 
Forbearance  0.82 1   0.82 0.49 .00 
Reparations 26.90 1 26.90    16.19*** .02 
Remorse × Responsibility  9.11 1   9.11  5.49* .01 
Remorse × Forbearance  5.07 1   5.07 3.05 .00 
Remorse × Reparations  0.17 1   0.17 0.10 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance  0.13 1   0.13 0.80 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations  0.93 1   0.93 0.56 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations  3.41 1   3.41 2.05 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance  0.10 1   0.10 0.06 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations  0.26 1   0.26 0.16 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations  0.32 1   0.32 0.19 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations  0.23 1   0.23 0.14 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations  0.99 1   0.99 0.59 .00 
Within treatments 1330.60 801  1.66   
Total 7023.22 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 18. Empathy Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
2.03 
(1.02) 
n = 52 
2.46 
(1.25) 
n = 54 
2.34 
(1.07) 
n = 47 
2.91 
(1.39) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
2.51 
(1.24) 
n = 43 
2.53 
(1.19) 
n = 57 
2.63 
(1.55) 
n = 55 
2.94 
(1.30) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
2.57 
(1.15) 
n = 56 
2.91 
(1.33) 
n = 50 
2.43 
(1.24) 
n = 44 
3.05 
(1.63) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
2.56 
(1.34) 
n = 50 
2.93 
(1.47) 
n = 51 
2.43 
(1.09) 
n = 46 
2.66 
(1.13) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 19. Behavioral Intention ANOVA 
 
Source SS df MS F η2 
Between treatments 104.72 15   6.98      3.46*** .06 
Remorse   4.42 1   4.42 2.19 .00 
Responsibility   7.48 1   7.48 3.71 .01 
Forbearance 22.44 1 22.44   11.13** .01 
Reparations 45.41 1 45.41    22.52*** .03 
Remorse × Responsibility   3.83 1   3.83 1.90 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance   0.70 1   0.70 0.35 .00 
Remorse × Reparations   0.00 1   0.00 0.00 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance   5.85 1   5.85 2.90 .00 
Responsibility × Reparations   1.84 1   1.84 0.91 .00 
Forbearance × Reparations   0.04 1   0.04 0.02 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance   0.24 1   0.24 0.12 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Reparations   6.75 1   6.75 3.35 .00 
Remorse × Forbearance × 
Reparations   2.34 1   2.34 1.16 .00 
Responsibility × Forbearance × 
Reparations   0.15 1   0.15 0.08 .00 
Remorse × Responsibility × 
Forbearance × Reparations   1.18 1   1.18 0.58 .00 
Within treatments 1615.16 801   2.02   
Total 26912.72 817    
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Table 20. Behavioral Intention Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.52 
(1.82) 
n = 52 
5.50 
(1.49) 
n = 54 
5.44 
(1.73) 
n = 47 
5.65 
(1.37) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
5.34 
(1.80) 
n = 43 
5.87 
(1.18) 
n = 57 
5.64 
(1.23) 
n = 55 
5.82 
(1.11) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
5.26 
(1.64) 
n = 56 
5.51 
(1.41) 
n = 50 
5.32 
(1.51) 
n = 44 
5.84 
(1.38) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
5.53 
(1.34) 
n = 50 
6.06 
(1.05) 
n = 51 
5.41 
(1.49) 
n = 46 
6.02 
(0.93) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 21. Attribution of Responsibility Mean Scores 
 
 Acknowledgment of 
Responsibility  
Absent 
Acknowledgement of 
Responsibility  
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Absent 
Offer of 
Reparations 
Present 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Absent 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.66  
(1.14) 
n = 52 
3.98 
(1.20) 
n = 54 
4.38 
(1.34) 
n = 47 
4.43 
(1.19) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.11 
(1.51) 
n = 43 
4.00 
(1.23) 
n = 57 
4.14 
(1.44) 
n = 55 
4.29 
(1.11) 
n = 57 
Expression 
of Remorse 
Present 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Absent 
4.24  
(1.22) 
n = 56 
4.02 
(1.22) 
n = 50 
4.16 
(1.20) 
n = 44 
4.21 
(1.22) 
n = 53 
Promise of 
Forbearance 
Present 
4.41 
(1.27) 
n = 50 
4.20 
(1.23) 
n = 51 
4.46 
(1.18) 
n = 46 
4.17 
(1.42) 
n = 49 
Note: Standard deviations for means are in parentheses. 
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Table 22. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting PA 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR .43 .07       .26*** 
 
Communal Relationship .00 .06 .00 
 
Exchange Relationship .01 .04 .01 
 
R2  .07  
 
F   19.73***  
***p < .001. 
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Table 23. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting AA 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR   .43 .06        .30*** 
 
Communal Relationship   .05 .05  .04 
 
Exchange Relationship -.03 .03 -.03 
 
R2  .11  
 
F   33.93***  
***p < .001. 
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Table 24. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting OR 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR   .45 .04        .39*** 
 
Communal Relationship   .24 .04        .24*** 
 
Exchange Relationship -.04 .02 -.06 
 
R2  .34  
 
F  142.39***  
***p < .001. 
 
 
 
252 
Table 25. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting Post-Crisis OPR 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR  .84 .04       .65*** 
 
Communal Relationship  .02 .04 .01 
 
Exchange Relationship -.03 .02 -.03 
 
R2  .44  
 
F  212.70***  
***p < .001. 
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Table 26. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting Anger 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR -.17 .07 -.10* 
 
Communal Relationship -.10 .07 -.07 
 
Exchange Relationship  .07 .04  .06 
 
R2  .03  
 
F      9.48***  
*p < .05. ***p < .001. 
 
 
254 
Table 27. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting Empathy 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR   .41 .05       .32*** 
 
Communal Relationship -.08 .05 -.08 
 
Exchange Relationship -.02 .03 -.03 
 
R2  .08  
 
F   24.89***  
***p < .001. 
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Table 28. Regression Analysis for Pre-Crisis OPR Predicting AR 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
OPR -.15 .05    -.10** 
 
Communal Relationship -.01 .05 -.01 
 
Exchange Relationship  .09 .03     .12** 
 
R2  .04  
 
F   11.03***  
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 29. Regression Analysis for Predictors of Behavioral Intention 
 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
Perceived Apology -.04 .02  -.05 
 
Account Acceptance  .04 .03   .04 
 
Organizational Reputation  .08 .04    .07* 
 
Attribution of Responsibility -.01 .02 -.01 
 
OPR (post-crisis)   .83 .03       .75*** 
 
Anger -.15 .02     -.18*** 
 
Empathy -.10 .02     -.09*** 
 
R2  .76  
 
F  367.37***  
*p < .05. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Theorized Measurement Model of OPR Scale 
 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 6.96, p < .001; GFI = .790; CFI = .817; TLI = .855; RMR = .202; 
RMSEA = .085 (Lo = .082; Hi = .089, PCLOSE < .001) 
Note: The covariance matrix was not positive-definite. 
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Figure 2. Revised Measurement Model of OPR Scale 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 7.849, p < .001; GFI = .752; CFI = .846; TLI = .833; RMR = .207; 
RMSEA = .092 (Lo = .089; Hi = .095, PCLOSE < .001); AIC = 3057.447 
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Figure 3. Final Measurement Model of OPR Scale 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 5.72, p < .001; GFI = .88; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; RMR = .07; 
RMSEA = .08 (Lo = .07; Hi = .08, PCLOSE < .001); AIC = 1041.34 
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Figure 4. Theorized Measurement Model of Apology Reaction Variables 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 7.24, p < .001; GFI = .82; CFI = .87; TLI = .86; RMR = .24; 
RMSEA = .09 (Lo = .08; Hi = .09, PCLOSE < .001); AIC = 2376.05 
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Figure 5. Final Measurement Model of Apology Reaction Variables 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 4.96, p < .001; GFI = .88; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; RMR = .12; 
RMSEA = .07 (Lo = .07; Hi = .07, PCLOSE < .001); AIC = 1300.90 
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Figure 6. Theorized Measurement Model of Behavioral Intentions 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 19.58, p < .001; GFI = .94; CFI = .97; TLI = .94; RMR = .08; 
RMSEA = .15 (Lo = .13; Hi = .17, PCLOSE < .001); AIC = 182.66 
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Figure 7. Final Measurement Model of Behavioral Intentions 
 
 
 
Fit statistics: χ2/df = 6.53, p < .001; GFI = .98; CFI = .99; TLI = .97; RMR = .04; 
RMSEA = .08 (Lo = .06; Hi = .11, PCLOSE = .02); AIC = 52.66 
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Figure 8. Interaction Effects for Perceived Apology 
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Figure 9. Perceived Apology Means by Number of Apology Components 
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Figure 10. Interaction Effects for Account Acceptance 
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Figure 11. Interaction Effects for Organizational Reputation 
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Figure 12. Interaction Effects for Anger 
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Figure 13. Interaction Effects for Empathy 
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Figure 14. Direct Effects of DVs on Behavioral Intention 
 
 
 
Note: All paths significant at the p < .05 level.  
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Figure 15. Effects of DVs on Behavioral Intention Mediated by Anger 
 
 
 
Note: All paths significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Figure 16. Effects of DVs on Behavioral Intention Mediated by Empathy 
 
 
 
 
Note: All paths significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Figure 17. Diagram of Apology Themes 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY ITEMS 
Unless otherwise noted, all items are measured on a 7-poing Likert scale (1= 
strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree). 
Introduction 
This study is designed to test how you would feel if a company you shop with 
online experienced a serious problem. For the purposes of this study, you must 
choose a company with whom you have done business online. All the questions 
in this study will apply to the company you chose. This company may be an 
online-only retailer (e.g., Newegg.com) or a company that does business online 
AND through brick and mortar stores (e.g., Wal-Mart). The only requirement is 
that you have made an online purchase from this company at some point in the 
past. 
 
Past Behavior 
1. Please enter the name or the website of a commercial website where you have 
made at least one purchase in the past:______________________________ 
2. Approximately how often do you visit this retailer’s website in a typical 
MONTH (please type a whole number)? _______________ 
3. Approximately how often do you make an online purchase from this retailer in a 
typical YEAR (please type a whole number)? ______________ 
 
Demographics 
 
1. What is your sex? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
2. What is your race? 
a. Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. Black/African American 
c. Hispanic/Latino/Latina 
d. Native American 
e. White/Caucasian 
f. Prefer not to answer 
g. Other (please specify) ____________ 
3. How many years old are you (please type a whole number)? __________ 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. No high school diploma 
b. High school diploma or GED 
c. 2-year college degree (Associate’s Degree) 
d. 4-year college degree (Bachelor’s Degree) 
e. Graduate or professional degree (Masters, Doctorate, etc.) 
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f. Other (please specify) ____________ 
5. What is your annual household income? 
a. Less than $10,000 
b. $10,000 - $19,999 
c. $20,000 - $29,000 
d. $30,000 - $39,999 
e. $40,000 - $49,999 
f. $50,000 - $59,999 
g. $60,000 - $69,999 
h. $70,000 - $79,999 
i. $80,000 - $89,999 
j. $90,000 - $99,999 
k. $100,000 - $150,000 
l. More than $150,000 
m. Prefer not to answer 
 
6. Which of the following categories best describes your employment status? 
a. Employed, working 1-39 hours per week 
b. Employed, working 40 or more hours per week 
c. Not employed, looking for work 
d. Not employed, NOT looking for work 
e. Retired 
f. Disabled, not able to work 
g. Student 
h. Other (please specify) ___________ 
 
Manipulation checks 
1. [The organization] expressed regret for what happened. 
2. [The organization] took responsibility for what happened. 
3. [The organization] promised this situation would not happen again. 
4. [The organization] offered to repair the damage caused by this situation. 
 
Perceived Apology (adapted from Choi & Lin, 2009b) 
5. [The organization] admitted its fault. 
6. [The organization] accepted responsibility for the situation. 
7. [The organization] sought forgiveness. 
8. [The organization] apologized for the situation. 
 
Account Acceptance (adapted from Blumstein et al., 1974) 
1. [The organization’s] response was believable. 
2. [The organization’s] response was sincere. 
3. [The organization’s] response was appropriate. 
4. [The organization’s] response was adequate. 
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Crisis Responsibility (adapted from Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2007) 
1. Circumstances, not [the organization], are responsible for the situation. 
(Reversed) 
2. The blame for this situation lies with [the organization]. 
3. The blame for this situation lies in the circumstances, not [the organization]. 
(Reversed) 
4. The cause of this situation was something [the organization] could have 
controlled. 
5. The cause of this situation was something that was manageable by [the 
organization]. 
 
Organizational Reputation (adapted from Coombs & Holladay, 2002) 
1. [The organization] is concerned with the well-being of its customers. 
2. [The organization] is basically DISHONEST. (Reversed) 
3. I do NOT trust [the organization] to tell the truth about this situation. (Reversed) 
4. Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what [the organization] 
says. 
5. [The organization] is NOT concerned with the well-being of its customers. 
(Reversed) 
 
Organization-Public Relationship (adapted from Hon & Grunig, 1999) 
Trust 
1. [The organization] treats people like me fairly and justly. 
2. Whenever [the organization] makes an important decision, I know it will be 
concerned about people like me. 
3. [The organization] can be relied on to keep its promises. 
4. I believe that [the organization] takes the opinions of people like me into 
account when making decisions. 
5. [The organization] is known to be successful at the things it tries to do. 
6. [The organization] has the ability to accomplish what it says it will do. 
 
Control Mutuality 
1. [The organization] and people like me are attentive to what each other say. 
2. [The organization] believes the opinions of people like me are legitimate. 
3. In dealing with people like me, [the organization] has a tendency to throw its 
weight around. (Reversed) 
4. [The organization] really listens to what people like me have to say. 
 
Commitment 
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1. I feel that [the organization] is trying to maintain a long-term commitment to 
people like me. 
2. I can see that [the organization] wants to maintain a relationship with people 
like me. 
3. There is a long-lasting bond between [the organization] and people like me. 
4. Compared to other organizations, I value my relationship with [the 
organization] more. 
5. I feel a sense of loyalty to [the organization]. 
 
Satisfaction 
1. I am happy with [the organization]. 
2. Both [the organization] and people like me benefit from the relationship. 
3. Most people like me are happy in their interactions with [the organization]. 
4. Generally speaking, I am pleased with the relationship [the organization] has 
established with people like me. 
5. Most people enjoy dealing with [the organization]. 
 
Communal Relationships 
1. [The organization] does not especially enjoy giving others aid. (Reversed) 
2. [The organization] is very concerned about the welfare of people like me. 
3. I feel that [the organization] takes advantage of people who are vulnerable. 
(Reversed) 
4. I think that [the organization] succeeds by stepping on other people. (Reversed) 
5. [The organization] helps people like me without expecting anything in return. 
 
Exchange Relationships 
1. Whenever [the organization] gives or offers something to people like me, it 
generally expects something in return. 
2. Even though people like me have had a relationship with [the organization] for a 
long time, it still expects something in return whenever it offers us a favor. 
3. [The organization] will compromise with people like me when it knows that it 
will gain something. 
4. [The organization] takes care of people who are likely to reward the 
organization. 
 
Anger (adapted from Lee & Chung, 2012) 
 
(1=not at all; 7 = very much) 
 
1. To what extent do you feel angry toward [the organization]? 
2. To what extent do you feel mad toward [the organization]? 
3. To what extent do you feel irritated toward [the organization]? 
4. To what extent do you feel annoyed toward [the organization]? 
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5. To what extent do you feel outraged toward [the organization]? 
 
Empathy (adapted from Coke et al., 1978; McCullough et al., 1998) 
 
(1=not at all; 7 = very much) 
 
1. To what extent do you feel softhearted toward [the organization]? 
2. To what extent do you feel moved for [the organization]? 
3. To what extent do you feel empathetic toward [the organization]? 
4. To what extent do you feel concerned for [the organization]? 
 
Negative Word of Mouth Intention (adapted from Coombs & Holladay, 2008) 
 
1. I would encourage friends or relatives NOT to do business with [this 
organization]. 
2. I would say negative things about [this organization] to other people. 
3. I would recommend [this organization] to someone who asked my advice. 
(Reversed) 
 
Future Purchase Intentions (adapted from Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Jorgensen, 
1996) 
 
1. I would do business with [this organization] in the future. 
2. I would not shop with [this organization] anymore. (Reversed) 
3. I would continue to buy products from [this organization].   
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APPENDIX B: APOLOGY SCENARIOS 
Scenario 1: No apology 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. Please contact our customer service department if you have any 
questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 2: Remorse only 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. Please contact our 
customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 3: Responsibility only 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We know our customers trust us with their private information 
and we have let you down. Please contact our customer service department if 
you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
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Scenario 4: Forbearance only 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. With the help of computer security experts, we have 
strengthened the security of our computer systems so this will not happen again. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 5: Reparations only 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We are offering a $1 million identity theft insurance policy to 
each customer who has been affected. Please contact our customer service 
department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 6: Remorse + Responsibility 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. We know our 
customers trust us with their private information and we have let you down. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
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Scenario 7: Remorse + Forbearance 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. With the help of 
computer security experts, we have strengthened the security of our computer 
systems so this will not happen again. Please contact our customer service 
department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 8: Remorse + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. We are offering a $1 
million identity theft insurance policy to each customer who has been affected. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 9: Responsibility + Forbearance 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We know our customers trust us with their private information 
and we have let you down. With the help of computer security experts, we have 
strengthened the security of our computer systems so this will not happen again. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
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[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 10: Responsibility + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We know our customers trust us with their private information 
and we have let you down. We are offering a $1 million identity theft insurance 
policy to each customer who has been affected. Please contact our customer 
service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 11: Forbearance + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. With the help of computer security experts, we have 
strengthened the security of our computer systems so this will not happen again. 
We are offering a $1 million identity theft insurance policy to each customer 
who has been affected. Please contact our customer service department if you 
have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 12: Remorse + Responsibility + Forbearance 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. We know our 
customers trust us with their private information and we have let you down. 
With the help of computer security experts, we have strengthened the security of 
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our computer systems so this will not happen again. Please contact our customer 
service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 13: Remorse + Responsibility + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. We know our 
customers trust us with their private information and we have let you down. We 
are offering a $1 million identity theft insurance policy to each customer who 
has been affected. Please contact our customer service department if you have 
any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 14: Remorse + Forbearance + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. With the help of 
computer security experts, we have strengthened the security of our computer 
systems so this will not happen again. We are offering a $1 million identity theft 
insurance policy to each customer who has been affected. Please contact our 
customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
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Scenario 15: Responsibility + Forbearance + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We know our customers trust us with their private information 
and we have let you down. With the help of computer security experts, we have 
strengthened the security of our computer systems so this will not happen again. 
We are offering a $1 million identity theft insurance policy to each customer 
who has been affected. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
 
[Insert company name here] 
 
Scenario 16: Remorse _ Responsibility + Forbearance + Reparations 
 
Dear friend, 
 
[Insert company name here] computer administrators recently discovered that 
hackers have illegally accessed a database containing the personal account 
information of [Insert company name here] customers. Your account is one that 
may be affected. We regret this security breach and apologize for the 
inconvenience and frustration it means for our customers. We know our 
customers trust us with their private information and we have let you down. 
With the help of computer security experts, we have strengthened the security of 
our computer systems so this will not happen again. We are offering a $1 
million identity theft insurance policy to each customer who has been affected. 
Please contact our customer service department if you have any questions. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
[Insert company name here] 
 
 
 
 
